

Issue 47: June 2018

Promoting a more transparent and accountable NATO



www.natowatch.org

NATO Watch Observatory

No. 47 (January - May 2018)

Published by
NATO Watch
Gairloch, Scotland
IV21 2DS
Email:

Editor: Dr. Ian Davis

Welcome to NATO Watch's quarterly *Observatory*: the only online publication dedicated entirely to news and independent commentary on NATO policy-making and operational activities. The clips are drawn from a wide range of subscriptions, feeds and alerts covering a substantial part of the major English language newspapers and other periodicals worldwide.

NATO Watch

conducts independent monitoring and analysis of NATO and aims to increase transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and participation in a progressive reform agenda within NATO.

Copyright © NATO Watch, 2018. Some rights reserved.

This publication is made available under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 licence, which allows copy and distribution for non-profit use, provided the authors and NATO Watch are attributed properly and the text is not altered in any way. All citations must be credited to NATO Watch and/or the original sources.

In this edition:

News, Commentary & Reports:

- Arms Control & Disarmament
- Arctic Security
- Book Review
- Chemical Weapons Attack
- Climate Change
- Collective Defence
- Counter Terrorism
- Cyber Security and Information Warfare
- Defence Budgets and Procurement
- Enlargement &
- Partnerships

Algeria; Asia Pacific & NATO; Australia;
Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Central Asia & NATO;
Colombia; EU-NATO relations; Finland;

Georgia; Iraq; Israel; Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; Japan; Jordan; Macedonia; Moldova; Policy; Qatar; Serbia; Sweden; Tunisia; Ukraine

- History
- Institutional Reform
- Intelligence
- Maritime Security
- Military Exercises
- Missile Defence
- Missile Defence
- Munich Security Conference
- NATO Defence Ministers
- NATO Foreign Ministers
- NATO Military Committee
- NATO Parliamentary Assembly
- Nuclear Weapons
US Nuclear Posture Review; New Russian nuclear weapons; Disinvestment from the nuclear weapons industry
- Operations and Missions
Afghanistan; Kosovo; Libya
- Populism and NATO
- Russia-NATO relations
- Secretary General's Annual Report
- Strategic Concept
- Summits
- Syria
- Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance
- Women, Peace and Security

Security News from NATO Member States

- Albania
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Italy
- Lithuania
- Montenegro
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States

Upcoming Event: Shadow NATO Summit IV

News, Commentary and Reports:

Arms Control & Disarmament

Must Read: Eugene Rumer, [A Farewell to Arms . . . Control](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 April 2018

[NATO Allies host Russian arms control inspectors](#), NATO News Release, 13 March 2018

[Russia Questions U.S. Compliance With a Key Nuclear Arms Control Treaty](#), Time, 6 February 2018

Arctic Security

Russian anti-submarine warfare aircraft have resumed flights over the arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

Jennifer Loy, [Russia in the Arctic: Friend or Foe?](#) Geopolitical Monitor, 19 April 2018

Paula Dobriansky, [A Cold War in the Arctic Circle](#), *Wall Street Journal*, 1 January 2018

Book Review

Silvia Francesca Maglione-Grant, [Theorising NATO. New perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance](#), *European Security*, Vol. 27:1, 2018, pp.115-117 - Review of 'Theorising NATO. New perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance', edited by Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price, Oxon, Routledge, 2016, ISBN 978-0-415-68899-4

Chemical Weapons Attack – Salisbury (UK)

On 14 March, the UK expelled 23 Russian diplomats after the Kremlin ignored Prime Minister Theresa May's deadline for Moscow to explain the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter. Addressing the House of Commons two days earlier, May described the attempted assassination on British soil as "an unlawful use of force by the Russian state", adding that the UK would mount a "full and robust response". Russia demanded that Britain include it in the ongoing investigation and requested a sample of the nerve agent. Moscow

warned that it would retaliate against any punitive action.

On 18 March, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson accused Russia of stockpiling the nerve agent Novichok believed to have been used in the attempted assassination. "We actually have evidence within the last 10 years that Russia has not only been investigating the delivery of nerve agents for the purposes of assassination, but has also been creating and stockpiling Novichok," Johnson told the BBC.

Stockpiling the nerve agent would represent a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Moscow denied Johnson's accusation. Experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons began conducting independent tests on samples of the nerve agent on 19 March, while a contingent of EU foreign ministers noted that Russia's use of the nerve agent, if verified by the organization, would mark the first use of the poison on European soil in 70 years.

On the 26 March, President Trump expelled 60 Russians from the US and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. Senior White House officials told reporters that the expulsion fell within the administration's broader effort to counteract Russian intelligence operations against the US and to demonstrate Washington's commitment to its NATO allies. At a meeting of EU leaders in Bulgaria, EU Council President Donald Tusk announced that 14 EU countries joined the US in expelling Russian diplomats.

At the end of March, UK officials investigating the attack announced that Skripal's door handle had been coated with the banned nerve agent, and maintained that the attack must have been undertaken at the direction of and with consent from Moscow. Russian officials continued to deny responsibility for the attack. Russian President Vladimir Putin [said](#), "We destroyed all our chemical weapons

under the supervision of international organizations, and we did it first, unlike some of our partners who promised to do it, but unfortunately did not keep their promises”.

A [report](#) in the Washington Post, however, suggests that Russia’s chemical weapons research may have continued: “Since the start of Putin’s second term, a construction boom has been underway at more than two dozen institutes that were once part of the Soviet Union’s biological and chemical weapons establishment, according to Russian documents and photos compiled by independent researchers. That expansion, which includes multiple new testing facilities, is particularly apparent at secret Defense Ministry laboratories that have long drawn the suspicions of U.S. officials over possible arms-treaty violations”.

In April, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [confirmed](#) the UK’s assertion that the chemical used was the military-grade nerve agent Novichok, but did not specify who created the agent and when. The UK contends that the high purity of the toxic chemical—and Moscow’s production of Novichok-class agents in the past decade—suggests that it was made in a Russian government laboratory.

[Nato expels seven staff from Russian mission over Skripal poisoning](#), The Guardian, 27 March 2018

[Spy poisoning: Nato expels Russian diplomats](#), BBC News, 27 March 2018

[Statement by NATO Secretary General on further decisions following the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury](#), NATO Press Release, 27 March 2018

Judy Dempsey, [Skripal, Putin, and Europe’s Resilience](#), Carnegie Europe, 27 March 2018

[Scores of Russians Expelled by U.S. and Its Allies Over U.K. Poisoning](#), New York Times, 26 March 2018

[Statement issued by the Standing Committee](#), Vilnius, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 24 March 2018

[Babiš in NATO rejects Russian words on Novichok’s Czech origin](#), Prague Daily Monitor, 23 March 2018

[Joint press point](#) with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, 20 March 2018

[Britain wins fresh EU, NATO support over nerve attack](#), Reuters, 19 March 2018

[Inspectors analyse toxin used on Russian spy, EU backs Britain](#), Reuters, 19 March 2018

[Britain accuses Russia of secretly stockpiling deadly nerve agent used in attack](#), Reuters, 18 March 2018

[Spy poisoning: Putin most likely behind attack – Johnson](#), BBC News, 16 March 2018

[Poison Attack on Former Spy Isn’t Just a U.K. Problem](#), Bloomberg Editorial, 15 March 2018

Michael Paradis, [The U.K.’s Opportunity to Use Lawfare in Response to the Salisbury Attack](#), Lawfare Blog, 15 March 2018

[Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury](#), NATO Press Release, 14 March 2018

[NATO calls on Russia to give full details on nerve agent programme](#), Reuters, 14 March 2018

Freddy Gray, [No, Britain shouldn’t invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty](#), Spectator, 14 March 2018

Ashley Deeks, [Prime Minister May’s Use-of-Force Claim: Clarifying the Law That Governs the U.K.’s Options](#), Lawfare Blog, 13 March 2018

[What authority does Putin have to order extrajudicial killings abroad?](#) EuroNews, 8 March 2018

Climate Change

The EU and the OSCE are actively seeking to incorporate climate security in efforts to promote peace and security, whereas NATO’s role currently remains more limited to disaster response, according to [SIPRI analysis](#).

