



# Briefing Paper No.14

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*Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO*

## NATO Reform Lite: An Evaluation of the Lisbon Summit (Part I)

New Alliance blueprint oversold as a transformation – NATO 3.0 – when much of it is a slow-cooking evolution

Afghanistan exit strategy masks divisions over conduct of war, lessons learnt and pace of withdrawal

Russian re-set built around missile defences, cooperation in Afghanistan and a future joint security review



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Note: Part II will provide a post-summit guide to NATO decisions in relation to 'crisis management' and 'cooperative security'

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## Official Documents of the Lisbon Summit

- **Active Engagement, Modern Defence** - Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of NATO, 19 November
- **Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership**, 20 November
- **Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan**, 20 November
- **Lisbon Summit Declaration**, 20 November
- **NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement**, 20 November
- **Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions**, 20 November

## Headline Decisions

- A new Strategic Concept was adopted that will serve as the Alliance's roadmap for the next ten years. It seeks to refocus NATO on three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. In doing so, it reconfirms "the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack" as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security and also sets out the case for developing new capabilities to defend against "new threats to the safety of our citizens" such as ballistic missile and cyber attacks.
- To this end, NATO agreed to develop the capability to defend European territory and populations against missile attack as a core element of collective defence and extended an offer to Russia to cooperate in this project.
- Despite some subtle changes in language, nuclear weapons *policy* within the Alliance remains largely unchanged: the new Strategic Concept commits NATO to "the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, while reconfirming that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance" – a future 'deterrence review', vaguely described in the Summit Declaration (and without any timeline) offers the potential to address the impasse over tactical nuclear weapons.
- Euro-Atlantic security is to be promoted through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe, such as the United Nations and the European Union. NATO is open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern and will offer them "a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute". A "more efficient and flexible partnership policy" is being developed for the April 2011 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin.
- The Alliance will seek to streamline its military command structure and make NATO more efficient.
- A process was launched by which Afghan security forces will increasingly take the lead for security operations across the country, starting in early 2011. This "conditions-based, not calendar-driven" transition process was supported by the 28 NATO Allies and the 20 partners who are contributing forces to the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The transition process is expected to be completed by the end of 2014, although NATO officials acknowledge that allied forces would remain in Afghanistan, in a "non-combat" role, well beyond that date.
- The NATO Secretary General signed a separate agreement with President Karzai on a long-term partnership between the Alliance and Afghanistan that will endure beyond the combat mission. With this partnership, NATO commits itself to stay "as long as necessary" to support Afghanistan until it can no longer become a safe haven for terrorism.
- A fresh start in relations with Russia was made, with the aim of building a true strategic partnership. The NATO-Russia Council reached three specific agreements: to undertake a joint review of 21st century security threats as a basis for further cooperation; a resumption of theatre missile defence cooperation; and enhanced cooperation in the stabilisation of Afghanistan.
- NATO Heads of State will meet again in the United States in 2012 to review progress.

# Summary Assessment

## Strategic Concept

At the Lisbon Summit NATO leaders signed off on a new strategic doctrine, the first since 1999, intended to explain to over 900 million citizens in the 28-member Alliance why it still matters. Strategic concepts set out the military and political guidelines for NATO. During the Cold War, Alliance strategic concepts were predominantly military documents and remained classified, but those published since (in 1991 and 1999) were essentially a tool of public diplomacy. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the new [Strategic Concept](#) meant that NATO would “continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security”.

The Secretary General also referred to it as an ‘Action Plan’, although the truth is that it looks more like an inaction plan, or at best a delayed action one, than the kind of energised, collective agreement that was needed. Alliance officials are quick to point to the difficulties in securing change within an intergovernmental organisation that works by consensus – and one need look no further than NATO’s Brussels-based neighbour, the EU, and the prolonged Lisbon Treaty process, to recognise the complications and pitfalls.

Moreover, summits are invariably as much about continuity as they are change – and this one was no exception. But the Secretary General has made no secret of his ambition to be the great reformer of the Alliance and he flagged Lisbon as an opportunity to move towards NATO 3.0 (borrowing from computer jargon, the Alliance of the Cold War era is described as NATO 1.0 and the changes after 1990, when the Alliance embarked on an era of overseas stabilisation missions, as NATO 2.0). However, the outcomes in Lisbon appear to provide too much continuity and too little change: a NATO Reform Lite – or NATO 2.1 – rather than the blueprint for a strategic transformation.

In many respects, the document is not dramatically different to the previous Strategic Concept, which also contained an awareness of evolving and changing threats and the need to balance traditional Article V defence of all NATO members with new and emerging security challenges. But over the past ten years there has been a further evolution in the security environment (not least, as a result of 9/11, and subsequent reactions to it) and the new strategy attempts to keep pace with those changes. At just under 4,000 words and set out in 38 paragraphs, the new strategic document has some good intentions, expressions of cooperation and commitments to make future commitments. And these are supplemented by the [Summit Declaration](#), which at just under 7,000 words and 54 paragraphs adds a little more colour to the mix

– although attempting to make sense of the two documents as a ‘package’ is not always easy (as can be seen in the detailed assessment below). In addition, many of the common denominators appear to hit new lows: containing just enough substance for the Secretary General to present the policy reforms as an important step in the right direction, but often vague enough to paper over the cracks in unity within the Alliance. In sum, many key questions are left hanging for another day.

On nuclear issues, for example, if there had been no mention of a commitment “to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” it would have been a slap in the face for those political leaders who have been pressing for the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as part of the ‘global zero’ agenda. But in reconfirming the centrality of nuclear deterrence for “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world”, the subsequent commitment to also “seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future” falls well short of the kind of bankable assurances that nuclear reformers sought – although a promised ‘deterrence review’ does provide some succour to the glass half-full brigade, despite being vaguely articulated.

