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Human Security in an independent Scotland:
new thinking for new challenges

Independent recommendations on SNP foreign and defence policy

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The recommendations:

- *Place 'human security' at the centre of Scottish foreign and defence policy*
- *Remove Trident and support the development of Scottish and Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zones*
- *Apply to join NATO, but only after a consultation process and if approved in a separate referendum by the Scottish people*
- *To create an effective Scottish Security Force: undertake a credible threat assessment and develop a national security strategy and a unified security budget to match the threats; buy in to NATO's 'Smart Defence' initiative to provide the military component*

- *Establish a Scottish Defence Diversification Agency*
- *To ensure that Scotland's use of armed force is always in conformity with international law, make it a criminal offence in Scotland for any Scottish leader to commit an act of aggression*
- *Select the path of peace when intervening overseas: support Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is not primarily about military intervention*
- *Establish a Scottish Peace Research and Education Centre*

Introduction

A number of political parties, advocacy groups and individuals within Scotland have long been campaigning for Scotland to once again become an independent sovereign state. (Scotland was an independent country from its foundation in the Early Middle Ages until 1707 with the Act of Union). The Scottish National Party (SNP)-controlled Scottish Government has expressed its intention to hold an independence referendum in late 2014, now agreed with the UK Government.

Scotland is located in one of the safest and least threatened parts of Europe. Nonetheless, it is a country with an important strategic legacy, active role in current UK defence affairs and potentially significant future security roles both within and beyond these shores. The most controversial aspect of Scotland's contribution to UK defence is the basing

of the nuclear force at Faslane and Coulport, although 'conventional' base closures and merger of Scottish regiments have also caused resentment.

The SNP is in the midst of a policy review that is seeking to have its long-standing policy of Scotland becoming a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace—which provides for defence co-operation between NATO and non-NATO countries (like Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland)—being dropped in favour of full NATO membership. The issue is due to be debated at the SNP's annual policy conference on 18-21 October in Perth. This briefing paper is a contribution to that debate.

Common adversaries

Many, but by no means all, NATO member states continue to concentrate a disproportionate amount of their scientific, technological and economic might into arming to defend themselves from threats both real and imagined, often using tools (e.g. nuclear weapons and armed drones) and strategies (e.g. 'nuclear deterrence', 'pre-emptive war' and 'targeted assassination') that are themselves a source of global insecurity. Key major powers in the rest of the world have been drawn into this futile search for security through force of arms. Meanwhile, common adversaries have been let loose.

Global warming, the debt crisis and resource distribution problems represent adversaries that no nation can afford to ignore. The list of crises which at best decrease our real quality of life—or our 'human security'—and at worst threaten the very existence of life on this plant seems endless.

These symptoms of our inability to make progress without excessive exploitation of human and natural resources represent the macrocosm of human inability to live at peace with each other. The links are both direct and indirect, as we see ecological crisis feeding political instability, causing conflict and further ecological and developmental crisis. This spiral of destruction is threatening our planet's future.

Citing widespread insecurity, the squandering of vast funds on deadly weapons instead of economic development, and the growing impact of climate change, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that the world is in a race against time to save itself. "This year, I am here to sound the alarm about our direction as a human family," he told the 67th General Assembly at the opening of its annual General Debate. "This is a time of turmoil, transition and transformation – a time when time itself is not on our side."

Clearly, then, to consider military security in a vacuum is to consider it inadequately. Defence must be viewed within a holistic framework of what *really* makes Scotland secure.

A newly independent Scotland would be uniquely placed to provide a security analysis which considers both human and global problems on both a human and global scale. It would be ideally suited to promote an alternative foreign and defence policy, based on a realistic assessment of the need for a radically different approach to defining security in the 21st century. A newly independent Scotland would be in a strong position to bring to bear a fresh approach within existing international security frameworks and to help set a new human security agenda. In practical terms, human security translates into defence which is safer and also cheaper. The following eight practical policy recommendations are suggested for further consideration.

1. Place 'human security' at the centre of Scottish foreign and defence policy

Redefining security means considering new questions: Security for whom? Security from what? Security by which means? Some valuable answers to these open questions have been developed in a relatively new concept, first put forward in the 1994 Human Development Report. 'Human security' is a people-centred approach to global security which recognises that lasting peace and social justice cannot be achieved unless people are protected from threats to basic needs and rights. Ultimately, human security is a shift to a normative framework which emphasises the outcomes of interventions, research and policy frameworks on those for whom it matters most: the people.

(Yes Scotland's first annual Independence rally, Edinburgh, 22 September – photo credit: PhylB/ flickr)

What are the main threats to the Scottish people's security? The list might include: climate change, energy insecurity, an inequitable global economic system, bad governance (at Westminster and Holyrood), corruption, abuse of human rights and violence (see the further discussion in section 4 below).

At its simplest, a human security centred approach requires an understanding of inescapable, interdependent risk. Scotland's security and well-being is dependent upon and cannot be divorced from both the security and well-being of its neighbours in an increasingly globalised world.

A broad human-centric understanding of security puts people and by extension their ecological, economic, social and political circumstances at the forefront of strategic thinking. It also means providing protection

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against all threats to human life, whether they emanate from terrorism, 'rogue states', the spread of nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, energy or infrastructure insecurity, outbreaks of disease or instability arising from deep-rooted poverty and hunger. However, many of these threats are not amenable to traditional ideas of collective defence – or even extended notions of collective defence that have seen greater use in recent years of expeditionary forces in support of 'peace enforcement' or 'humanitarian intervention' missions. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions.

In addition to the growing disutility of military war-fighting solutions to these complex threats and risks, war is itself a dangerous risk-generating social institution to be avoided, rather than pursued. Thus, an independent Scotland could seek to address the traditional mismatch in resources that continues to see the UK Government devote far too much funding to traditional military missions at the expense of the more diverse set of tools needed to address current and future threats. In particular, a newly independent Scotland could recognise the central importance of the funding, practice and prioritisation of conflict prevention, management, resolution and transformation practices.