Niklas Bremberg, [European Regional Organizations and Climate-Related Security Risks: EU, OSCE and NATO](#), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No.2018/1, February 2018

Collective Defence

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO leaders decided to enhance NATO's military presence in the eastern part of the alliance. Since then, four multinational battlegroups totalling approximately 4,500 troops have deployed to the Baltic nations and Poland.

NATO is also strengthening its multinational presence in the Black Sea region, based around a Romanian-led multinational framework brigade. The Alliance has also tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 - with a high-readiness Spearhead Force at its core - and set up eight small headquarters (NATO Force Integration Units) to facilitate training and reinforcements.

In late March, the *Wall Street Journal* reported claims from military planners that only several thousand of NATO's more than 1 million soldiers are ready for rapid deployment in the event of a war between Europe and Russia. Of Italy's 59 battalions, only five stand ready to deploy within 10 days. Of the UK, Germany, and France's 56, 51, and 39 battalions respectively, only three of each country's battalions stand ready to deploy in under 30 days. None of the battalions in Poland, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark can deploy in under 30 days.

Pavel Anastasov, [The Black Sea region: a critical intersection](#), NATO Review, 25 May 2018

[Top official: NATO changes focus from missions to defence](#), Prague Daily Monitor, 29 April 2018

Rayk Hähnlein, [Air Power: Credible deterrence and defence call for superior air forces. NATO has realised that](#), German Federal Academy for Security Policy, Security Policy Working Paper, No. 6/2018

[With NATO, EU sets out plan to enable faster troop movement across Europe](#), Reuters, 28 March 2018

Mark Cozard, [Strategic Warning on NATO's Eastern Flank: Pitfalls, Prospects, and Limits](#), RAND, 2018

Jordan Becker, [NATO and the south: opportunities for coherence and integration](#), Real Instituto Elcano, 13 February 2018

Scott Boston, Abby Doll, David Ochmanek and David Shlapak, [A 'Glass Half-Full': Next Steps for Enhancing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank](#), RAND Commentary, 12 February 2018

Thomas-Durell Young, [Can NATO's "new" allies and key partners exercise national-level command in crisis and war?](#), Comparative Strategy, Vol. 37:1, 2018, pp.9-21

Bryan Frizzelle, [What Makes a Reliable Ally? A Fresh Perspective on NATO, Strategic Culture and Collective Defense](#), War on the Rocks, 19 January 2018

[Red tape, radios and railway gauges: Nato's battle to deter Russia](#), *Financial Times*, 2 January 2018

Rodolfo Ragonesi, [From Nato to Pesco](#), Times of Malta, 2 January 2018

Counter Terrorism

NATO training missions have focused on counter terrorism capabilities in in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. NATO surveillance planes support the anti-ISIS coalition, and at the NATO summit in May 2017, the alliance announced it would become a full member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

According to the Stimson Center the [amount of money spent on post-9/11 counterterrorism](#) initiatives by the US alone between 2002 and 2017 is \$2.8 trillion: an average of \$186.6 billion per year over 15 years. For comparison, that figure represents more than the

overall 2017 defence expenditures of Russia, India and South Korea combined. Terrorist actions by Muslim extremists or jihadis since 9/11 have killed 100 people in the United States, or about six per year.

The terrorist threat remained higher in Western Europe throughout 2017 and continued to be dominated by jihadi terrorism. 16 attacks struck eight different countries, while more than 30 plots were foiled.

[Here's how much the US has spent fighting terrorism since 9/11](#), Defense News, 16 May 2018

Thomas Renard, [Terrorism and counterterrorism in Europe in 2017](#), Egmont Institute, 2018 - This article covers the main developments in terrorism and counterterrorism in Europe, over the past year. It is part of a broader publication covering developments across the world, published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The entire version of ASPI's Counterterrorism Yearbook 2018 is available [here](#)

Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet (Editors), [Returnees: Who are they. Why are they \(not\) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands](#), Egmont Paper 101, February 2018

Gorm Rye Olsen, [Transatlantic cooperation on terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Africa: the Franco-American axis](#), *European Security*, Vol. 27:1, 2018, pp. 41-57

Cyber Security and Information Warfare

NATO now considers cyberspace to be a conflict domain alongside that of air, sea and land. NATO Defence Ministers [agreed](#) in February to create a new Cyber Operations Centre as part of the adapted NATO Command Structure.

[Big three cyberthreats bring Asia-Pacific and NATO allies closer](#), Asian Review, 24 May 2018

Andrea Galli, [The secret dream of all propagandists](#), Modern Diplomacy, 21 May 2018

[By staging war games, NATO members prepare for cyber attacks](#), PBS News Hour, 5 May 2018

[Fictional Foe Attacking NATO In War Training Sounds A Lot Like Russia](#), NDTV, 4 May 2018

[NATO prepares for war with Russia with simulated naval and cyberattacks](#), Newsweek, 4 May 2018

Elisabeth Braw, [We Need a NATO for Infowar](#), Defense One, 3 May 2018

[NATO team wins Locked Shields live-fire cyber exercise](#), Homeland Preparedness News, 2 May 2018

[NATO wins the world's largest live-fire cyber exercise](#), NATO News Release, 30 April 2018

[Locked Shields exercise begins at NATO cyberdefense center in Tallinn](#), ERR, 25 April 2018

[Australia and Portugal join NATO cyber cooperative](#), Cyberscoop, 23 April 2018

[NATO cyber defenders tested at world's largest cyber drill](#), NATO News Release, 20 April 2018

Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer, [The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition](#), Brookings-Robert Bosch Foundation, March 2018

[Inaugural Meeting of the NATO Military Committee Working Group on Strategic Communications](#), NATO News Release, 5 March 2018

[Russia a potential threat actor in cyber security: NATO](#), Frontier Post, 2 March 2018

[NATO's Crossed Swords exercise preps cyber warriors](#), Fifth Domain, 5 February 2018

[NATO CCDCOE coordinates NATO Cyber Education and Training](#), SC Media, 1 February 2018

[Middle East Needs Regional NATO for Cyber Defense, Margalit Says](#), Bloomberg, 31 January 2018

[Japan to Join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn](#), CCDCOE News Release, 12 January 2018

Defence Budgets and Procurement

NATO member states agreed in 2014 to move towards investing 2% of GDP on defence by 2024. They also agreed to invest more in key military capabilities and equipment, and to contribute personnel to NATO missions and operations. In 2017 NATO member states agreed to report annually on how they intend to make progress on all three commitments: more money, capabilities and contributions.

At the [February 2018 meeting of Defence Ministers](#) the first national annual reports on NATO's defence investment pledge were reviewed, but apparently not all member states submitted plans and none were made public.

[According to the Secretary General](#), the picture is one of substantial progress: "After years of decline, since 2014 we have seen three years of increasing defence spending across European allies and Canada. Amounting to an additional 46 billion US dollars. The national plans show that we can expect further increases". He added: "In 2014, only 3 allies spent 2% of GDP or more on defence. This year we expect 8 allies to meet the target. And by 2024, we expect at least 15 allies will spend 2% of GDP or more on defence".

Stoltenberg also outlined that spending on capabilities was also up—by 2024, 22 allies are expected to invest 20% or more of their defence budget on major capabilities—and that "almost all" member states intend to maintain or increase their contributions to NATO operations, missions and activities.

However, none of the national plans have been made public and it was reported by the *Wall Street Journal* on the 9 February that fewer than half of NATO's 29 member states actually submitted one.