In an attempt to reconcile divergent member state positions, similar contradictions and compromises are scattered throughout the Strategic Concept and Summit Declaration. Broader non-traditional security threats to NATO and its populations are now said to include ballistic missile proliferation, potential cyber attacks, terrorism, failed states and energy vulnerabilities, yet the idea of collective defence remains the core organising principle. The threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is described as “low”, but the document goes on to argue that it “cannot be ignored”, since “many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area”.

However, there is no self-awareness of the major role played by NATO member states in exporting destabilising quantities of weapons to conflict regions. The recently [proposed \\$60bn US arms sale to Saudi Arabia](#), the biggest in US history, for example, is in keeping with a track record that regularly sees NATO nations at the forefront of military arms exports. Indeed, the current top four arms suppliers to the Middle East are the US, France, Germany and Britain, the very NATO powers that are falling over themselves to warn the ‘international community’ of the “threat posed by Iran”. Similarly, seven of [the top 15 countries with the highest military spending in 2009](#) were from the Alliance, and collectively NATO accounts for over 60% of the global total of military

spending. Ballistic missile technology also continues to proliferate horizontally in NATO member states as a result of upgrades to strategic nuclear weapon systems and initiatives such as [Prompt Global Strike](#).

More promising, perhaps, is NATO's commitment to work to "*prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations*" and pledge closer cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union. However, it remains to be seen whether the gap between NATO enthusiasm for conflict prevention in principle and its selective application in practice can be bridged – especially since the failing counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan hangs over the new document like a bad smell.

Indeed, it is far from clear that the right lessons are being drawn from experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept commits NATO to "*further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations*" and "*develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones*". In addition, civilian-military planning will be enhanced, and there will even be "*an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability*". Some of this makes sense, at least on paper – although before NATO develops any sort of counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine it needs to properly evaluate its record in Afghanistan (since it may well conclude that COIN is a worthless currency for an Alliance being recast as "*fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges*").

## Afghanistan

The Lisbon Summit also marked the beginning of the end of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan – or possibly not. Amidst the tightly choreographed coming together of all the main international governmental actors with a stake in that war-torn country, a process was launched by which, according to Rasmussen, "*the Afghan people will once again become masters of their own house*". He went on to explain that "*starting early next year, Afghan forces will begin taking the lead for security operations. This will begin in certain districts and provinces, and based on conditions, will gradually expand throughout the country. The aim is for the Afghan forces to be in the lead country-wide by the end of 2014*".

However, almost before the ink was dry on the 2014 deadline, it began to fade into the shadows (rather like President Obama's earlier commitment to begin bringing American troops home in July 2011). Officials were quick to establish the [aspirational](#) nature of this goal, which would not see *all* NATO troops head for the exits, only 'combat troops' – and probably not all of them (especially those flying the Stars and Stripes and

engaging in an ongoing [base-building surge](#)). In keeping with the Iraq model, where 50,000 US 'non-combat' troops remain in situ, tens of thousands of NATO and US trainers and other so-called non-combat forces are likely to stay to help with the 'transition process' as part of the [Enduring Partnership](#) agreement signed in Lisbon.

Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, also [claimed](#) that the US would need to maintain a "*counterterrorism capability*" in Afghanistan (in addition to the one in Iraq) beyond 2014. Meanwhile, Mark Sedwill, NATO's leading civilian representative in Afghanistan, while claiming that children were [safer in Kabul than in Glasgow](#) also suggested that Afghans could face "*eye-watering violence*" after troops leave. He insisted, therefore, that 2014 was nothing more than "[an inflection point](#)" in an ever more elastic withdrawal plan. And topping them all, the new British Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, says that NATO should be preparing plans to maintain troops in Afghanistan for the [next 30 to 40 years](#).

"*Staying for as long as it takes*" is preferable to 'cutting and running', but only if the "*active engagement*" is underpinned by a genuine political settlement, as argued in a [report](#) by a group of leading development, human rights and conflict prevention organisations. The authors' argue that a new approach is needed that puts reconciliation and the drive for a comprehensive peace settlement at the heart of the international strategy on Afghanistan. This means dropping the present pre-condition that the main insurgent groups should disarm first (or be defeated in battle). It also requires a change of military tactics to support confidence-building towards peace (for example, through locally-negotiated ceasefires or suspending widely-resented tactics like night raids in particular areas).

However, reports on the ground suggest that the opposite is happening and most of the current news makes grim reading. Having earlier in the year implemented a welcome shift from high-intensity to low-intensity and non-kinetic warfare, the policy has been reversed in a major way. In October, NATO planes launched missiles or bombs on [1,000 separate Afghan missions](#), numbers rarely witnessed since the 2001 invasion. A [powerful artillery system](#) has also been deployed in the area around the southern city of Kandahar and [tanks are about to be introduced](#) to the conflict for the first time (the M1 Abrams tank has a "main gun that can destroy a house more than a mile away" and in an echo of the war in Iraq, is expected to bring "awe, shock, and firepower" to the fight). Night raids on Afghan homes by "*capture/kill*" teams have [tripled](#) with 1,572 such operations over the last three months. Previously reticent NATO commanders are now also proclaiming their 'successes' in [killing or](#)



[capturing insurgent leaders](#): across Afghanistan 19 Taliban leaders and 252 lower-level fighters were killed or captured between 15 and 21 November, with a further 387 insurgent commanders reported as having been killed or captured in the three months before 18 November. In the districts around Kandahar, a [new tactic of the US military](#) is simply to flatten houses or even whole villages believed to be booby-trapped by the Taliban. Unsurprisingly, therefore, civilian and NATO casualties are rising rapidly: another [inter-agency report](#) says that this has been the most deadly year for Afghan civilians since the Taliban regime fell nine years ago.

None of this, of course, has anything to do with winning hearts and minds. Nor is it conducive to developing the comprehensive peace settlement envisaged in the NGO report. Rather, it suggests that COIN may be creating anti-Western jihadists faster than it is killing or capturing them. And at \$100 billion a year (seven times the GDP of Afghanistan) the cost of the war already [exceeds the cost of the Vietnam and Korean Wars combined](#) and is feeding a deficit that will eventually take an additional human toll across the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond.