A more detailed capability guidance document for Scotland (on military capabilities, transformation and planning for a human security-centric approach) is beyond the scope of this briefing, but NATO Watch would be willing to contribute to a study on this issue if there is sufficient interest. Such a study could also explore how Scotland might target security assistance to improve governance, policing and justice in nations scarred by conflict to ensure they do not become failed states and havens for terrorism.

2. Remove Trident and support the development of Scottish and Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

An independent Scotland should work for global abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of nuclear weapons represents an existential threat to humanity and the SNP has a long-standing commitment to combine the vision of nuclear weapon-free Scotland with practical steps for supporting efforts towards a nuclear weapon-

free world. In addition to following through with the 'red line' in Scottish independence politics—the physical removal of Trident from Scottish soil under the shortest possible timeline—an independent Scotland could play a major role in seeking to encourage the incremental, law and treaty-based steps that build confidence and create the atmosphere in which the international community can move with determination towards:

- Zero nuclear weapons (total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons);
- Zero fissile materials (total elimination of the existing stockpiles, and total prohibition on the military and commercial production and reprocessing, of weapons-usable radioactive materials); and
- Zero 'nuclear breakout' (strengthened verification and enforcement mechanisms for policing a nuclear weapon-free world and the running of civil nuclear reactors).

A combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures are needed in each of these three areas. One of the best ways for moving towards a nuclear weapon-free world is via regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs). There are currently five zones covering groups of countries (including their territorial waters and airspace), one UN-recognized zone consisting of a single country, Mongolia, and three governing Antarctica, the seabed, and outer space which are not part of any state. The six land zones cover 56% of the Earth's land area and 60% of the 193 states on Earth (see Appendix A for further details).

An independent and Trident-free Scotland could prioritise international diplomacy to expand upon and link these zones as part of the global menu to achieve nuclear abolition. Additional NWFZs have been proposed, including in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia and Central Europe. These proposed NWFZs differ significantly from previous ones in that they all include or border on *de facto* or declared NWS. They also indicate a transition from a passive but legally protected region to a region where active disarmament is carried out. Establishing a Central Europe NWFZ, for example, would require the actual withdrawal, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. Establishing such a zone in Northeast Asia would require the folding and withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella.

(No to Trident – photo credit: Gareth Harper/ flickr)

Similarly, establishing a Scottish NWFZ would require

active disarmament; namely the withdrawal (if not necessarily the dismantling and destruction) of the UK Trident nuclear weapon system. The situation in New Zealand is probably the most interesting in relation to the potential for establishing a nuclear weapon-free Scotland. In 1984, Prime Minister David Lange barred nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships from using New Zealand ports or entering New Zealand waters. Under the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, territorial sea and land of New Zealand became NWFZs. This led the US Government, which could no longer use New Zealand's ports for its nuclear vessels, to suspend its regional treaty obligations to the country (under the ANZUS agreement). New Zealand's three-decade campaign for a NWFZ is generally seen as an important act of sovereignty, self-determination and cultural identity.

Table 1: Possible Groupings of NWFZs in Europe
Nordic NWFZ: Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, *Scotland* and Sweden **+ Nordic/Arctic NWFZ:** Canada **+ Baltic NWFZ:** Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania **+ Central and Eastern Europe NWFZ:** Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine **+ Balkan NWFZ:** Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia

But If Trident was simply to be relocated to England or Wales the Scottish people, despite acting with reason and sanity, would remain endangered. Thus, a Scottish NWFZ should be part of a process to accelerate UK and European nuclear disarmament. To do this, Scotland should help to resurrect proposals first aired in the 1960s and 1980s for the creation of Nordic and Baltic NWFZs – possibly even extending to Central and Eastern Europe. Today, virtually the entirety of the southern hemisphere is covered by NWFZs. Latin America and the Caribbean led the way in this important achievement. Scotland can lead the way in creating NWFZs in the northern hemisphere.

The exact parameters of the boundary line and formal negotiations of a zone or zones in northern Europe, together with precise obligations, would be a matter to be decided by the political entities constituting the zone(s) and therefore immediately affected by it. To be meaningful, the zone has to encompass all land territories, internal and territorial waters and airspace of participating states. Several possibilities arise as shown by Table 1. A short history of past NWFZ proposals in Europe is contained in Appendix 1.

At a time when people and governments of nearly every persuasion look for better ways to be safe and create the conditions for their children and societies to flourish, the citizens and governments of the world's NWFZs have much to teach an independent Scotland. In a post 9/11 world, it is more important than ever to create regional zones of safety and security that foster co-operation and trust among neighbouring states. Sustaining and expanding NWFZs can lead the way to nuclear abolition and the fulfilment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) promises.

Scotland can lead by example by declaring itself a NWFZ and working for a Nordic or possibly a broader European NWFZ. There will be challenges in developing a Scottish NWFZ, but they pale in comparison to the dangers of Trident replacement and all that entails. The idea of a Nordic NWFZ has been around for over 45 years, yet proposals to establish such a zone have made little headway. But history has shown that the right idea at the right time can capture the public imagination and irrecoverably shift the public mindset – and when that happens, political change that once seemed impossible becomes inevitable. This may be an idea whose time has come.

3. Apply to join NATO, but only after a consultation process and if approved in a separate referendum by the Scottish people

There are three key questions in relation to the issue of NATO membership:

- Would an independent Scotland automatically inherit NATO membership?
- Is the policy of a nuclear weapon-free Scotland compatible with NATO membership?
- Is Scotland better off inside or outside of NATO?

Would an independent Scotland automatically inherit NATO membership?

Probably not. An independent Scotland would be entering unchartered waters with regard to future NATO membership. There is simply no precedent for an existing NATO member state to split into two separate legal entities. In terms of status in relation to international organisations and treaties, international lawyers are divided as to whether a newly independent Scotland could claim to have equal rights with the rest of the UK (RoUK). Some have argued that independence would effectively dissolve the Act of Union and create two new legal entities: RoUK and Scotland. In which case, rather intriguingly, would both of these entities have to apply for NATO membership? Other lawyers argue that Scotland

would be seceding from the UK, the remaining part of which would – like Russia in relation to the Soviet Union – inherit all previous treaty rights and commitments (thereby leaving Scotland to apply for membership of both the EU and NATO). The latter seems the more plausible scenario.