At the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in April, new US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo [reiterated calls](#) by the Trump administration for European allies to step up their defence spending.

In May, the [NATO Communications and Information \(NCI\) Agency](#) awarded [Airbus](#) a 40 million euros contract for the delivery of the first phase of the new NATO Communications Infrastructure Project — the contract also includes options for future phases of the project, worth up to 50 million euros. In February, however, Airbus was [seeking to negotiate reductions in fines](#) imposed on the company due to delivery delays and failing to meet contract capability requirements for its A400M Atlas military transport aircraft program, worth \$21 billion. [Technical problems](#) in manufacturing, specifically with cracking in the engine's gearbox, have put the project years behind schedule, and costs have risen. Germany's share of costs, for example, have risen from an expected \$10 billion to nearly \$12 billion.

[Airbus' Major 40 Million Euros NATO Comms Contract](#), Satnews, 29 May 2018

Michael Peck, [Can Congress Save NATO's Technological Edge?](#) National Interest, 27 May 2018

[Trump: NATO members short on defense spending to be 'dealt with'](#), Stars and Stripes, 18 May 2018

[Trump Touts Increased NATO Spending, But That Sort of Misses the Point, Experts Say](#), Defense One, 18 May 2018

[NATO chief thanks Trump for leadership on military spending](#), Politico, 17 May 2018

[On first day, Pompeo charms NATO but warns on Iran, defense spending](#), Reuters, 27 April 2018

Lisa A. Aronsson, [Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress](#), Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2018

[Results are in: Here's how much NATO allies spent on defense in 2017](#), Defense News, 15 March 2018

[NATO defense spending goes up for third year in a row](#), Washington Post, 15 March 2018

[Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries \(2010-2017\)](#), NATO Press Release, 15 March 2018 ([pdf](#))

[As NATO summit approaches, European allies fret over burden-sharing formulas](#), IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 April 2018

Lucie Beraud-Sudreau and Bastian Giegerich, [Is NATO's two percent target fit for purpose?](#) IISS Expert Commentary, 6 March 2018

[Saab touts GlobalEye as future E-3A replacement for NATO](#), IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 February 2018

Azita Raji, [Salvaging Trump's Legacy in Europe: Fixing NATO Burden-Sharing](#), War on the Rocks, 26 February 2018

Max Bergmann, [To Help NATO Allies Get Off Russian Equipment, The United States Should Revive Defense Lending](#), War on the Rocks, 14 February 2018

Steve Saideman, [NATO and the Classic Problem of Measuring Inputs vs. Outcomes](#), DuckofMinerva (blog), 11 February 2018

[Most NATO members do not have plans to meet military spending targets: report](#), The Hill, 9 February 2018

[Despite U.S. Push, Most NATO Allies Fail to Fulfill Military-Spending Goals](#), Wall Street Journal, 9 February 2018

[Airbus says A400M deal with buyers will limit future losses](#), Reuters, 7 February 2018

[NATO buyer nations to meet on A400M on Feb. 5 – sources](#), Reuters, 29 January 2018

[NATO buyers to meet with Airbus over billions in A400M fines](#), Defense News, 29 January 2018

[BAE Chairman Backs Trump on Push for More NATO Military Spending](#), Bloomberg, 23 January 2018

[NATO Industrial Advisory Group turns 50 and elects new leadership](#), NATO News Release, 17 January 2018

[NATO awards Cobham operational readiness training contract](#), Cobham Press Release, 16 January 2018

[Raytheon to support Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile for U.S., NATO partners](#), UPI.com, 4 January 2018

[NATO to Upgrade UHF Satcom Control Stations with ViaSat](#), Satellite Today, 3 January 2018

Kevin Drum, [NATO Defense Spending Started Increasing Three Years Ago](#), Mother Jones, 2 January 2018

Energy Security

[North Atlantic Council discusses challenges to Energy Security](#), NATO News Release, 21 March 2018

Enlargement & Partnerships

Algeria

Algeria joined NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue initiative in 2000.

[NATO Assistant Secretary General Alvar González visits Algeria to discuss deepening cooperation](#), NATO News Release, 22 March 2018

Asia-Pacific and NATO

This paper launches a discussion about images and perceptions of NATO in the alliance's five global partners in the Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand and South Korea). It treats perceptions as key factors behind global expectations of NATO, and as a key cultural filter triggering a range of its partners' reactions to NATO's global initiatives.

Natalia Chaban, Paul Bacon, Joe Burton & Vlad Vernygora, [NATO Global Perceptions – Views from the Asia-Pacific Region](#), Asian Security, vol. 14:1, 2018, pp. 1-7

This article analyses how NATO officials perceive the alliance's five global partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. It seeks to establish the degree of conformity within the alliance about how useful and important the partnerships are and how NATO's strategic narrative about its global security role is changing.

Joe Burton, [NATO's "Global Partners" in Asia: Shifting Strategic Narratives](#), Asian Security, vol.14:1, 2018, pp.8-23

In the wake of the Afghan missions, this article assesses the appetite in Australia and New Zealand for an ongoing relationship with NATO. It finds that there is a keen desire for an on-going partnership with NATO, particularly in maintaining interoperability and in the area of "emerging security challenges." Although the findings were mostly positive for NATO, New Zealand elites were more reticent about NATO involvement than those in Australia.

Ben Wellings, Serena Kelly, Bruce Wilson, Joe Burton and Martin Holland, [Narrative Alignment and Misalignment: NATO as a Global Actor as Seen from Australia and New Zealand](#), Asian Security, vol. 14:1, 2018, pp.24-37

This article uses Strategic Narrative Theory to explain how NATO has successfully communicated narratives of "natural partnership" and cooperative security to Japan. Japan strongly perceives NATO to be an embodiment and guarantor of global norms and international law.

Paul Bacon and Joe Burton, [NATO-Japan Relations: Projecting Strategic Narratives of "Natural Partnership" and Cooperative Security](#), Asian Security, Vol. 14:1, 201, pp.38-50

Mongolia and South Korea are in the same "partnership basket" for NATO in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries have burgeoning relations with NATO, which represent a relatively new dimension of international engagement for the region.

Sung-Won Yoon, Adiyasuren Jamiyandagva, Vlad Vernygora, Joe Burton, Byambakhand Luguusharav and Munkhtur Dorjraa, [Views on NATO from Mongolia and the Republic of Korea: Hedging Strategy, and "Perfunctory Partnership"?](#), Asian Security, Vol. 14:1, 2018, pp.51-65

This article provides a reflection on the communication phase in a narrative's cycle. It explores and compares NATO narratives communicated by influential press in NATO's five Asia-Pacific strategic partners. The analysis traces NATO narratives communicated to broader society on the system, identity, and policy-issue levels.

Natalia Chaban, Svetlana Beltyukova and Christine Fox, [Communicating NATO in the Asia-Pacific Press: Comparative Analysis of Patterns of NATO's Visibility, Capability, Evaluation, and Local Resonance](#), Asian Security, Vol. 14:1, 2018, pp. 66-81

Australia

NATO and Australia are currently strengthening relations, building on dialogue and cooperation that have been developing since 2005. Australia was one of the top non-NATO troop contributors to NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. In a joint political declaration in June 2012, NATO and Australia signalled their commitment to strengthen cooperation, and since February 2013, work is being taken forward through an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. (Also see *Asia-Pacific and NATO* above)

[Secretary General: Australia is one of NATO's closest partners](#), NATO News, 24 April 2018

[Australia joins the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence](#), Open Gov Asia, 24 April 2018

[Australia joins the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence](#), Australian MFA Media Release, 23 April 2018

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan joined Partnership for Peace in 1994 and contributes to NATO-led operations and cooperates with the alliance and other partner countries in many other areas. NATO supports the country's defence reform efforts.