### **Conclusion: two essential missing ingredients - human security and transparency**

What might a real NATO 3.0 blueprint for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century look like? At a [Shadow NATO Summit](#) organised by civil society groups in Brussels last week a fledgling draft [Citizens Strategic Concept](#) set out some initial ideas on how to move NATO forward from conventional security logic—the security of borders and the role of military forces—and to think in terms of human security. Work on this civil society initiative continues (the draft is now open for discussion and revision) with the aim of building a policy platform based on a range of existing initiatives and ideas rather than reinventing the wheel. Mary Kaldor, Co-Director of the Centre for the [Study of Global Governance](#) and Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, for example, have [urged](#) the EU to seize the opportunity offered by Russian President Medvedev's initiative for a new post-cold war security order to propose a human security architecture for Europe. They conclude that despite all the various security organisations, "our ability to keep people safe in the region as a whole, or to contribute to security in the rest of the world, is at best ad hoc and at worst non-existent". There is no reason why NATO cannot also seize this initiative – and do so in partnership with the EU and Russia.

The human security approach is based on protecting individuals worldwide from a range of risks (violence, natural disasters, famine or

disease, for instance) using a mixture of military and civilian forces under international authorisation. This human security approach needs to be complemented by strong parliamentary and public oversight of NATO affairs. Unfortunately, the opposite is currently the case. In particular, the role of national parliaments in their most important function—of assenting to policy—is particularly underdeveloped. Many parliaments simply lack the power of prior authorization of national involvement in NATO military operations or of determining the length of time of any such deployment. Given the proliferation of NATO missions, this is a significant failing. And because NATO lacks a dynamic treaty base (the North Atlantic Treaty remains essentially unaltered since its adoption in 1949) and legal system (akin to the EU) parliaments are rarely afforded the opportunity to debate and decide upon major initiatives within the Alliance. Executive prerogative often renders the positions of NATO members (and thus the eventually decisions reached within the Alliance, including those last weekend in Lisbon) out of reach of parliamentary oversight.

The [Expert Group](#) headed by Madeleine Albright recognised that this had to change and called for the Alliance to strive to attract and maintain public and legislative backing for its operations through "*transparency and effective public communications*", but without setting out how this might be achieved. The Lisbon Summit remained silent on this issue, however. So what should be done? First, national parliaments in member states need to sharpen their scrutiny of NATO affairs. At a minimum, this means establishing permanent standing parliamentary committees in each member state dedicated to NATO. Second, the democratic mandate of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly needs to be strengthened. In particular, there needs to be greater accountability and openness about how members are selected. Third, NATO should adopt an information openness policy consistent with the access to information laws already in place in the Alliance's 28 member countries. Such a policy should include guidelines for proactive publication of core information, a mechanism by which the public can file requests for information, and an independent review body for hearing appeals against refusals or failures to make information public within a short time-frame. And finally, since NATO was unwilling to publish a working draft of the Strategic Concept in advance of the Summit, Member State Parliaments should take it upon themselves to discuss and ratify the documents agreed in Lisbon.

In order to deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance, NATO needs to become closer to its citizens. This means an updated, more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expectations. It means

reforms that less heavily distort NATO towards Pentagon interests. It means convincing public opinion that terrorist attacks sometimes need to be absorbed with a degree of phlegm and self-control in order to avoid even greater blowback from overreactions. It means combating terrorism with everyday policing, intelligence sharing and

the rule of law rather than drone attacks. It means refocusing the military on the fundamentals of 'proper soldiering': safeguarding human security, peacekeeping and disaster relief. And above all else, it means looking in the mirror and putting our own house in order.

## Post-Summit Guide to Key NATO Reforms and Policy Changes

### 1. NATO reform

#### What was agreed?

Strategic Concept (Para 37) *NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:*

- *maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets;*
- *ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;*
- *develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;*
- *preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;*
- *engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.*

#### Summit Declaration

(Para 49) *We have agreed a framework for a new NATO Command Structure, which will be more effective, leaner and affordable. It will also be more agile, flexible, and better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5 contingencies and providing visible assurance. The new structure represents a significant reduction in the number of headquarters and a manpower saving of 35%, representing almost 5,000 posts, or more, if and where possible. It will have a new relationship with our national headquarters, and will also ensure a regional focus. A final decision on a new NATO Command Structure, including its geographic footprint, will be taken no later than June 2011, and we have tasked the Secretary General to prepare proposals to this end.*

(Para 50) *For the NATO Headquarters, we welcomed progress towards a structure and organisation which can best deliver informed timely advice for our consensual decision-making. We welcome the reform of intelligence support, and the Secretary General's initiative on emerging security challenges. His review of personnel requirements will also be key in achieving demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings. In the coming months, we look forward to further improvements, including co-location of military and civilian staff wherever possible, on a functional basis, to achieve more coherent advice to shape Alliance decisions.*

(Para 51) *NATO's Agencies are making a valuable contribution to addressing the Alliance's most pressing capability needs. We have approved the consolidation and rationalisation of the functions and programmes of the NATO Agencies into three Agencies, and task the Council to prepare a plan for implementing this reform, with a view to achieving improved governance, demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings, focusing on outputs, taking into account the specific needs of multinational programmes, for approval by Defence Ministers in March 2011. The plan should include a quantified target for savings, while preserving capability and service delivery, in particular support to operations. Agreed proposals should then be swiftly implemented. A decision on the recommended major geographic footprints will be presented to Defence Ministers at the March 2011 Ministerial, with the finalised geographic footprints presented for decision by the June 2011 Ministerial.*

(Para 52) *Resource reform will underpin our broader transformation efforts. As responsible and reliable Allies, we are committed to reforming the way in which NATO's common funded resources are managed. Accordingly, we welcome progress in this area. The implementation of improved financial management, accountability and oversight is an essential element of comprehensive resource management reform. This ensures a clear proactive and continuous process to balance resources and requirements in order to sustain*

more efficiently the Alliance's integrated structures, support our commitment to operations, and deliver our highest strategic priorities.