However, much would depend on the status of the discussions and negotiations in the run up to independence. But given that an independent Scotland would probably not have an automatic right to NATO membership, this means that the Alliance would first need to discuss and agree a process for Scottish accession. There are several reasons for believing that a Scottish NATO membership application would not be onerous.

First, the alliance already has a number of on-going fault lines and it would not welcome another one. Hence, the process would likely be much less formal or lengthy than the Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for other aspirant member countries (although NATO would need to be seen to be adopting a level-playing field for all new members). Second, Scotland already meets all the necessary requirements and would be widely seen as continuing its longstanding contribution to core regional goals of security, stability and prosperity. On the other hand, the very fact that there would be some form of process and given also that NATO makes decisions by consensus, it does raise the possibility that the rest of the UK (or another member state) could potentially veto a Scottish membership application. But this would not be without political risks for the RoUK.

NATO's 'open door' policy asserts that "no European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the (Washington) Treaty's objectives will be excluded from consideration". And while there is a precedent of the NATO accession process being held hostage to bilateral grievances—Greece continues to bar the accession of Macedonia until the interminable naming dispute has been settled—it would be politically embarrassing for the RoUK to do likewise in order, for example, to force a reluctant Scotland to continue to host nuclear weapons. It would likely be the RoUK rather than Scotland that would have few allies in Brussels, if it were seeking to trade EU and NATO

membership on the basis that it was politically impossible, to find a suitable alternative location for the warhead storage facility, currently based in Coulport. Indeed, the assertion that it is politically unacceptable for a pro-nuclear RoUK to host nuclear warheads, but acceptable for an anti-nuclear Scotland to do so says much about why Scottish independence is being sought in the first place.

Is the policy of a nuclear weapon-free Scotland compatible with NATO membership?

Yes it is. Some analysts, most notably Malcolm Chalmers (Research Director at the Royal United Services Institute), have argued that it would be "hard to square" acceptance of NATO nuclear deterrence with an expulsion of the UK's nuclear force from Scottish bases. "There would be a fundamental inconsistency in accepting the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's security, but demanding their rapid removal from one's own national territory", he writes. Welcome to the barking mad world of General Jack D. Ripper (of *Dr. Strangelove* fame), where nuclear weapon-related policy-making is resplendent with fundamental inconsistencies and hypocrisies.

(NATO HQ – photo credit: Utenriksdept/ flickr)

Currently, of the 28 NATO member states, only three (the US, UK and France) are Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as defined under the NPT. The other 25 are Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) although 'benefit' from so-called extended nuclear deterrence within NATO. If that sounds like a 'fundamental inconsistency' (and it is), it gets even worse for five of those states (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey - originally seven but US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Greece and the UK) that currently host some 200 forward-deployed US 'tactical' nuclear weapons under a 'nuclear task sharing' arrangement. Although these nuclear sharing arrangements may not be in technical breach of provisions of the NPT—a subject that has been ferociously debated—it certainly violates the spirit of that treaty. It also provides Russia with the perfect excuse to do nothing about its own massive holdings of such weapons.

There is pressure building for change within NATO (so far rather glacial). In its new Strategic Concept,

adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO continues to base deterrence on nuclear and conventional capabilities and retains its nuclear first-use option (but the circumstances under which the deployment of nuclear weapons would have to be considered are described as "extremely remote"). For the first time, the alliance welcomed the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world, but at the same time made it clear that "as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance". Further disarmament steps with regard to tactical nuclear weapons have been linked to reciprocal Russian steps, which are unlikely to happen – hence this is widely seen as a recipe for maintaining the status quo.

As a follow-up to the Lisbon Summit, NATO underwent a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) the outcome of which was announced at the NATO Chicago Summit in May this year. However, the DDPR was undermined by divisions and disagreements among members from the outset. Some, especially in the NATO International Staff and in the US Government, saw it as an opportunity to re-assess comprehensively the required mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence capabilities required by the Alliance. Others, such as the German and Norwegian Governments, saw it as an opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, to support both the nuclear non-proliferation regime and President Obama's Prague 'zero' agenda. France, along with some of the newer member states (on the eastern border with Russia) on the other hand, saw little need for the review and believed change in NATO's approach was not only unnecessary but potentially dangerous to Alliance cohesion.

Thus, the issue was once again kicked into the long-grass at the Chicago Summit, with only some slight modification in NATO nuclear posture to bring it into line with recent changes in US posture. A decision to remove the last remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe seems as remote as ever, despite a large proportion of the alliance not explicitly favouring their continued deployment. A majority of NATO states, experts, NGOs and populations regard the weapons as redundant militarily and of little significance politically. They want the weapons removed.

Some of the host states may well assert their right (like an independent Scotland) to negotiate a plan for withdrawal of these weapons outside of the NATO framework. Does membership of NATO make this more difficult? In part, the answer is yes, but the US tactical nuclear weapons are a historic legacy and one with a direct umbilical cord to NATO. That is not the case with Trident. And despite positive noises from the German, Dutch and Belgium Governments about securing the removal of the weapons, it has not been an issue that has generated sufficient political will for any of the governments to press the issue through bilateral discussions with the US. That would not be the case with an independent Scottish Government.

The bottom line is this: it is feasible for Scotland to have a full membership of nuclear-armed NATO and still be committed to the removal of Trident from Scottish soil. Indeed, Scottish links to NATO—whether as a full member or as a 'partner'—would be largely irrelevant to the tough bilateral negotiations between Holyrood and Westminster that would determine the future of the nuclear force. The people and political leaders of Scotland can themselves take decisions that may seem "hard to square" with existing political realities, but in time help to change the terms of the debate. The whole discussion about Scottish independence, unthinkable only a few years ago, is a case in point.

(NATO Chief of Defence Meeting, Sibiu, Romania, September 2012 – photo credit: NATO)

Would Scotland be better off inside or outside NATO?

