

Annual NATO-Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in
Split, 6-7 May 2013

Remarks by Ambassador Rolf Nikel during a panel discussion on

**“The Role of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Today’s Security
Policy”**

**A stable Euro-Atlantic security architecture requires progress in disarmament, arms
control and non-proliferation.**

NATO is an important pillar in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ever since the Harmel Report, NATO is rightly committed to a broad approach to security, including arms control, disarmament and other co-operative security tools. These tools are a necessary complement to military capabilities. In Lisbon, NATO identified three core tasks to guarantee the security of NATO’s territory and populations, namely collective defense, crisis management and co-operative security including arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. A co-operative security architecture for the Euro-Atlantic area can thrive if it is based on trust. Trust leads to cooperation. Unfortunately, trust is sorely missing.

Today, security in the Euro-Atlantic area must be inclusive. Security is possible only with Russia, not against Russia. Close cooperation with Russia in all areas including arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is therefore imperative. A constructive dialogue on cooperation in missile defense is of paramount importance. The US-decision to forgo the 4th phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach can facilitate the dialogue, not only on missile defense but on other areas as well. Recent signals from Moscow are encouraging. Transparency is key.

NATO’s Strategic Concept and the outcome of the Chicago Summit are the initial version of a “strategic concept on disarmament”, Angela Kane has called for. Alliance members are committed to actively support arms control, promote disarmament and contribute to non-proliferation efforts. NATO members re-endorsed the objective of a world without nuclear weapons. NATO expressed its intention to create the conditions for further reductions of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. A dialogue on non-strategic nuclear weapons would be beneficial for progress in arms control and can contribute to forging a co-operative security relationship between NATO and Russia. Transparency and confidence-building measures should accompany future reductions on both sides. A mere re-deployment out of Europe is not

a solution we pursue. Improving mutual transparency and strengthening confidence on each other's motives and intentions could greatly facilitate future US-Russian talks about nuclear weapons reductions. Last but not least: NATO-members agreed to establish a new committee within the Alliance to address and discuss the contribution of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, particularly transparency and confidence-building measures for non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia.

To summarize: NATO's contribution to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. All this signals NATO's intent to pursue its comprehensive approach to security issues, recognizing that military strength will not be sufficient to ensure security and stability in the 21st century.

Deadlock in nuclear disarmament erodes the NPT.

The NPT is the framework for nuclear disarmament. To ensure security and stability and to make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, we have to strengthen the NPT. Progress is needed in both tracks: disarmament as well as nonproliferation. The future and credibility of the NPT require transparency and further reductions, if not total elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. Otherwise, non-nuclear-weapons states and party of the treaty might feel less inclined to fulfill their obligations. Together with our partners in the *Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative* (NPDI), we submitted two working papers to the recent second NPT-preparatory meeting in Geneva. Besides Germany, 4 NATO-partners support the NPDI (Canada, Poland, Turkey and The Netherlands) which is a cross-regional initiative including Japan, Australia, Mexico, Chile and the United Arab Emirates. One of the NPDI-papers calls for progress on to sub-strategic nuclear weapons. They must be part of any future disarmament round. The second paper recalls that the last NPT-Review Conference agreed to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines. Our paper makes some concrete proposals in this regard while the debate on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons is gathering momentum. Other important steps are necessary, such as the universal acceptance of the IAEA-Additional Protocol as "*gold standard*". The entering-into-force of the CTBT is long overdue. All states yet to ratify the Treaty should consider the benefits of ratifying. Hiding behind one another is detrimental to the interests of the International Community. Some positive developments should be noted: No nuclear testing remains undetectable. In the case of the DPRK, the existing verification system supplied important information. Finally, negotiations on FMCT have to start without further delay.

We need to join all our efforts to combat the proliferation risks which challenge the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction including proliferation of their delivery systems constitutes a very real and significant threat to global security. We must ensure that we confront these security threats with the right tools at hand, at national and international level. Looking at today's most prominent regional proliferation cases of concern to the international community, namely Iran and DPRK, it is our responsibility to support all ongoing diplomatic efforts by applying and implementing the corresponding UN-sanction-regimes. DPRK's third nuclear test constitutes a serious challenge for today's security environment. It is of utmost importance to remain level-headed in this difficult situation in order to contribute to de-escalation. We need to keep up the international pressure in order to send a clear signal to Pyongyang: Nuclear brinkmanship will not be tolerated. In the case of Iran, E3+3 mandated by the UN Security Council keep working for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program. We have to continue our dual track approach which includes negotiations and pressure by sanctions.

In both cases, the circumvention of UN-sanction-regimes constitutes a very real and significant challenge. We all should be very much concerned about loopholes. And we have to use all our tools available to close these loopholes. Initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as export control regimes have to be strengthened further. Individually, all states should use their influence to demand that these countries abide by UNSC-and IAEA-resolutions and cooperate closely with the IAEA. Nationally, we all have to ensure that appropriate legislation is in place and executing authorities are adequately trained to implement UN-sanction-regimes. Internationally, we should assist those countries which need and wish to have assistance in capacity building.

In a globalized world with WMD-proliferation and international terrorism, the international community needs to stand united. The goal should be a WMD-free world as soon as possible.