[Azerbaijan, NATO mull future prospects of cooperation](#), News.Az, 14 May 2018

Bahrain

Bahrain is a member of NATO's 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and in 2016 the kingdom opened a diplomatic mission at NATO's HQ in Brussels.

[Undersecretary meets NATO leaders, officials](#), Bahrain News Agency, 24 February 2018

Central Asia and NATO

NATO established relationships with the five Central Asian countries in the framework of Partnership for Peace Agreements after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. However, each relationship is different. Some Central Asian countries gained particular strategic importance as logistic hubs and transit zones in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan.

Uguloy Mukhtorova, [Central Asia and NATO: Against a Backdrop of Changing Geopolitical Realities](#), Fellowship Monograph 10, Research Division NATO Defense College, January 2018

Colombia

President Juan Manuel Santos announced on 25 May that Colombia will be the latest NATO 'partner across the globe'. Santos said the move would improve Colombia's image.

[Colombia In Nato: What Will The Latin American Country Gain With This New Alliance?](#) Latin American Post, 31 May 2018

[President Santos Visits NATO to Advance Colombia's 'Global Partner' Relationship with the Alliance](#), Finance Colombia, 31 May 2018

[Secretary General welcomes President of Colombia to NATO](#), NATO News Release, 31 May 2018

[European Parliamentarians Protest Colombia's Decision to Join NATO](#), Telesure, 30 May 2018

[Venezuela: 'Colombia Joining NATO A Threat To Regional Peace'](#), Telesurtv.net, 26 May 2018

[Colombia to become NATO's first Latin American 'global partner'](#), Deutsche Welle, 26 May 2018

EU-NATO Relations

Following the signature of the Joint Declaration on NATO-EU cooperation in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO and the EU have been discussing how to expand their joint work, including by bringing more coherence in their respective defence capability development priorities and output. In November 2017, European countries agreed to deepen defence cooperation outside NATO through the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

[Former US diplomat accuses Trump of causing 'significant damage' to EU relations](#), Defense News, 22 May 2018

Nicholas Williams, [NATO-EU Cooperation: Don't Forget Berlin Plus!](#) European Leadership Network Commentary, 26 March 2018

Daniel Keohane, [EU Military Cooperation and National Defense](#), GMF Policy Brief, 15 January 2018

Shannon Togawa Mercer, [No, Europe Isn't Ambushing NATO](#), Foreign Policy, 3 January 2018

Finland

Finland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. Finland is one of NATO's most active partners and has contributed to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It is one of five countries that has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with NATO. Almost half of Finns (46%) support closer cooperation with NATO, according to a recent opinion poll.

[46% of Finns approve of close defence co-operation with Nato, finds poll](#), Helsinki Times, 6 March 2018

René Nyberg, [Hybrid Operations and the Importance of Resilience: Lessons from Recent Finnish History](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 February 2018

[Finns seek calm amid US and Russian unpredictability](#), Deutsche Welle, 27 January 2018

Georgia

US Secretary of State Pompeo in May 2018 said President Trump “stands by the 2008 Bucharest declaration,” which affirms that Georgia “will become a member of NATO”. Since independence in 1991, Georgia has made steady progress toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and also partly stabilized relations with Russia. Yet Tbilisi’s Western aspirations remain unresolved and Georgia is unlikely to gain entry into NATO or the EU in the near term. However, expanded practical cooperation with NATO seems likely, for example, through further participation in NATO exercises and missions.

William Courtney, Daniel Fried and Kenneth Yalowitz, [Where is Georgia Headed?](#) The National Interest, 22 May 2018

[Eucom Commander Launches Readiness Program Training Initiative in Georgia](#), US Department of Defense, 19 May 2018

[Georgia moves closer to NATO, but there is more work to do](#), NATO Parliamentary Assembly News Release, 27 April 2018

['We Deserve It': Georgian President Touts Tbilisi's Contributions To NATO](#), Radio Free Europe7 Radio Liberty, 10 March 2018

[Secretary General and President Margvelashvili discuss deepening NATO-Georgia Relations](#), NATO News Release, 9 March 2018

[Georgia Mulls Expedited NATO Membership Strategy](#), VOA, 8 March 2018

[NATO-Georgia Commission Meeting in Brussels](#), Civil.ge, 1 February 2018

[Georgia's Foreign Minister Meets NATO Secretary General](#), Georgia Today, 31 January 2018

Iraq

NATO and Iraq are engaged in political dialogue and practical cooperation aimed at developing the capacity of Iraq’s security forces, its defence and security institutions, and its national defence academies. In February 2018,

at the request of the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Daesh, NATO [defence ministers agreed](#) to start planning for a NATO training mission in Iraq to make current training efforts more sustainable.

[NATO works closely with Iraq to strengthen good governance in the Iraqi security structures](#), NATO News Release, 2 May 2018

[Director General of the NATO International Military Staff visits Georgia](#), NATO News Release, 27 April 2018

[NATO helps Iraqi forces strengthen vehicle maintenance skills](#), NATO News, 23 April 2018

[NATO Chief Plans Military Academies for Iraqi Forces](#), Military.com, 7 March 2018

[NATO Secretary General visits Iraq, praises Allied trainers and Iraqi forces](#), NATO News, 6 March 2018

Wojciech Lorenz, [Political and Military Significance of NATO's Mission to Iraq](#), The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1 March 2018

[Trump wants NATO to do a long-term mission in Iraq, but some say it 'looks suspiciously like another Afghanistan'](#), Business Insider, 8 February 2018

[Facing Trump's demands, NATO to consider larger Iraq training mission](#), Reuters, 7 February 2018

Israel

Israel is a member of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and has also been developing stronger bilateral relationships with the alliance. For example, Israel is now being invited to take part in NATO naval drills and is developing maritime partnerships with NATO countries. In February, Israel signed a logistics agreement with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), which will enable Israeli companies to compete in NATO tenders and be part of NATO's database of authorized exporters.

[Israel, NATO carry out naval drills in Haifa](#), Middle East Monitor, 29 May 2018

Colonel Uri Naaman, [Israel and NATO: History and Progress](#), Jewish Policy Center, Spring 2018

[Israel Edges to NATO as Turkey Pivots to Russia](#), Breaking Defense, 26 March 2018

[Israel signs tenders agreement with NATO](#), Globes, 12 February 2018

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The ICI was established in 2004 at the NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey. Through this cooperative framework, NATO and the Gulf have intensified political consultations and the exchange of expertise in critical areas. This has also enabled them to work together in NATO-led and UN-mandated military operations. NATO and partner countries in the Gulf held the fourth ICI Policy Advisory Group Meeting, on 22-23 January 2018.

[NATO-ICI Regional Centre holds first energy security training in Kuwait](#), NATO News Release, 13 February 2018

[GCC and NATO have plenty to offer each other](#), Arab News, 5 February 2018

[Recent NATO partners' meeting boosts cooperation – envoy](#), Kuwait News Agency, 27 January 2018

[NATO meets Gulf partners](#), NATO News Release, 25 January 2018

Japan

Japan is the longest-standing of NATO's 'partners across the globe'. Building on initial contacts in the early 1990s, dialogue on common security interests has become more regular and structured. NATO and Japan signalled their commitment to strengthen cooperation in a joint political declaration signed in April 2013. In January 2018 Japan joined NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn and in May opened a mission at NATO HQ in Brussels. (Also see *Asia-Pacific and NATO* above)

[Allies agree Japan's Mission to NATO](#), NATO News Release, 24 May 2018

[Japan turns to NATO for improving cyber-defense](#), Asia Times, 22 January 2018

[Abe wins cybersecurity support in meeting with Estonian leader Juri Ratas](#), Japan Times, 13 January 2018

Jordan

NATO supports Jordan in the areas of cyber defence, border security and counter improvised explosive devices (C-IED). In February 2018, NATO launched a Defence Capacity Building Project on "Enhancing Jordan's capacity for Crisis Management, Continuity of Government and Exercises". The three-year project is expected to assist the Jordanian National Centre for Security and Crisis Management in achieving full operational capability, and to enhance Jordan's capacity in national resilience and crisis management.