Much of the debate about NATO is little short of caricature. There are vociferous critics among both hawks and doves. US hawks, for example, argue that NATO has no cutting edge, is slow to react and weighed down by European freeloaders. Many peace movement doves argue that it is an aggressive war machine dominated by US and military interests. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Put simply, NATO (like the EU) is the sum of its collective parts. There is a constant battle of narratives at play within the Alliance: in the last two decades those narratives have enabled the more progressive actors to play a stronger role in shaping NATO's move away from the relatively fixed and narrow security agenda of the Cold War towards engagement with a broader, more fluid and unpredictable set of security challenges.

But it is understandable that NATO membership is a tough call for SNP (and Scotland as a whole). On the one hand, Scotland could push for reform within NATO and work alongside other progressive nations that are encouraging the transition from a confrontational to a cooperative set of international relationships, in which the military component plays a much smaller role. The message of a new Member State having removed

nuclear weapons from its territory, in compliance with NPT norms, and seeking to positively create a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone could re-generate enthusiasm and galvanism support from other Member States.

Also, given what the UN Secretary General said about the urgency of the global challenges ahead, does Scotland really have the time and resources to try and build the political alliances that would allow it to by-pass NATO while trying to forge alternative security structures? Remaining outside NATO may suit the purists, but is it practicable and would it likely be more or less effective in the longer term? Opinion polls indicate that the majority of the Scottish electorate would prefer to remain in NATO. Without securing independence all the other chatter about alternative and independent security decision-making in Scotland will simply remain as hot air.

On balance, the question of NATO membership should be considered separately and be put to the Scottish people in a referendum after independence has been achieved. And at that point, the Scottish people could have a fundamental debate about the nature of security in the 21st Century and Scotland's role in the world. We live at a time of unprecedented peace in which the risk of a large-scale conventional military attack on Scotland/Britain is at an all-time low. Yet we continue to spend on nuclear and conventional defences as if we are living at a time of unending conflict and remain locked in a mind-set that spending on weaponry provides security. That discussion (at both Westminster and Holyrood) would be unhampered by the independence debate and should be about how, whether in or out of NATO, Scotland can contribute to multidimensional and multinational crisis management missions using a toolbox of military, diplomatic, police, human rights and development aid resources.

Potential security models for Scotland go from unarmed neutrality to armed and full Euro-Atlantic integration (which includes membership of the EU, NATO and OSCE), as shown in Table 2.

There are a small number of sovereign states without any armed forces, but none within Europe (of comparable size to Scotland). The Costa Rican constitution has forbidden a standing military since 1949. It does have a public security force, whose role includes law enforcement and internal security. Andorra has no standing army but signed treaties with Spain and France for its protection. Its small volunteer army is purely ceremonial in function. The paramilitary GIPA (trained in counter-terrorism and hostage management) is part of the national police. Liechtenstein abolished its army in 1868 because it was deemed too costly. An army is only permitted in times of war, but that situation has never occurred. However, the country maintains a police force and a SWAT team, equipped with small arms to carry out internal security duties.

There are four EU member states that have long been associated with the concept of armed neutrality, although Sweden arms itself very heavily while the other three EU 'neutral' states get by with relatively much smaller military capabilities. Most analysts argue that these countries' policies of neutrality were largely abandoned or modified during the Cold War in response to the prevailing security conditions and that all are now aligned to a greater or lesser degree with all the Euro-Atlantic security institutions – including, in the case of NATO, via 'Partnership for Peace'. Norway is only partially integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security structures since it is a member of NATO but not the EU.

Iceland is unique. It has not had a standing army since 1869, but is an active member of NATO. It was party to a defence agreement with the United States, which maintained an Iceland Defence Force and a military base in the country (between 1951-2006), but today the US continues to provide for Iceland's defence, but without permanently basing forces in the country. Even though Iceland does not have a standing army, it still maintains a military expeditionary peacekeeping force, an air defence system, an extensive militarised coast guard, a police service and a tactical police force. There are also agreements about military and other security operations with Norway, Denmark, and other NATO countries.

The final category includes a large number of Scotland's peer group, although again there are considerable nuances between them in terms of how much they each allocate to and how they spend their respective defence and security budgets. Whatever model that Scotland decides to adopt or adapt, the thinking should be preceded by a full and frank debate

by the Scottish people – some of the further principles that might help shape that debate are explored next.

4. To create an effective Scottish Security Force: undertake a credible threat assessment and develop a national security strategy and a unified security budget to match the threats; buy in to NATO's 'Smart Defence' initiative to provide the military component

In terms of conventional force structures the purpose of this paper is not to put forward detailed options for the future. A number of people have already done this. For example, there is much to commend in Malcolm Chalmer's, 'The End of an 'Auld Sang': Defence in an Independent Scotland' (*RUSI Briefing Paper*, April 2012) and Angus Robertson's 'SNP Defence Policy Update' (July 2012). Rather its main aim is to suggest a robust conceptual and procedural framework within which further choices might be made. Three main propositions emerge.

(Fear – Graffiti – photo credit: Jimee, Jackie, Tom & Asha/ flickr)

First, an independent Scotland would need to establish effective machinery for ensuring that its real and continually changing security requirements determine the supply of instruments, military and non-military, capable of meeting those requirements; and not as currently tends to happen within the UK, the other way around. This means undertaking regular and credible threat assessments. The report by Rebecca Johnson, Bill Patterson, Paul Rogers and William Walker, 'No Need To Be Afraid: An assessment of possible threats to Scotland's security and how they should be addressed' (The Jimmy Reid Foundation, October 2012) is the first serious attempt to do so. This paper agrees with many of the report's main conclusions, and especially the central one that "Scotland faces no credible security threat to which the primary response is military".

Within the UK at present, the threat assessment and strategic response are set out in two documents: a National Security Strategy (NSS, October 2010) and a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR, October 2010). The most recent NSS identifies four tiers of threat, with four so-called 'tier one risks': "attacks on cyberspace and cybercrime"; "international terrorism"; a foreign crisis "drawing in Britain" (this refers, among other possibilities, to the risk of being drawn into conflict between Israel and Iran over Tehran's nuclear programme); and natural hazards "such as severe coastal flooding or an influenza pandemic".