(Para 53) *We task the Secretary General and the Council to take forward the reform process in all necessary areas without delay, including the implementation of: Reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; comprehensive Resource Management Reform; Headquarters Reform, including the new Headquarters project; and an end-to-end rationalisation review of all structures engaged in NATO capability development. We further task the Council to report back to Defence Ministers by March 2011 and subsequent Defence Ministers' meetings, on progress on this package of measures and possible additional steps necessary to ensure an Alliance capable of delivering on our new Strategic Concept*

## Assessment

Billed as “far-reaching”, the reforms of the NATO Military Command Structure and the agencies that provide essential capabilities and services to NATO armed forces are expected to result in “a strengthened Alliance”. The number of higher-end headquarters will be reduced from eleven to seven with a reduction of military personnel by nearly one third. It was agreed that NATO agencies are an essential part of the Alliance and will remain a vital mechanism for procuring and sustaining capabilities collectively or in groups. However, the number of such agencies is being reduced (from fourteen to three) in order to achieve greater synergy and efficiencies. Implementation plans are expected to be approved at future Ministerial meetings in spring and summer 2011.

The commitment to “*providing visible assurance*” and a “*regional focus*” suggests that part of the new geographic footprint of the headquarters may be located in Eastern Europe, where a lack of such visibility has been a major irritant to many political leaders in that part of the Alliance. Overall, however, this is very much work in progress and a continuation of earlier reorganisations (such as the earlier creation of [Allied Command Transformation](#), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia). But as mentioned in the summary assessment above, these reforms are severely weakened by the absence of any new initiatives to enhance oversight and accountability. How will we know when the Alliance becomes more [effective, engaged and efficient](#)? When the Secretary General announces it one of his [video blogs](#), one presumes.

And as US Secretary Gates has found with a similar effort at reducing bureaucracy and rationalising infrastructure in the United States, it is often more difficult in practice. Clearly, NATO currently has too many committees and agencies, and if it does end up reducing them while preserving the infrastructure's ability to do what the Alliance needs to do, that would be a very positive step forward. Paradoxically, having warned Alliance members about cutting back too much on common defence projects and architecture, the Secretary General is himself overseeing extensive cuts that are likely to raise serious questions about future NATO capacity to manage current operations, much less the emerging security challenges that are set out in the Strategic Concept. NATO's long-term coordination capability is one of its unique selling points, yet in several key areas it remains understaffed (it has only one UN liaison officer in New York, for example).

## 2. Collective defence and arms control

### 2.1 Improving capabilities

#### What was agreed?

Strategic Concept (Para 19) *We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:*

- *maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;*
- *maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;*
- *develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance's expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;*
- *carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;*
- *ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;*
- *develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;*

- further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
- sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
- continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

#### Summit Declaration

(Para 3) *We pledge to support our veterans. To further advance this important objective, Allies will share, where beneficial, national best practices and lessons learned*

(Para 43) *Having adopted a new Strategic Concept, we have tasked the Council to develop Political Guidance for the continuing transformation of our defence capabilities and forces and the military implementation of our new Strategic Concept for approval by Defence Ministers at their meeting in March 2011*

(Para 44) *We reaffirm our resolve to continue to provide the resources, including the forces and capabilities required to perform the full range of Alliance missions. Particularly in light of these difficult economic times, we must exercise the utmost financial responsibility over defence spending. We are determined to pursue reform and defence transformation and continue to make our forces more deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and thus more usable. We will ensure that the Alliance is effective and efficient. In this context, we welcome the outcome of the France-United Kingdom Summit on 2 November 2010 which will reinforce their security and defence cooperation by introducing innovative methods of pooling and sharing. We believe that such bilateral reinforcements of European capabilities will contribute to NATO's overall capabilities.*

(Para 45) *We have endorsed the Lisbon package of the Alliance's most pressing capability needs and thereby provided a renewed focus and mandate to ensure these critical capabilities are delivered within agreed budgetary ceilings and in accordance with the Alliance's defence planning process. The Lisbon package will help the Alliance to:*

1. *Meet the demands of ongoing operations – including through developing further capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices, and the greater use of collective logistics for medical support and other operational requirements.*
2. *Face current, evolving and emerging challenges – including through expanding the current theatre missile defence programme, and defending against cyber attacks.*
3. *Acquire key enabling capabilities – including information systems for more effective decision-making and command and control, and improved arrangements for sharing intelligence.*

(Para 46) *We have tasked the Council, in time for the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in March 2011, to conduct further conceptual work on multinational approaches and other innovative ways of cost-effective capability development. We welcome cooperation with the EU, as agreed. Together, and avoiding unnecessary duplication, we will continue to address common shortfalls, which include the areas of countering improvised explosive devices, providing medical support and increasing the availability of heavy-lift helicopters*

#### Assessment

There is a lot to unpack here. Many of the individual capability commitments (in relation to missile defence, nuclear weapons, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security and arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation) are discussed in more detail below. NATO has been seeking to improve its [capabilities](#) for many years in order to drive change. The 'new' capabilities package presented at Lisbon, therefore, appears to be a mix of old and new requirements – although details of the package remain classified. It would have been drawn up by the military planning staffs of the Allied Command Operations and the Allied Command Transformation well in advance of the Summit. Various operational requirements or 'wish lists' would have



been identified and bundled into a Capability Package, which NATO military and civilian decision-makers reviewed in detail based on guidance from officials in Member States. By the time of the Summit, therefore, Heads of State were simply required to 'rubber stamp' the package. And to put it into perspective, NATO has approved over 100 capability packages and several more are formally under review at any given time, along with numerous addendum and revisions to previously approved packages.