[Jordan, NATO draw map of continued cooperation](#), Jordan Times, 7 March 2018

[NATO launches defence capacity-building project for Jordan](#), The Jordan Times, 21 February 2018

[NATO launches defence capacity building project for Jordan](#), NATO News Release, 19 January 2018

Macedonia

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1995 and agreed a Membership Action Plan in 1999. Beyond the need to make progress on reforms, the country must find a mutually acceptable solution with Greece to the issue over its name before it can be invited to join NATO.

During a visit to Macedonia in January 2018, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the country needed to resolve the decades-long dispute over its name, implement judicial reform and build good relations with neighbouring countries to join NATO.

[NATO Chief Hopes Macedonia, Greece Can Resolve Name Dispute](#), Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 25 May 2018

[Zaev repeats commitment to NATO, EU accession before meeting](#), Ekathimerini, 17 May 2018

[Kotzias: Too late for FYROM to join NATO in July](#), Ekathimerini, 18 April 2018

Might the question of what to call Macedonia finally be resolved? The Economist, 6 February 2018

[Over 64% of FYRO Macedonian citizens favor EU accession, 66% want NATO membership](#), BalkanEU, 12 February 2018

[Macedonia 'optimistic' on Nato despite Greek far right](#), EU Observer, 1 February 2018

[Macedonia takes step to end Greek name dispute](#), EU Observer 25 January 2018

[NATO Secretary General in Skopje: "We want you to succeed"](#), NATO News Release, 19 January 2018

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg [Macedonia told to resolve Greece dispute and implement reforms to join NATO](#), Reuters, 18 January 2018

[Nato prepares to take in Macedonia](#), EU observer, 18 January 2018

[NATO Secretary General begins two-day visit to Skopje](#), NATO News Release, 17 January 2018

[Macedonia, Greece Agree to Form Working Groups on Name Dispute](#), Reuters, 12 January 2018

Moldova

Moldova contributes to the NATO-led operation in Kosovo and cooperates with the alliance and other partner countries in many other areas. NATO supports the country's reform efforts and especially capacity-building in the defence and security sector.

[Neutral Moldova arming itself under NATO standards](#), Eurasia Daily, 21 February 2018

[NATO launches second cyber defence project with Moldova](#), NATO News Release, 20 February 2018

[Moldovan Army Looks to NATO for Modernisation Help](#), Balkan Insight, 30 January 2018

Policy

Ruben Díaz-Plaja, [Projecting Stability: an agenda for action](#), NATO Review, 13 March 2018

Alexander Lanoszka, [Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War](#), *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 39:2, 2018, pp. 234-257

Hannes Adomeit, [NATO's Eastward Enlargement What Western Leaders Said](#), German Federal Academy for Security Policy, Security Policy Working Paper, No. 3/2018

Qatar

Qatar is one of four countries—along with Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates—participating in NATO's 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, see above. In January 2018, Qatar signed a security agreement with NATO and in March signed a further agreement allowing NATO forces and personnel to enter and transit Qatar, and to use the Al-Udeid Air Base. This will facilitate NATO missions and operations in the region, including the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

[Qatar Signs Security Pact with NATO](#), Albawaba News, 8 March 2018

[Qatar signs security agreement with NATO](#), NATO News Release, 18 January 2018

Serbia

Unlike other Western Balkan partners, Serbia does not aspire to join NATO. However, the country is deepening its political dialogue and cooperation with the alliance on issues of common interest, such as defence reforms.

["It's our obligation to prove consequences of NATO bombing"](#), B92, 14 May 2018

[NATO PA delegation visit to Belgrade underscores strong NATO-Serbia cooperation despite the persistence of misperceptions of the Alliance and its regional role in the country](#), NATO Parliamentary Assembly News Release, 27 April 2018

[Serbian president and premier speak of importance of cooperation with NATO](#), Eurasia Daily, 20 April 2018

[‘We may forgive, but won’t forget’: Serbia’s commemoration of NATO bombing victims ignored by West](#), RT, 25 March 2018

[Serbians Remember NATO bombing in 1999](#), Prensa Latina, 24 March 2018

[Crown Prince Alexander publishes statement regarding the NATO bombing of Serbia](#), 24 March 2018

[84 percent of Serbians oppose NATO membership – poll](#), b92, 23 March 2018

[NATO and Serbia have a strong partnership, says Chairman of the NATO Military Committee](#), NATO News Release, 16 March 2018

Sweden

NATO and Sweden actively cooperate in peace and security operations, and the country has been a major contributor to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994 and became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. Sweden is one of five countries that has enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with NATO.

In an election year in Sweden, there appears to be growing support for joining NATO, with the four-party opposition bloc agreeing in January 2018 to back membership of the alliance for the first time. During a visit to Sweden the same month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said “Sweden and NATO cooperate very tightly. If Sweden were to apply to join, I think there would be broad support for that within NATO”.

Sweden has reintroduced military service, which was scrapped in 2010, for a limited number of draftees who will be called up for compulsory basic training this year. It is also stationing troops on the Baltic island of Gotland for the first time in a decade, and increased [military spending](#) by 2.7 billion Swedish kronor (€274 million) a year from this year through 2020.

In February, the US State Department approved the possible sale of Patriot missiles to Sweden. If completed, the deal would be valued at around \$3.2 billion. In May it was reported that the Swedish Air Force is flying surveillance missions in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, most likely to gather information on Russian forces deployed to Syria.

Also in May, although Sweden has not fought a war in 200 years, the Government issued its 4.8 million households with a manual on what to do if one breaks out. The newly updated 20-page pamphlet, entitled [Om krisen eller kriget kommer](#) (“[If crisis or war comes](#)”), offers strategies for handling everything from cyber attacks and terrorism to climate change, food shortages and fake news

[Sweden Advises Its Citizens to Prepare Wet Wipes and Tinned Hummus in the Event of War](#), Time, 22 May 2018

[War warning: Sweden issues its people with booklet on how to cope with crisis](#), News.com.au, 22 May 2018

[Why Is A Swedish ELINT Aircraft Operating Off Lebanon and Syria These Days?](#), The Aviasionist, 2 May 2018

Björn von Sydow, [Resilience: Planning for Sweden’s “Total Defence”](#), NATO Review, 4 April 2018

Ian Anthony and Carrie Weintraub, [Closing Sweden’s Military Security Deficit: the National Debate on NATO Membership](#), NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 144, March 2018

[Possible \\$3.2B Patriot sale to Sweden gets US State Department approval](#), Defense News, 23 February 2018

[Under threat, Sweden rediscovers its Viking spirit](#), Politicio, 31 January 2018

Swedes told how to prepare for war as Russia fears grow, Financial Times, 17 January 2017

[Nato has no legal duty to come to Sweden’s aid, says secretary-general](#), The Local, 15 January 2018

[NATO Secretary General welcomes deepening cooperation with Sweden](#), NATO News Release, 14 January 2018

Ambassador Malmqvist, [Sweden and NATO – 23 years down the road](#), NATO Review, 11 January 2018

Jay Nordlinger, [Sweden, Jolted Awake](#), National Review, 3 January 2018

Tunisia

In 2014, 20 years after joining the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative, Tunisia entered a NATO individual partnership and cooperation programme focused on priority areas including counter-terrorism and border security. In February 2018. However, Tunisia rejected a NATO grant of €3 million (US\$3.7m) for the establishment of a joint command centre in the country.

Umberto Profazio, [Tunisia's reluctant partnership with NATO](#), IISS Voices, 6 April 2018

[Tunisia rejects proposal for NATO presence: Official](#), AA, 12 February 2018 - NATO offers Tunis 3 million euros in return for granting it access to planned military command centre

Ukraine

Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantial of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified.