Lesser threats listed include attacks from chemical, biological or radiological weapons, "organised crime" and "severe disruption to information collected by satellites". The risk of a "large-scale conventional military attack on Britain" is to be found in the lowest tier category, alongside illegal immigration, and "disruption to fuel supplies or price instability". Thus, both the first credible independent assessment of the threats facing Scotland and the most recent official threat assessments to the UK as a whole, both conclude that there is a low risk of a military attack on these islands.

Second, having evaluated the threats to Scotland, it would be necessary to develop a national security strategy for countering them and a budget to pay for it. For the UK as a whole, however, currently there is a serious mismatch in the list of 'threats' facing modern Britain, as set out in the NSS, and the list of responses detailed in the SDSR. The higher-tier risks identified are increasingly 'asymmetric' threats where there is no obvious enemy for the UK to attack or deter. Instead of missiles and carriers these threats demand regulation, intelligence, policing and civil contingency by largely non-military agencies of government. As David Cameron and Nick Clegg say in the foreword to the NSS, "twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down, the equipment we have is still too-rooted in a Cold War mindset".

The NSS and SDSR did give conflict prevention a high priority and commit more resources to addressing instability in fragile states as far 'upstream' as possible. This was a welcome move away from what the NSS describes as an "over-reliance on military intervention". Yet, despite this and some limited new investment to deal with emerging unconventional threats—such as £500 million for a new national cyber security programme—the shape of Britain's armed forces will continue to be dominated by expensive 'heavy metal' kit, most of which is devoted to fighting or deterring one of the least probable threats: a concerted attack on British soil.

In the context of an independent Scotland, there would be an opportunity for a protracted and radical

look at Scotland's place in the world and to develop a Scottish NSS based on real defence and security needs.

Clearly, breaking up the UK armed forces, and seeking to create a new Scottish Security Force from scratch, will not be easy. But many military capabilities currently possessed by the UK are ones that an independent Scotland would have no need to possess. To some extent, both Malcolm Chalmers and Angus Robertson's papers recognise that fact, although their suggested defence budgets (£2 billion and £2.5 billion respectively) are still predominantly focused on 'hard' security investments.

It is the contention of this paper, however, that somewhere between 50-75% of a 'unified Scottish security budget' (a budget that brings together and allows a comparison of all government security-related spending) should be spent on 'soft' or human security tools and mechanisms. Currently, the UK Government does not provide such a budget breakdown, but Table 3 is a rudimentary first effort that compares existing UK security-related expenditure with what an independent Scotland might look to spend if it were to follow the guidance in this paper.

The development of a unified security budget would allow Scotland to reach an effective balance of the nation's security resources, taking into account inherited hardware and infrastructure (both soft and hard), future funding requirements for military forces and conflict prevention tools (non-military international engagement and human security at home and abroad). Hence, the Scottish MoD budget

(as a percentage of total government expenditure) would be roughly half that of the current UK MoD spend, with compensating increases in all the other departmental spends.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to developing a military-lighter NSS for Scotland is the muddleheaded notion that independent armed forces are at the heart of what it means to be a sovereign country. They are not. And many states rely on others, at least partially, for their protection and an increasing number of states are pooling and sharing their armed forces.

Outside of the United States, notions of independence of action by NATO member states are largely a myth. Former British Army Chief, General Sir Mike Jackson, has said that soldiers can only have one "political master". The General obviously failed to notice that the RAF and Royal Navy were at that time part of a Canadian-led NATO mission in Libya. He also must have overlooked the NSS and SDSR in which even the Coalition Government recognised that Britain cannot go it alone in the world. Indeed, British troops have only operated independently twice in the past 30 years - in Sierra Leone (2000) and in the Falklands (1982). The bulk of UK military activity has been undertaken in co-operation with allies, either within NATO, the EU or 'coalitions of the willing'.

Leaving aside thorny questions as to who were the political masters of the two most divisive military interventions of the last decade (Iraq and Afghanistan), British soldiers have served under many different 'foreign' commands as part of a range of legitimate multinational missions. These include Irish and French commanders when part of a 26-nation EU peacekeeping force to Chad in 2008-09 (just one example of some 27 EU deployments of multinational missions around the world since 1999).

Under its 'Smart Defence' initiative, NATO is seeking to develop a renewed culture of cooperation that encourages Allies to

Table 3: Comparison of UK and Independent Scotland 'Unified Security Budgets'

| | 2010-11 | Example of potential future spend | |
| | UK | UK | Independent Scotland |
Department	£bn	%of total government expenditure	
MoD	39.46	5.7	2.5
DFID	7.69	1.1	1.5
FCO	2.26	0.3	1.0
Security and intelligence services	1.91	0.3	0.5
Justice and Home Affairs*	14.60	2.1	2.5
(*Includes Police/ Fire/ Law Courts/ Prisons/ R&D public order and safety)			
Defence Diversification Agency	n/a	n/a	0.5
Scottish Peace Research and Education Centre	n/a	n/a	0.05
Total Unified Security Budget	**65.92**	**9.2**	**8.55**
Total government expenditure	691.67	100	

Sources: Government spending by department, 2010-11 (Guardian data blog); UK public spending breakdown; and author's own estimates

cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the Alliance's essential core tasks agreed in the new NATO strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.

To promote efficiency and concrete results, the initial 20-25 Smart Defence projects that were endorsed at NATO's Chicago Summit were by small teams and organised with a limited number of participating governments. One of the projects unveiled, for example, is led by Denmark and focuses on the joint management of munitions. Each participating government has the right to draw from the stockpile based on the level of their contribution. Other projects are concentrated on expanding training, for helicopter pilots, ground crews and mountain warfare at an instruction centre in Slovenia.