The key question is whether the capability packages are at last moving away from Cold War thinking and scenarios. In short, has NATO the courage to stop unnecessary projects so that budgets can be freed up and switched to more relevant requirements? Without greater transparency this is a difficult question to answer. Similarly, reforms to the procedures for acquiring and managing capabilities make sense *if* they do lead to greater multinational or coordinated and functionally integrated defence planning and procurement. The proposed French-UK cooperation cited in the Summit Declaration may be a step in the right direction (it is still too early to tell), yet the overall record of multilateral procurement within NATO (and the EU, for that matter) is poor. The experience of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in stimulating international collaboration, and of OCCAR in managing it, is not encouraging. More will no doubt be revealed by the next round of Political Guidance due to be agreed at the March 2011 Defence Ministers meeting

Finally, the pledge to support veterans, while welcome, has the feel of a last minute addition. While this is undoubtedly an important objective much still needs to be done to turn patriotic rhetoric in support of troops into more visible and concrete care for veterans. For example, [three times as many US veterans are dying soon after returning home than are being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined](#). A good place to start in lessons learnt, therefore, would be to end the practice of [deploying wounded and traumatised troops into war zones](#).

## 2.2 Missile defence

### What was agreed?

Strategic Concept (Para 19). *[We will]... develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners*

#### Summit Declaration

(Para 36) *The threat to NATO European populations, territory and forces posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing. As missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, we have decided that the Alliance will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its core task of collective defence. The aim of a NATO missile defence capability is to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.*

(Para 37) *To this end, we have decided that the scope of NATO's current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme's command, control and communications capabilities will be expanded beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory and forces. In this context, the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture, as are other possible voluntary contributions by Allies. We have tasked the Council to develop missile defence consultation, command and control arrangements by the time of the March 2011 meeting of our Defence Ministers. We have also tasked the Council to draft an action plan addressing steps to implement the missile defence capability by the time of the June 2011 Defence Ministers' meeting.*

(Para 38) *We will continue to explore opportunities for missile defence co-operation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence. We reaffirm the Alliance's readiness to invite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking current and planned missile defence systems at an appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways. NATO missile defence efforts and the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach provide enhanced possibilities to do this. We are also prepared to engage with other relevant states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase missile defence mission effectiveness.*

### Assessment

One of the main headline announcements at Lisbon was the decision to move ahead (at least on paper) with the development and eventual deployment of a [missile defence](#) system to protect "NATO European

populations, territory and forces”, in other words, the entire continent. It was initially signposted back in September 2009 with President Obama’s [announcement](#) of a ‘phased adaptive approach’ for missile defence in Europe and the missile defence industrial lobby together with the NATO public diplomacy machine have been relentlessly championing it ever since. But will it ever get off the ground? At a time of fiscal restraint and drastic reductions in defence expenditures across the Alliance, it is a bizarre time to be pressing ahead with this controversial project. The Alliance is already encountering extreme difficulties in taking forward the arguably more important (and less costly) [Airborne Ground Surveillance](#) project, while the joint [Strategic Airlift Capability](#) has resulted in the purchase of just three aircraft.

And yet, NATO is now seeking to develop a grandiose and appallingly expensive programme to provide defence against a threat that barely exists and, indeed, could not even be named (all reference to Iran was avoided in the Summit Declaration at the insistence of Turkey). The Secretary General’s back-of-an-envelope estimate—less than Euro 200 million over ten years—is simply for the cost of the command-and-control networks and not the future interceptor missile and radar sites that will be needed to plug into the NATO architecture. These national systems will cost billions of Euros to procure (from the same consortium of defence manufacturers that have been hyping both the threat and the capabilities of their missile defence systems for decades). If ever a decision needed greater exposure to public and parliamentary oversight, it is this one. Publication of the “*latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance*” is long overdue and all future relevant background papers and decisions—including those slated for the March and June 2011 Defence Ministers meetings—should also be placed in the public domain.

Missile defence has also long created tensions between NATO and Russia, although these appear to have eased during the Lisbon Summit. NATO officials are now optimistic that Moscow will now take part in developing the system, especially with intelligence and radar sharing. However, while Russia has indicated an interest, at this point in time it has only agreed to participate in a joint NATO-Russian technical study to determine how such a system would work. President Medvedev also insisted that Russia would not participate in anything less than “a full-fledged strategic partnership”.

## 2.3 NATO’s nuclear forces

### What was agreed?

#### Strategic Concept

(Para 17) *Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.*

(Para 18) *The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.*

(Para 19) *[We will] ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements*

(Para 26) *We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.*

*With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.*

*In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons*

#### Summit Declaration

(Para 30) *Our Strategic Concept underscores our commitment to ensuring that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of our populations and the security of our territory. To that end, NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defence forces. Missile defence will become an integral part of our overall defence posture. Our goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We have tasked the Council to continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes in the evolving*

*international security environment. This comprehensive review should be undertaken by all Allies on the basis of deterrence and defence posture principles agreed in the Strategic Concept, taking into account WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. Essential elements of the review would include the range of NATO's strategic capabilities required, including NATO's nuclear posture, and missile defence and other means of strategic deterrence and defence. This only applies to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.*

*(Para 31) Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We welcome the conclusion of the New START Treaty and look forward to its early ratification and entry into force. With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future. We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency, and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for security. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. In order to maintain, and develop further, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues, we task the Council to establish a Committee to provide advice on WMD control and disarmament in the context of the review above, taking into account the role of the High Level Task Force (HLTF).*

*(Para 34) We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We will continue to implement NATO's Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats. We task the Council to assess and report, before the meeting of Defence Ministers in June 2011, on how NATO can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.*

## **Assessment**

"When it comes to nuclear weapons, our Strategic Concept reflects both today's realities as well as our future aspirations," President Obama tellingly said at [press conference](#) after the Summit. But while an official NATO vision for nuclear disarmament was offered for the first time, hopes were also dampened that the Alliance would renounce anytime soon a need for the 200 or so forward deployed US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey – a reflection of the political stalemate over the tactical nuclear redeployment issue. Concerns about changing [NATO's nuclear posture](#) were initially focused on Central and Eastern Europe concerns, but ended up as a confrontation between long-standing NATO member nations Germany and France. The former was looking for a more substantial commitment to future cuts in deployed tactical nuclear weapons, while French objections centred on fears that this might focus the spotlight on its own strategic nuclear forces. (Indeed, France has also been blocking strong pro-disarmament language in all EU statements since Obama's Prague speech).