[NATO doesn't plan to cease support of Ukraine despite Hungary's demand](#), UNIAN, 27 May 2018

Taras Kuzio, [The Case for Ukraine's Membership of NATO](#), New Eastern Europe, 18 May 2018

[Ukrainian troops complete Combined Resolve X maneuvers with NATO forces](#), Kyiv Post, 11 May 2018

[Hungary once again blocking Ukraine-NATO Commission](#), UNIAN, 23 April 2018

[NATO Military Committee to visit Ukraine April 18-19](#), UNIAN, 18 April 2018

[Poroshenko approves Annual National Program of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation](#), Interfax-Ukraine, 29 March 2018

Taras Kuzio, [Poroshenko could be the president to take Ukraine into NATO](#), The Hill, 18 March 2018

[Poroshenko: Ukraine Seeking NATO Membership Action Plan](#), VOA, 10 March 2018

[Glen Grant: Top 10 NATO standards Ukraine must achieve](#), Kyiv Post, 28 February 2018

[Ukraine has to do more than adopt NATO standards, alliance envoys say](#), Kyiv Post, 27 February 2018

[Poroshenko tells NATO chief of national security reform to alliance's standards](#), Kyiv Post, 23 January 2018

[Poroshenko: Ukraine's membership in EU and NATO not viable in 2018, but will happen eventually](#), Kyiv Post, 6 January 2018

History

Robert Kupiecki, [The Harmel Report and lessons from NATO's dual-track policy](#) (undated)

Institutional Reform

Command structure reforms to enable the more rapid deployment of forces in Europe were agreed when NATO defence ministers met in February (see below). It was agreed to establish two new commands—one focused on securing transit routes by sea and another to deal with facilitating supply lines across land in Europe. In April NATO moved into its new HQ in Brussels (although the [catering](#) apparently is a “violation of the chemical weapons ban”).

[NATO's 7-year switch: Alliance finally makes its move to new headquarters](#), Deutsche Welle, 2 May 2018

[New home, but same worries, as NATO moves into glass and steel HQ](#), Reuters, 20 April 2018

[NATO begins the final phase of its move to a new home](#), NATO News Release, 19 March 2018

[New NATO command centre to be installed in Germany](#), New Europe, 9 February 2018

[Fearing Russia, United States, Germany offer to host new NATO commands: officials](#), Reuters, 8 February 2018

[German army to set up new NATO headquarters](#), Deutsche Welle, 8 February 2018

[Putin's submarines spur Nato to boost its UK nerve centre](#), The Times, 10 January 2018

Intelligence

In 2016, NATO appointed its first Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S) and in 2017 opened its new Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD). In response to the challenging threat environment posed by an assertive Russia and the rise of terrorism and instability in the south, the member states are fundamentally adapting how NATO organises and analyses intelligence. On 23-24 May 2018, the Military Intelligence Committee held one of two annual meetings in Ottawa, Canada.

In January, a Luxembourg-made communications satellite designed in part to expand NATO's surveillance reach and its capability to deter cyber attacks on alliance members was launched into space.

[NATO's Military Intelligence Community meets in Ottawa](#), NATO News Release, 31 May 2018

[Amid Russia threat, NATO calls on members to share more intelligence](#), National Post, 24 May 2018

Artur Gruszczak, [NATO'S Intelligence Adaptation Challenge](#), GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative, March 2018

[Canada assumes chair of Military Intelligence Committee](#), NATO News Release, 31 January 2018

[SpaceX rocket launches Luxembourg satellite for NATO](#), Reuters, 31 January 2018

Maritime Security

Peter Roberts, [Will the Alliance discover navies again?](#) NATO Review, 30 April 2018

Kathleen Hicks, [NATO Needs to Step Up its Maritime Defenses](#), Defense One, 11 April 2018

Must Read: Garrett Hinck, [Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables](#), Lawfare Blog, 5 March 2018

Jerry Hendrix, [There Is No NATO without the North Atlantic](#), National Review, 29 January 2018

[Nuclear submarines inshore Norway 3 to 4 times monthly](#), Barents Observer, 27 January 2018 -NATO and Russia's cat-and-mouse game in the Norwegian and Barents Seas gives a sharp increase in allied port-calls, especially in northern Norway

[NATO seeks better ASW for challenges in Baltic, Black seas](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 2018

[Outgunned Allies Must Contest Baltic, Black Seas: NATO Admiral](#), Breaking Defense, 19 January 2018

Military Exercises

NATO Exercise [Siil 2018](#), involving over 15,000 allies and partner troops from 19 different countries, as well as forces from NATO's enhanced Forward Presence, took place in Estonia between 2-13 May. Naval assets from five allied nations and the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 trained in maritime capabilities and anti-submarine procedures in the Black Sea from 7-13 May, as part of Romania-led Exercise [Sea Shield](#) 18. More than 21 military ships, 10 fighter aircraft, a submarine, and 2,300 servicemen took part in the exercise.

The largest NATO exercise held in Norway since the Cold War will take place in the autumn. [Trident Juncture](#) is set to involve around 40,000 soldiers from 30 countries. Around 130 combat aircraft and 60 vessels are expected to take part in the exercise scheduled to run from 25 October to 7 November.

[Huge NATO exercise gets bigger](#), News in English.No, 24 May 2018

[Sea Shield 18, biggest allied exercise on NATO's Southeastern flank, at Constanta](#), NineO'clock, 3 May 2018

[Exercise Siil 2018 kicks off in Estonia](#), NATO News Release, 2 May 2018

[U.S. And Nato Allies Rally in Europe's Biggest Artillery Drill Since End Of Cold War](#), Newsweek, 8 March 2018

[Scouts Battalion, NATO allies to rehearse wintertime warfare](#), ERR, 5 February 2018

[Formidable Shield 2017 Makes History – Watch how this international maritime exercise successfully delivers world-firsts](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 January 2018

Missile Defence

Under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks, supposedly from countries such as Iran and North Korea. Two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania are also part of the EPAA. Between 2002-17, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system has [reportedly](#) achieved 37 successful missile intercepts out of 46 attempts. However, another failed test of the US Aegis ashore missile defence system took place at the end of January 2018, when a Raytheon SM-3 missile failed to intercept another missile fired from an aircraft near Hawaii.

Stephen J. Cimballa, [Deal Breakers or Speed Bumps? Missile Defenses and Russian-American Nuclear Arms Control](#), The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 31:1, 2018, pp. 2-14

[U.S. Test of Missile Interceptor Fails Off Hawaiian Coast, Officials Say](#), New York Times, 31 January 2018

[Russia is testing new tech for its ICBMs that could defeat NATO missile defences](#), Business Insider, 5 January 2018

Munich Security Conference

MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2018, [To the Brink - and Back?](#)

[‘To the brink- and back?’ – Question remains after the Munich Security Conference](#), Western European Balkans, 20 February 2018

[If America Is First, Is NATO Second? An interview with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg](#), Foreign Policy, 20 February 2018

Pepe Escobar, [Munich did nothing to appease Cold War 2.0 fears](#), Asia Times, 20 February 2018

[U.S. Revives Concerns About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies](#), New York Times, 18 February 2018

[Germany's defence minister says EU defence pact will complement NATO](#), France 24, 18 February 2018

[Russia interference should be countered with 'the truth' and not 'more propaganda,' NATO chief says](#), CNBC, 17 February 2018

[NATO Secretary General meets world leaders at the Munich Security Conference](#), NATO News Release, 17 February 2018

[Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the opening session of the Munich Security Conference](#), 16 February 2018

Magnus Nordenman, [The Munich Security Conference and Transatlantic Security](#), Atlantic Council, 16 February 2018

[Raising the Curtain on MSC: 5 Things to Watch](#), Atlantic Council, 15 February 2018

[AI warfare is coming, and some global leaders say NATO isn't ready](#), Defense News, 15 February 2018

Judy Dempsey, [In Munich, Clinging to Nostalgia](#), Carnegie Europe, 15 February 2018

[Will Nato Nations go to War With Russia? New Munich Security Report Warns of Conflict and Collapse of Liberalism](#), Newsweek, 8 February 2018

[EU, NATO Face Growing Threat of Inadvertent Military Clash, Report Says](#), US News, 7 February 2018

NATO Defence Ministers Meeting Brussels, 14-15 February 2018

A final decision was taken to adapt the NATO Command Structure, with two new commands: a Joint Force Command for the Atlantic, to help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe; and a Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) for logistics, reinforcement and military mobility. It was also agreed to create a new Cyber Operations Centre as part of the adapted NATO Command Structure.