Such thinking is not just confined to NATO. The EU and the Nordic countries all now share military assets within designated 'battle groups'. Practical examples of this thinking are becoming more visible all the time. NATO countries without combat aircraft, for example, are covered by NATO Air Policing Missions. These take place in the Baltic States (since 2004 and involve 14 countries), Slovenia (since 2004 and involve Italy and Hungary), Iceland (since 2008); and Albania (since 2009 and involve Italy and Greece). Another example is the Dutch government opting last May to disband all of its army's tank battalions, implicitly putting trust in the German Army and others to defend Dutch territory. In exchange, the Netherlands will invest the savings in new ballistic missile defence radars for four Dutch frigates, a capability that would theoretically benefit all Alliance members. (Whether spending on ballistic missile defence represents Smart Defence is another matter).

(Air policing mission in the Baltics – photo credit: Finnish Air Force)

Similarly, 13 NATO members are pooling their money to buy five high-altitude Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance drones. With this purchase, European NATO members will acquire a critical capability that only the United States currently has. Another example is the collaboration of the three Baltic states in creating a peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) and the joint naval squadron (BALTRON). Finally, recent Anglo-French defence cooperation treaties seek to combine several key elements of each sides' militaries. David Cameron described these agreements at the time as a "practical, hard-headed agreement between two sovereign countries".

Smart Defence is an ambitious initiative. It requires counties to accept mutual dependencies, undertake more seed and common funding for multinational projects and (potentially) enter into partnerships with countries outside of NATO. If it works, it could change the way NATO, develops, provides, operates, maintains and uses military capabilities. The initiative is promising but the reality of defence spending cuts, escalating technology costs and longer lead times, together with the poor historical record for transnational procurement programmes (the Eurofighter Typhoon being an exemplar), suggests that it may yet fall short of aspirations.

Could Scotland look to meet a large proportion of its military security needs through pooling and sharing in NATO? One option, for example, is for Scotland to forgo combat aircraft and enter into an air policing arrangement with the RoUK and/or NATO. As part of a quid pro quo, Scotland could invest more heavily in the NATO common funding pool. Nations currently contribute in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on relative Gross National Income. There are three budgets within the common funding arrangements: a civil budget, a military budget and the Security Investment Programme, which pays for NATO installations and facilities.

In 2010-11, the UK contributed about £200 million to NATO's common funding budget (approximately 12% of the total). An independent Scotland could look to equal or better that commitment.

It all comes down to trust: trust that shared defence won't leave some members of the alliance more vulnerable than others. Such profound changes can only be accomplished incrementally and are part of a longer process of transformation. More transparency and openness is also required in the decision-making process. The different national budget cycles and varying military and strategic ambitions among member states add to the complexity. Again, an independent Scotland could be at the forefront of these efforts.

5. Establish a Scottish Defence Diversification Agency

With the levels of defence expenditure set out in this paper, there is likely to be little need for Scotland to maintain a large-scale independent military naval manufacturing sector. There will be a continuing need for some military shipbuilding, both for a revamped Scottish maritime presence and to supply export orders from allies. The size and scale of that commitment needs to be further discussed.

The concept of a Scottish Navy can be a positive symbol for independence; a plausible, real expression of intangible notions such as guardianship of Scotland's marine environment, enabling the fishing industry and supporting engineering jobs. There would be an opportunity to redefine what a Navy does and widen it to environmental protection and sea safety, plus perimeter defence. But even allowing for a revamped Scottish Navy with broad home maritime responsibilities, a comprehensive defence diversification strategy will still be an urgent requirement in order to maintain important technological capabilities and skills, as well as explore alternative uses for redundant bases.

Some of the potential options (for the UK as a whole) were set out in a 2007 study 'Oceans of Work'. It is a re-evaluation of an earlier 1987 study by the same author on behalf of the Barrow Alternative Employment Committee (BAEC), which was part of a campaign by local trade unionists for alternative, civil work to the construction of the Trident ballistic missile submarines at the VSEL shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, West Cumbria.

(Sun and the wind, near Glasgow – photo credit: dmcneil/ flickr)

The 1987 study put forward an ambitious programme to utilise the shipbuilding and engineering skills of the workforce, with particular emphasis on offshore renewable energy, including wave and wind power systems. The 2007 study, two decades later, looked at the same questions (this time with the backdrop of construction of the Trident replacement), and reached similar conclusions: more sustainable and lasting employment could be created by a diversification programme. An independent Scotland could commission a similar study to explore diversification at the Scottish shipyards as part of a 'national needs' agenda, highlighting a fundamental shift from military R&D and procurement to a programme of investment in civil technologies for major objectives like renewable energy and reduced carbon emissions in the face of a global environmental crisis.

6. To ensure that Scotland's use of armed force is always in conformity with international law, make it a criminal offence in Scotland for any Scottish leader to commit an act of aggression

It is in the interest of every nation-state to strengthen the fabric of international law. An effective law-based system of international peace and security is a more enduring guarantor of national and collective security than reliance on a balance of power through military strength. The SNP has already proposed that a new written constitution for Scotland should include an explicit ban on nuclear weapons being based on Scottish territory. Such a constitution (or a separate bill) might also include language to ensure that the use of armed force by Scotland is always in conformity with international law and in particular the UN Charter; and to protect Scottish leaders from external pressure to commit armed forces to any illegal action overseas. A draft bill under consideration in New Zealand offers a potential model for Scotland to emulate.

The crime of aggression has already been incorporated into domestic law in some 25 national criminal codes, including three NATO countries (Germany, Italy and Spain) and Russia. The method of implementation differs, depending upon a country's juridical system. Some have simply implemented the crime as provided for in customary international law. Others have crafted national legislation with a view to protecting specific domestic legal values. In all cases, aggression is treated as exclusively a 'leadership crime'; it cannot be committed by ordinary members of a country's armed forces - only by its most senior political leaders.

It should be stressed that such a non-aggression commitment would not prevent Scotland from undertaking the lawful use of armed force in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence or where authorised by the UN Security Council, including as part of an enhanced commitment

to enforce the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) agenda (see below).