Hence, the issue has been kicked into the long grass via a review of NATO's "overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats," which will specifically include "nuclear weapons assigned to NATO" (in other words, US tactical nuclear weapons and not US, French and British strategic nuclear systems). This appears to be much broader than an earlier Dutch proposal to have a NATO Nuclear Posture Review after Lisbon, although both the mandate and structure are yet to be decided. Some encouragement is provided by the selection of NATO's political body, the North Atlantic Council, instead of the more conservative and bureaucratic Nuclear Planning Group, to undertake the deterrence posture review. However, unlike all of the other NATO review processes declared in Lisbon, no timeline for this review was announced and the format also remains vague.

Arms control advocates and nuclear weapons experts are divided over whether all this represents progress, although the general prognosis has been downbeat. The Arms Control Association and the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), for example, issued a [joint statement](#) describing the new doctrine as a "conservative, backward-looking" document and "a missed opportunity". Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists calls it "one step forward and a half step back", while the Conference on European Churches described it as "static and disappointing".

More encouragement perhaps can be found in the paragraphs on Russian reciprocity, since here the text is weaker than might have been anticipated (for example, in comparison to the language used in [Hillary Clinton's 'five principles' speech](#)). There is no linkage to Russian negotiations or reductions, but instead the "aim" is to increase transparency about Russia's nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate them away from NATO territory. Hence, overall, there appears to be nothing that was agreed on paper in Lisbon that would prevent an end to NATO's Cold War practice of nuclear sharing. A repeated phrase from the 1999 Strategic Concept, for example, that NATO wants to "ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in nuclear

planning, including peacetime basing of nuclear forces", no longer explicitly adds that these must be based in Europe. Indeed, keeping those weapons in Europe undermines the credibility of NATO's non-proliferation policy and fails to discourage other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons with a similar deterrence rationale. What the deterrence review should do, therefore, is present at an early date (and certainly at some point during 2011), an Action Plan for the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons.

## 2.4 Weapons of mass destruction

### What was agreed?

#### Strategic Concept

(Para 9) *The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions*

(Para 19) *[We will] further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction*

(Para 26) *We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts*

#### Summit Declaration

(Para 31) *....In order to maintain, and develop further, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues, we task the Council to establish a Committee to provide advice on WMD control and disarmament in the context of the review above, taking into account the role of the High Level Task Force (HLTF).*

(Para 33) *We continue to be concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We recall our Declaration at Strasbourg/Kehl and the United Nations Security Council's serious concern with Iran's nuclear programme, and call upon Iran to comply fully and without delay with all relevant UNSCRs. In this context, we welcome the resumption of talks between the P5+1 and Iran. We are also deeply concerned by the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to comply fully with UNSCRs 1718 and 1874, and relevant international obligations.*

(Para 34) *We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call for full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We will continue to implement NATO's Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats. We task the Council to assess and report, before the meeting of Defence Ministers in June 2011, on how NATO can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery*

### Assessment

The language here largely reaffirms earlier commitments in relation to [weapons of mass destruction](#) (WMD). Of course, it precisely the nexus of failing states and fears of WMD proliferation that led to a deeply misguided and, some would say, illegal 'preventive war' of alleged self-defence in Iraq. While not a NATO mission, it was a war prosecuted by leading NATO member states and one that led to deep divisions within the Alliance. Thus, NATO's own non-proliferation efforts could have been enhanced by looking more closely in the mirror. In addition to greater progress on nuclear disarmament (discussed above), the Alliance could have also declared that it intended to move towards a WMD-free deterrence posture, for example, by agreeing to withdraw US tactical nuclear weapons and indicating that it would exclude national strategic nuclear assets from its deterrence posture at the earliest opportunity. The first may yet be an eventual outcome from the deterrence review, but the second remains a distant prospect. NATO could have also sought to bolster non-proliferation norms by agreeing to promptly [investigate any allegations of WMD use by a member state](#).

Instead, the Summit Declaration rests on safe territory by pointing to proliferation concerns in both North Korea and Iran. While such concerns are real enough, diplomacy and engagement can still defuse tensions with both countries – backed if necessary by military containment. Even the recent escalation in tensions on the Korean peninsula, as provocative and serious as this is, still ultimately holds out the [opportunity for engagement](#).

The one new concrete proposal is the establishment of a "Committee to provide advice on WMD control and disarmament", although no further details were given as to its mandate and scope. It is probably a reflection of the earlier NATO Experts' Group recommendation to "re-establish the [Special Consultative Group](#) (SCG) on Arms Control for the purpose of facilitating its own internal dialogue about the whole range of issues related to nuclear doctrine, new arms control initiatives, and proliferation". The Experts Group saw the revival of the SCG more as a means of managing an emerging intra-NATO debate and trying to prevent



unilateral actions (especially around tactical nuclear weapons) than as a means of advancing multilateral arms control. It is hoped that the new Committee has a more positive and proactive mandate.