NATO will begin planning for a new training mission in Iraq at the request of both the Iraqi Government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Canada and Poland joined an ongoing multinational effort to develop a new generation of maritime multi-mission aircraft capabilities, while Belgium joined an ongoing multinational effort to acquire multirole tanker-transport aircraft. The first national annual reports on NATO's defence investment pledge were reviewed by ministers, but apparently not all member states submitted plans and none were made public. For further details see this [NATO Watch report](#).

[Poland, Canada join NATO members in potential maritime surveillance aircraft buy](#), Defense News, 15 February 2018

[US Says NATO Closing Gaps In Alliance Unity](#), ATTNNet, 15 February 2018

[NATO's tanker, AWACS programs see membership increase](#), Defense News, 15 February 2018

[UK steps up commitment to a modernised NATO](#), UK MoD News Release, 15 February 2018

[NATO Defence Ministers take decisions to strengthen the Alliance](#), NATO News Release, 15 February 2018

[US, Germany likely home to new NATO commands](#), Defense News, 14 February 2018

[Belgium joins Allied effort to deliver air-to-air refueling capacity](#), NATO News Release, 14 February 2018

[U.S., NATO Urge Hungary, Ukraine To Settle Language-Law Dispute](#), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 February 2018

[NATO Defense Ministers Approve New Alliance Commands](#), US Department of Defense, 14 February 2018

[NATO chief backs bigger alliance training mission in Iraq](#), Reuters, 13 February 2018

[Secretary General: More Countries on Track to Meet NATO Spending Goals](#), US Department of Defense, 13 February 2018

[NATO still struggling to meet US spending demands](#), Stars and Stripes, 13 February 2018

NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting Brussels, 27 April 2018

NATO Foreign Ministers discussed several key issues, including preparations for a new training mission in Iraq and the long-term implications of Russia's foreign and defence policies. They reconfirmed NATO's dual-track approach to Russia: strong deterrence and defence, combined with meaningful dialogue. Ministers also discussed new measures of support for Jordan and Tunisia, and expressed continued commitment to Afghanistan, welcoming President Ghani's offer of peace talks and calling on regional actors to play a constructive role. Finally, ministers also discussed NATO's Open Door Policy and the progress made by aspirant countries.

[Mikser: NATO foreign ministers reaffirmed importance of allied relations](#), ERR News, 28 April 2018

[Pompeo Dives into NATO Diplomacy as Allies Confront Russia](#), Military.com, 27 April 2018

[NATO Supports Afghan Leader's Call For Peace Talks With Taliban](#), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 April 2018

[Statement by Foreign Ministers on Afghanistan](#), NATO Press Release, 27 April 2018

[Secretary General chairs last-ever North Atlantic Council meeting in NATO's original Brussels Headquarters building](#), NATO News Release, 27 April 2018

[Press Conference](#) by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the morning meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Foreign Ministers' session, 27 April 2018

[Allies discuss NATO's Open Door Policy as ministerial meeting wraps up](#), NATO News Release, 27 April 2018

[On first day, Pompeo charms NATO but warns on Iran, defense spending](#), Reuters, 27 April 2018

[Foreign Ministers Setting Stage for NATO Summit, Secretary General Says](#), US Department of Defense, 26 April 2018

[Secretary General previews meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers](#), NATO News Release, 26 April 2018

NATO Military Committee Meetings, Brussels, 16 May 2018 and 16-17 January 2018

The NATO Military Committee—the most senior military authority within NATO and comprising the 29 chiefs of defence—met in the alliance's new headquarters in Brussels in May to discuss proposals that will go to defence ministers at their NATO meeting in June, and ultimately to alliance heads of state/government at the July NATO Summit. For further details see this [NATO Watch report](#).

[Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee attends the 12th conference of the Chiefs of Defence of the Balkan countries](#), NATO News Release, 28 May 2018

[Dunford Pleased with Results of NATO Military Committee Meeting](#), US Department of Defense, 17 May 2018

[NATO Chiefs of Defence inaugural meeting in new NATO Headquarters focuses on Deterrence and Defence, Modernisation and Projecting Stability](#), NATO News Release, 16 May 2018

[NATO Must Adapt, Alliance's Military Committee Chairman Says](#), US Department of Defense, 16 May 2018

[NATO Aims to Stay Capable, Agile to Meet Threats](#), US Department of Defense, 16 May 2018

[New NATO Headquarters Hosts Military Committee Meeting](#), US Department of Defense, 16 May 2018

[NATO Chiefs of Defence address Adaptation, Coherence and Cooperation](#), NATO News Release, 17 January 2018

[NATO Military Chiefs Discuss Strategic Environment's Challenges](#), US Department of Defense, 17 January 2018

[NATO Notes Russia's 'Resurgence,' Urges Vigilance](#), Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 17 January 2018

[Russia closing gap with NATO, top US general in Europe warns](#), Stars and Stripes, 17 January 2018

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The Polish Parliament hosted the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Spring Session from 25-28 May 2018, which brought together some 260 parliamentarians from the 29 NATO member countries as well as delegates from partner countries and observers to discuss current international security issues and the draft reports prepared by the Assembly's five Committees: Political, Defence and Security, Science and Technology, Civil Dimension of Security and Economics and Security. For further details see this [NATO Watch report](#).

The first Annual Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was issued in February. According to Paolo Alli, President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "[O]ur work helps make NATO and NATO policies more transparent for our citizens, and this annual report will further enhance our Assembly's own transparency. My hope is that this report will help our citizens better understand the value of our work and the contribution our Assembly and NATO make to our security today and tomorrow". The 2017 Annual Report focuses on the following topics:

- Russia's Destabilising Global Activism
- Instability in NATO's Southern Neighbourhood
- NATO Adaptation

- The Transatlantic Bond, Burden sharing and New US Priorities for NATO
- Expanding the Assembly's Network of Partners
- Technological Risks and Opportunities
- Climate Change and Security
- The High North
- The Western Balkans
- Afghanistan
- Strengthening Women's Role in Peace and Security
- Communication and Education about NATO

[YPG defined as PKK offshoot for first time in NATO PA report](#), Daily Sabah, 31 May 2018

[Secretary General addresses NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Warsaw](#), NATO News Release, 28 May 2018

[Parliamentarians appeal for unity, credibility ahead of July NATO Summit](#), NATO PA News Release, 28 May 2018

[NATO should adopt hybrid warfare trigger: Special Rapporteur](#), Shephard Media, 28 May 2018

[NATO PA confronts Russian election meddling, tech-terrorists](#), NATO PA News Release, 27 May 2018

[Response to Russian military buildup on Allies' eastern borders debated at NATO PA](#), NATO PA News Release, 27 May 2018

[Defence spending, transatlantic ties paramount concerns, NATO told](#), NATO PA News Release, 27 May 2018

[NATO lags behind Russia and China on defence tech, must invest more](#), NATO Parliamentary Assembly News Release, 27 May 2018

[North Korea talks progress welcomed at NATO PA, doubts over deal](#), NATO Parliamentary Assembly News Release, 27 May 2018

[NATO PA Spring Session in Warsaw focuses on NATO Summit in July](#), Estonian Parliament Press Release, 26 May 2018

[European energy security in the spotlight at NATO PA meeting](#), NATO PA News Release, 26 May 2018

[NATO nations urged to avoid trade protectionism trap](#), NATO PA News Release, 26 May 2018

[NATO Allies urged to provide Iraq trainers, bolster southern flank](#), NATO PA News Release, 26 May 2018

[NATO lawmakers urge robust response to Russia's hybrid aggression](#), NATO PA News Release, 26 May 2018

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, [2017 Annual Presidential Report](#), February 2018

Nuclear Weapons

US Nuclear Posture Review

On the 2 February 2018, the US Department of Defence released its new [nuclear posture review](#) (NPR). Overall, the new NPR continued an aggressive and expansive approach to nuclear weapons policy, which has been the benchmark for successive US administrations. The current nuclear weapon and infrastructure modernisation programme, for example, began under the Obama administration. And the policies and practices associated with nuclear deterrence have been in place since the 1950s, as Daniel Ellsberg's latest book [The Doomsday Machine](#) clearly shows.