Of course, the lawful use of force often turns on the particularities of each case. But the nexus of failing states and fears of WMD proliferation have led to a lowering of the threshold in the use of force, including deeply misguided and even illegal preventive wars of alleged self-defence. But numerous other options (both military and non-military) are also available, and may be more appropriate and effective in achieving security objectives. The alternatives include diplomacy, conflict prevention, deterrence, containment and collective defence.

A parallel international process to establish the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression is also making progress. There is still much that needs to be done to make this a reality, and the next hurdle is to gain entry into force of an amendment to the Rome Statute that will enable the ICC Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression. That amendment will enter into force when two conditions are met: ratifications by 30 States Parties before 1 January 2017; and a further decision by the States Parties (by consensus or a two-thirds majority) on or after 1 January 2017 to activate the Amendment. Liechtenstein has become the first State Party to deposit its ratification with the UN Secretary-General and other States Parties, including Argentina, Belgium, Botswana, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Peru, Slovenia, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay are expected to follow suit. It is possible and important for Scotland to be one of the 30 States Parties forming the 'activating group'. Implementation of the amendment in Scottish law at an early stage would greatly facilitate ratification.

Had a law, such is proposed in New Zealand, been on the statute books in the UK in 2003, the then British Prime Minister might well have tempered his enthusiasm for a 'war of choice' in Iraq.

7. Select the path of peace when intervening overseas: support Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is not primarily about military intervention

Will Scotland seek to intervene overseas to protect gross violations of human rights? Or will Scots stick their heads in the sand and hope for the best? In Syria, for example, 20,000 civilians (and counting) have been massacred within the last year in a civil war that threatens to destabilize the entire region. When such crises deepen, the tendency is to turn to NATO and to see if it is time use the big stick, military intervention. But the question of intervention should not necessarily be interpreted as, "should Scotland participate in a military intervention"?

The choice is never between doing nothing and creating a firestorm. Under the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which emerged from the human security framework and supports the shielding of populations from mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing) the aim is to promote prevention. It means using all measures, from peaceful to coercive, local, regional and international, to protect civilians. In practice, this means that the UN and its Member States (and organisations like NATO) need to build their capacity to identify mass atrocities and their precipitating factors, and develop the tools necessary to address them before a situation such as Syria occurs.

(Barbed Candle-Protect The Human on the Fourth Plinth - One and Other - performance art in Trafalgar Square, London – photo credit: Feggy Art/ flickr).

For Scotland this would mean developing a prevention policy framework and the institutional capability to implement it. This would not be achieved by increasing the level of rhetoric and the adoption of empty slogans; it would be done through careful and deliberate action. It would mean making the prevention of mass atrocities a national security priority, appointing a senior member of the Scottish cabinet for the prevention of mass atrocities, creating an interdepartmental coordinating office for the prevention of mass atrocities and creating a significant diplomatic and development presence in fragile states. A few states, including the United States, have already done some of these things.

8. Establish a Scottish Peace Research and Education Centre

Small nations can have a big impact on international affairs. For example: Switzerland is home to the International Committee of the Red Cross; Sweden and Norway introduced the Nobel prizes and both countries have peace research institutes of world renown: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), respectively; Finland has a Crisis Management Initiative for mediation; and Ireland has a strong record of contributing to UN missions and agencies, as well as two long-standing centres for

peace and reconciliation work at Glencree and Limerick.

Scotland has a wide range of civil society organisations doing valuable work on peace and justice issues (usually on low and very insecure income), and some individual academics are doing likewise mainly within well-established politics and international relations departments at four Scottish universities (Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and St Andrews). The Scottish Government and Parliament have previously indicated an interest in developing their role in relation to 'soft' or human security, but there is currently no independent body that can provide well-informed advice that is developed from a Scottish perspective.

A Scottish Peace Research and Education Centre (SPREC) could give Scotland the building blocks to develop a positive role in regional and global affairs. The values that should underpin such an undertaking might include:

- *Involvement: enabling people to play their part*. The Centre could be a movement builder and work with the Scottish people at many levels, from the local to global ("Scots abroad"), from the grassroots to decision-makers. Often, the best way to achieve positive change is for people to be involved in the decisions that affect them.
- *Insight: putting across intelligent solutions to peace-building and human security problems*. The Centre could go to the heart of the security challenges facing Scotland, providing clear and credible analysis of the connections between political, economic, environmental and social systems.
- *Inspiration: painting a compelling vision*. The Centre could be a catalyst for change, unlocking new ideas and solutions, and motivating people to take action for themselves.
- *Influence: making change happen*. The Centre should be results-driven, seeking tangible and substantial improvements to the lives of the Scottish people and the rules and systems that shape their security.
- *Independence: free from influence*. The Centre should certainly be honest and free from influence of political, religious or business interests. The Centre's integrity would be vital to its credibility and therefore success.

The core function of such a Centre should be to make peace and human security-related research more accessible to the Scottish policy and research communities, the media, educators and public. Human security has rich implications for research and

policy making in Scotland. A human security programme at SPREC could study these threats and the way they are interlinked.

The Centre could also seek to build links to business, government, NGOs and communities within Scotland and outreach to similar communities in the rest of the UK and around the world. It could promote peace education and non-violent conflict resolution in Scottish schools. It could deliver peace education materials as part of the citizenship module in the national curriculum for Scottish primary and secondary schools. It could also help children and young people develop skills to deal with conflict, anger and stress, with an emphasis on the importance of non-violent conflict resolution in every sphere of life.

It could work with like-minded organisations to broaden and deepen the commitment to various peace initiatives in Scottish life more generally. Not just in education, but in justice, health and other areas, liaising with NHS boards, religious groups, voluntary organisations and other relevant bodies in order to bring forward an integrated strategy for encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes in all fields and promoting education for peace.

The cost of setting up and running such a Centre would be a 10th of the cost of a single F-35 fighter jet and potentially provide a more wide-ranging and effective outcome.

(photo credit: hellothomas/flickr)

Appendix 1: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones – A Backgrounder

The momentum toward nuclear disarmament continues to be fitful. But the obligation to bring about nuclear disarmament does not rest solely with the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). For over six decades, some governments and citizen groups have been developing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), which generally ban the stationing, testing, use or development of nuclear weapons in certain geographic areas. Early efforts focused on unpopulated areas or environments, resulting in treaties covering Antarctica (1959), the seabed (1971) and outer space (1967).