## **2.5 NATO and the fight against terrorism**

### **What was agreed?**

#### Strategic Concept

(Para 10) *Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities*

(Para 11) *Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.*

(Para 19) *[We will] enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves.*

Summit Declaration (Para 39) *Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people. Terrorism in particular poses a real and serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. All acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motivations or manifestations. We will continue to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. In accordance with the Strategic Concept, we will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO's contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing. We reiterate our continued commitment to dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners in this important area. We deplore all loss of life and extend our sympathies to the victims of terrorism. What they suffer is a visible demonstration of the evil of terrorism and should help mobilise civil society against it.*

### **Assessment**

The language here masks significant differences within NATO in the approach to the [fight against terrorism](#). And, again, there is no self-awareness of the Alliance's role in fuelling the spread of extremist groups through its prosecution of the 'Global War on Terror' and specific counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and increasingly Pakistan. Unrealistic expectations of military victory against non-state actors still appears to figure highly in Alliance thinking, and the apportioning of counter-terrorism resources has reflected that flawed approach. Research by the RAND Corporation into the case histories of 648 terrorist organisations that carried out attacks between 1968 and 2006 found that only 7 percent were successfully eliminated through direct military force. This is in contrast to 43 percent who dropped their violent activities after some form of political accommodation and 40 percent who were broken up successfully through some combination of local community policing, infiltration, and prosecution. NATO counter-terrorism policy needs to focus on international cooperation to improve the intelligence base, strengthen civilian law enforcement capabilities, restrict terrorist access to funds and weapons, and reduce the root causes driving people to radical violence.

The commitment to "*to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter*" is welcome – as far as it goes – but if such words are to have any true meaning, NATO's specialised counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism forces need to have clearly defined doctrines, rules of deployment and engagement, and effective parliamentary oversight. In particular, the possible use of NATO air power or Special Forces to target specific terrorist training camps remains an option that would need to be used sparingly and proportionately. As one analyst rightly concludes, the [military is not a surgical tool of political engineering](#) and assuming an expensive role as a world police gifts propaganda opportunities to extremists – and the ultimate logic of such an approach is endless war.

## **2.6 Defending against cyber attacks**

### **What was agreed?**

#### Strategic Concept

(Para 12) *Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.*

(Para 19) *[We will] develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations.*

Summit Declaration (para 40): *Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In order to ensure NATO's permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO's doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection. We will use NATO's defence planning processes in order to promote the development of Allies' cyber defence capabilities, to assist individual Allies upon request, and to optimise information sharing, collaboration and interoperability. To address the security risks emanating from cyberspace, we will work closely with other actors, such as the UN and the EU, as agreed. We have tasked the Council to develop, drawing notably on existing international structures and on the basis of a review of our current policy, a NATO in-depth cyber defence policy by June 2011 and to prepare an action plan for its implementation.*

## Assessment

[Defending against cyber attacks](#) is not about military capital – tanks are not the answer – instead, it is more about intellectual, human and financial capital. An increased NATO effort to deal with cyber threats was one of the issues heavily signposted in advance of the Summit and no one would argue that the Alliance needs to be better prepared to deal with it. A NATO [Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence](#) was established in Estonia in May 2008 and on the face of it there is very little in the new text to argue with, although, as ever, the devil may be in the detail – or in what may get cooked-up behind closed doors. To this end, the proposed cyber defence policy and implementation Action Plan both need to be made public in advance of the June 2011 meeting. As with missile defences, one nagging concern is the potential role of industry in promoting unsuitable and expensive solutions, especially as key defence companies are known to be [realigning their structures](#) to profit from a new wave of intelligence, cyber, information and electronic weaponry, as well as the sophisticated sensors that will guide them.

## 2.7 NATO's role in energy security

### What was agreed?

#### Strategic Concept

(Para 13) *All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.*

(Para 15) *Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.*

(Para 19) *[We will] develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning*

Summit Declaration (Para 41) *A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security in accordance with decisions at previous Summits and in line with our new Strategic Concept. We will further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas, agreed at Bucharest, where NATO can add value. In advancing our work, we will enhance consultations and cooperation with partners and other*

international actors, as agreed, and integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities. We task the Council to prepare an interim report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for the Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 2011, and a further report for consideration at our next Summit.

## Assessment

NATO's role in energy security is largely framed in geo-political terms, as Mary Kaldor and Javier Solana argue: "NATO's primary preoccupation is how to protect the security of oil supplies to Western countries and to prevent the control over supplies by Russia from being used as a political lever. A human security approach to energy would mean working together to ensure universal access to energy supplies, to combat climate change through energy efficiency and diversification, and to foster the stability and development of suppliers, who are excessively dependent on oil rents". However, there are some positive signs in the text that NATO is moving in the right direction, making clear that it does not intend to take on tasks of other organisations and limiting its own contribution to where it adds value, mainly in the protection of infrastructure and transport lines. Again, open consultation and transparency in the next steps will be crucial, with publication of the "interim report" a must.

## 2.8 Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

### What was agreed?

Strategic Concept (also see nuclear, WMD and missile defence sections above)

(Para 14) *A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.*

(Para 19) *[We will] ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account*

(Para 26) *NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts*

- *We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.*
- *National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.*

Summit Declaration (Para 31) *Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We welcome the conclusion of the New START Treaty and look forward to its early ratification and entry into force. With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future. We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency, and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for security. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. In order to maintain, and develop further, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues, we task the Council to establish a Committee to provide advice on WMD control and disarmament in the context of the review above, taking into account the role of the High Level Task Force (HLTF).*

## Assessment

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons, will remain a real threat to the transatlantic area and beyond. The Strategic Concept reiterates many of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation commitments made at the April 2009 summit in Strasbourg/Kehl but lacks any concrete plans to translate this into reality. The reference to "significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space" fails to acknowledge that most of these are taking place within

NATO, and the United States in particular. Outer space is critical for human security and economic development. Day to day life—both inside and outside the Alliance—increasingly relies on access to satellite data, and there is an integral connection between human security on Earth and the safety and security of outer space. The threats that would create irreversible harm come from Earth-based and space-based weapons, and from certain dual-use (military-civil) satellites that are specially designed to damage or destroy. For that reason NATO should be supporting the development of a Space Security Treaty that would ban the placement of weapons in space; prohibit the testing or use of weapons on satellites so as to damage or destroy them; and prohibit the testing or use of satellites as weapons themselves.

Similarly, the commitment to “*ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies*” invariably excludes the human security dimension of such weapons, including those deployed in NATO missions. The growing use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, in NATO missions is a case in point. NATO doctrine on drones is being developed at the [Joint Air Power Competence Centre](#) (JAPCC) at Kalkar in Germany – a ‘Centre of Excellence’ established in 2005 and supported by 17 NATO nations. A January 2010 JAPCC report, [Strategic Concept of Employment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO](#), sets out current thinking in some detail. The JAPCC report offers operational guidance for “optimum UAS employment across a range of military operations”, such as counter-terrorism, expeditionary and counter-piracy missions, and includes discussion on doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, airspace management, standardisation and interoperability. Consideration is also given to limitations that most frequently affect the drones, such as reliance on data links and adverse atmospheric conditions (wind, turbulence, icing conditions etc). However, there is no guidance or discussion about how such systems could impact on the ways in which wars are fought, the legality of their use or what the likely effect will be on civilian populations.

More welcome was the call for *early ratification and entry into force* of the new START Treaty. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, signed the treaty in Prague in April, but Russia has refused to ratify before the US does, and some Republican leaders are calling for ratification to be delayed or scrapped. The question of START came up time and again during the NATO and NATO-Russia summits, with a number of NATO leaders calling for the treaty to be ratified as soon as possible. “Unprompted, I have received overwhelming support from our allies here that the New START treaty is a critical component to US and European security. They have urged both privately and publicly that this gets done. ... They would feel more safe and secure if this treaty gets ratified” Obama said.

Finally, does NATO really seek its security “*at the lowest possible level of forces*”? As mentioned in the summary, collectively NATO accounts for over 60% of the global total of military spending. With the world engulfed in the worst recession in a hundred years and global problems like climate change requiring huge preventive investments, a smarter approach to security budgeting and procurement in the Alliance is required. The idea of [unified security budgets](#) is beginning to take hold in a few member states. NATO ought to establish a task force to explore how such a new standardised and less militarised budgeting arrangement might be applied across the Alliance. Certainly, the debate in NATO has been too narrowly focused on burden sharing with accusations that Europe spends too little on defence. But while some Member States may need to raise their security spending or allocate their existing defence budgets more wisely—only five of the 28 allies spent the recommended 2% of their GDP on defence and security last year —others clearly need to spend less on defence. The US defence budget, for example, has seen a \$2 trillion increase since 9/11 and now stands at 4.7% of GDP.

Classic military strategy is failing to provide security. In Afghanistan and elsewhere the US and NATO should be prioritising soft power and human security. But excessive defence spending and military solutions produce opportunity costs which often crowd out such options. To help facilitate these shifts, NATO Member States could, in addition to reaffirming the commitment to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on a unified security budget, also endorse a recommended ceiling for such a budget of 3% of GDP. A freeze in US defence spending could be introduced until the Pentagon reaches this milestone.

## **2.9 Conventional arms control**

### **What was agreed?**

Strategic Concept (Para 26) *We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent*

Summit Declaration (Para 32) *The Alliance reaffirms its continued commitment to the CFE Treaty Regime with all its elements. Although agreement has not yet been reached on how to strengthen and modernise the*



*arms control regime for the 21st Century, we welcome progress to date and encourage the 36 participating nations, on an equal footing, including all Allies and CFE States Parties, to redouble efforts to conclude a principles-based framework to guide negotiations in 2011. Building on the CFE Treaty of 1990, the Agreement on Adaptation of 1999, and existing political commitments, our goal would be to take a significant step toward ensuring the continued viability of conventional arms control in Europe and strengthening our common security. We look forward to making concrete progress toward this end this year. The results of our work in the coming weeks and months will guide our future decisions on continued implementation of CFE obligations, given that, as we said at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot continue indefinitely.*

## Assessment

The commitment “to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability” rings a bit hollow when viewed in the light of the arms transfer record of several member states, as discussed in the summary above. NATO does have a mixed track record in [conventional arms control](#), including [small arms and light weapons \(SALW\)](#) and [mine action](#). On the positive side of the ledger, NATO has overseen the destruction of thousands of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons in the Balkans. Given NATO's skills and concrete results, and the ongoing threats that these weapons are likely to pose, the Alliance should continually seek more opportunities for weapons collection, destruction and other coordination activities.

It is disappointing that there was no mention in Lisbon of the Arms Trade Treaty, which began negotiations in New York in July this year, especially since the NATO [website claims](#) that the Alliance “stands ready to support the Arms Trade Treaty process as appropriate”. This treaty seeks to establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms – something that some NATO member states clearly fear.

Up until December 2007, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) provided the spine of the European arms control system. On that date, however, then Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended Russian participation in the treaty – citing NATO's failure to ratify the [Adapted CFE Treaty](#) that was finalised in 1999. In turn, NATO States refuse to ratify the adapted treaty because of Russian failure to withdraw its armed forces from Moldova and Georgia. However, despite the Lisbon Summit initiating a re-set in Russian-NATO relations, on this issue the Summit Declaration places the blame (and onus for moving forward) squarely in Moscow's court. This is not helpful. As Donald Bandler and Jakub Kulhanek [argue](#), “Even if CFE is declared dead, more ingenious mechanisms should be found.... [it is] essential that NATO attempts to resuscitate the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continue building and pursuing close engagement with Russia”.

NATO Watch is an independent, not-for-profit ‘virtual’ think-tank which examines the role of NATO in public life and advocates for more openness, transparency and accountability within the Alliance. See our detailed [Frequently Asked Questions](#) and our [Vision and Mission](#).