However, the belligerent and fearful atmosphere after the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s prompted the countries of Latin American and Caribbean Region to create the world's first NWFZ Treaty in a populated region. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco set the standard for all subsequent NWFZ treaties, predating and preparing the way for the most widely agreed treaty in the world: the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since 1967, four more NWFZs have been created:

- the 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga, covering the South Pacific (entered into force in 1986);
- the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, covering Africa (entered into force in 2009);
- the 1997 Treaty of Bangkok, covering Southeast Asia (entered into force in 1997); and
- the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk, covering Central Asia (entered into force in 2009).

Each succeeding treaty has been stricter than previous ones, adding to and building on the strengths of earlier ones. The Treaty of Rarotonga, for example, forbids nuclear test explosions. The Treaty of Bangkok prohibits nuclear transport within the Economic Exclusion Zones of treaty parties, and the Treaty of Pelindaba abjures nuclear weapons research. Within existing NWFZs, New Zealand and the Philippines have added national legislation to strengthen protections of their territory. In addition, Austria (1999) and Mongolia (2000) are each single-state NWFZs.

Finally, throughout the world, hundreds of cities and municipalities have made similar NWFZ declarations. While without international legal status, these latter zones generate significant political will and public support for nuclear disarmament and larger regional NWFZs. In the UK, for example, the NWFZ movement started with Manchester Council in November 1980 (which still exists to this day), with other cities and councils following suit. By 1982, around 200 local jurisdictions, including County councils, District councils , City councils (such as the Greater London Council) and all of Wales (under the Nuclear Free Wales Declaration), had declared themselves to be nuclear-free.

Similarly, a number of Canadian cities are NWFZs, including Vancouver and Victoria. Since Canada's Pacific naval base is near Victoria this has caused problems for the US Navy, whose ships carrying nuclear weapons are forced to dock outside of the city limits in order to avoid violating the city by-laws.

Shared Characteristics and Important Functions of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

All existing NWFZs:

- ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in a regional zone of application defined within the treaty;
- exemplify a regional effort to create a common security structure;
- contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, promote nuclear restraint and general and complete disarmament;
- use nuclear materials and facilities under the jurisdiction of the treaty parties for exclusively peaceful purposes;
- commit the parties to abstain from carrying out, promoting, or authorising, directly or indirectly, the testing, use, fabrication, production, possession, or control of all nuclear weapons or to participate in these activities in any form;
- prohibit the receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any form of possession of all nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly by any of the parties, by order of third parties or by any other means;
- place all regional facilities under the inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
- enjoy security assurances granted to them by the NWS through NWFZ treaty protocols.

Past Proposals for a Nordic and other European NWFZs

As early as 1958, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki, proposed that Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany reject the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories and join in a NWFZ. In 1961, the Swedish government tabled what became known as the Undén Plan (named after the Swedish Foreign Minister) at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. This supported the idea of nuclear-free zones, and in 1963, President Kekkonen of Finland endorsed and elaborated on the proposal. The Norwegian premier responded by suggesting that parts of the Soviet Union also be included in the zone (since Denmark and Norway were both non-nuclear

members of NATO). During the period of détente in the early 1970s, the Kekkonen proposal was revived and actively pursued between 1972 and 1975. Romania also proposed the denuclearization of the Balkans and the Soviet Union proposed a Mediterranean NWFZ. A third set of proposals came from Kekkonen in 1978, just as the nuclear temperature in Europe was rising. But throughout this fifteen-year period, the response from the other Scandinavian countries was guarded, at best.

More proposals were advanced for a NWFZ in the early 1980s, as a response to the proposal to deploy nuclear cruise missiles in European NATO. These were mainly advanced by Norway and Sweden, but this time public opinion throughout the Nordic region was strikingly anti-nuclear and the campaign for a Nordic NWFZ enjoyed widespread popularity. The campaign was channelled through many different organizations, including the unions, the churches and the major political parties. By June 1982, a petition started eight months earlier calling for the creation of a Nordic NWFZ had been signed by 2.75 million people throughout the region. In October 1981, demonstrations in 54 Finnish cities and towns drew 130,000 participants. In Norway, a country of only 4 million people, over 100,000 people joined a 'No to Nuclear Weapons' organization, which was endorsed by the Norwegian TUC. 540,000 Norwegians signed a petition in support of a Nordic NWFZ and by late 1983, 11 (out of 19) Norwegian counties and 93 (out of 440) had adopted NWFZ resolutions. A Danish petition garnered 260,000 signatures, one in Sweden more than a million and in Finland some 1.2 million.

In October 1981, 38 residents of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania (then part of the Soviet Union) also issued an "Open Letter" calling for the inclusion of the Baltic republics in a Nordic NWFZ. Despite arrests of some of the signatories, Estonian activists repeated the call in December 1983.

With the election of Olof Palme as Prime Minister in 1983, commitment to a Nordic NWFZ became official Swedish policy. At an address to the North Atlantic Assembly later that year Palme called for a nuclear weapon free corridor in Europe and a Nordic NWFZ. These efforts also led to a broader disarmament effort known as the Five Continent Peace Initiative, which was launched in May 1984 by the Heads of State of six nations: Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.

In 1987 the Nordic foreign ministers established a working group to review NWFZ proposals, and in April 1988, the Danish parliament passed a resolution requiring foreign warships to proclaim that they were nuclear free before being allowed to enter Danish ports. This set off a crisis in Danish-US relations (similar to that between New Zealand and the US described above). Iceland also told the US government that it would not allow ships carrying nuclear weapons into its harbours. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 effectively buried the idea of a Nordic NWFZ since the perception then was that such a zone was unnecessary in the new world order. Nonetheless, in 1996, Ukraine and Belarus, which had formerly hosted Soviet nuclear weapons, proposed a NWFZ for Central and Eastern Europe, although this was opposed by those former Warsaw Pact states with aspirations to join NATO.