However, the new NPR sets out expanded scenarios for the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats, including cyber threats. It also identifies a plan to develop new "low-yield" warheads for its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and new ground-launched cruise missiles. The NPR contends that this capability would strengthen nuclear deterrence, while critics argue it would lower the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of nuclear war. While testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, US Defense Secretary James Mattis [said](#) that the proposed new nuclear systems could be used as a bargaining chip to bring Russia back into compliance with the INF Treaty.

The new NPR also directly attacks the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as “polarising” and potentially damaging to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, yet also asserts that the US does not support ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has no reference to disarmament commitments under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

One week before the NPR was published, the Doomsday Clock was advanced by 30 seconds to [2 minutes to midnight](#). The last time the clock was moved so close to midnight was in 1953, during the Cold War.

In January, two democratic lawmakers sought [to introduce legislation](#) that would require congressional approval before President Trump could launch a first-use nuclear strike. The move came as numerous current and former congressional and government officials [criticised](#) the president’s escalating rhetoric, which included a claim that his nuclear button was “much bigger & more powerful” than Kim Jong Un’s.

In April, arms control experts from the US, Europe and Russia signed a [statement](#) warning that the US and Russian nuclear arsenals could soon be unconstrained by any binding arms control agreements for the first time since 1972, triggering an expensive and dangerous new arms race.

New Russian nuclear weapons

In March, during his state of the nation address Russian President Vladimir Putin [said](#) that Russia has designed nuclear weapons capable of circumventing missile defence systems. The Russian president also announced plans to augment the country’s weapons arsenal with nuclear-powered cruise missiles that can strike any point on earth, adding that Moscow successfully tested one such missile last year. Putin framed these advances as a response to both US missile defence systems intended to challenge Russian capabilities and Washington’s unwillingness to take

Russia’s nuclear might seriously. However, some of the technological advances may well be exaggerated, with [testing of the nuclear powered cruise missile](#) particularly problematic.

“Russia is not building new dedicated theatre-nuclear systems, and there is little evidence of new ‘low-yield’ warheads; it does not have an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine; and it is not practising the use of nuclear weapons in large-scale military exercises. The Russian nuclear problem is real and serious – but it is political more than it is military.”

Bruno Tertrais, [Russia’s Nuclear Policy: Worrying for the Wrong Reasons](#), *Survival*, Vol. 60:2, 2018, pp. 33-44

Disinvestment from the nuclear weapons industry

According to the 2018 edition of [Don’t Bank on the Bomb](#) there are 319 significant investors in the top 20 nuclear weapon producers, the majority based in the US. The report also identifies the financial institutions that have adopted policies prohibiting any investment in nuclear weapons. Since the adoption of the TPNW in July 2017, two of the five biggest pension funds in the world have decided to end their relationship with nuclear weapon producers citing “international developments” as the motivating factor. Norway’s \$1 trillion sovereign wealth fund [will exclude](#) investing in BAE Systems, AECOM, Fluor Corp, Huntington Ingalls Industries, and Honeywell because of their involvement in the production of key components for nuclear weapons. The largest Dutch pension fund, the civil servants fund ABP, has decided to [end](#) investments—worth \$1 billion in 2016—in producers of nuclear weapons.

Vulnerability of nuclear weapon systems to cyber attacks

Risks of cyber attacks on nuclear weapons systems are “relatively high” according to a new [report](#) from Chatham House. Failure to keep up with fast-moving advances, lack of skilled staff, and the slowness of institutional change are cited as the main causes for this vulnerability, which is apparently not receiving adequate attention from those involved in military planning and weapons procurement.

Transparency deficit

These two reports by the US Government Accountability Office [have been determined](#) to contain either classified information or controlled unclassified information by the audited agencies and cannot be publicly released:

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe
GAO-18-86C: Published: 6 February 2018

Dual Capable Aircraft: DOD Needs to Develop a Reliable Schedule and Address Risk for Nuclear Certification of the F-35A
GAO-18-82C: Published: 31 January 2018

“NATO’s security requires a hard look at and new approaches to NATO deterrence and defense through the prism of reducing the risk of nuclear use. Forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe increase the risk of accidents, blunders, or catastrophic terrorism and invite pre-emption. Given these added risks, it is past time to revisit whether these forward-based weapons are essential for military deterrence and political reassurance”.

[New NTI Report Questions Need for Forward-Deployed U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe](#), NTI, 15 February 2018

[Russia’s Apocalypse Missile Keeps Crashing](#), Popular Mechanics, 23 May 2018
[US and Russian nuclear arsenals set to be unchecked for first time since 1972](#), The Guardian, 17 April 2010

Kingston Reif, [New Russian Weapons Raise Arms Race Fears](#), Arms Control Today, April 2018

[Leading by Example: Reforming UK Nuclear Declaratory Policy](#), BASIC Parliamentary Briefing Paper, April 2018

[Russia has tested new nuclear missile that NATO calls 'Satan 2'](#), ABC News, 30 March 2018

Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, [The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience](#), *Survival*, Vol. 60:2, 2018, pp. 61-72

Russia’s new nuclear weapons are technically plausible.....but practically dubious, *The Economist*, 8 March 2018

[NATO, Trump, Merkel, Macron Concerned Over Putin’s Weapons Claims](#), Eurasia Review, 3 March 2018

[Putin Shows New Russian Nuclear Weapons: 'It Isn't a Bluff'](#), New York Times, 1 March 2018

[Putin threatens US arms race with new missiles declaration](#), The Guardian, 1 March 2018

Paul Meyer, [Folding the Umbrella: Nuclear Allies, the NPT and the Ban Treaty](#), Canadian Pugwash Group, 28 February 2018

Rajan Menon, [Dr. Strangelove in the Pentagon: Lowering the Nuclear Threshold and Other Follies of the New Nuclear Posture Review](#), TomDispatch, 25 February 2018

Dick Zandee and Sico van der Meer, [Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review: A New Rift between Europe and the US?](#) Clingendael Policy Brief, February 2018

Must Read: [Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture](#), NTI Report, January 2018

Amy F. Woolf, [Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons](#), Congressional Research Service, 13 February 2018

Must Read: Tom Sauer, [The US Nuclear Posture Review does not carry Trump’s signature](#), Defense News, 9 February 2018

[Mattis: Plans for new U.S. nuclear weapon could be bargaining chip with Russia](#), Washington Post, 6 February 2018

[Nuclear Posture Review puts Russia firmly in crosshairs](#), Defense News, 4 December 2018

[To Counter Russia, U.S. Signals Nuclear Arms Are Back in a Big Way](#), New York Times, 4 February 2018

Karl-Heinz Kamp, [Nuclear reorientation of NATO](#), NATO Defense College Commentary, February 2018

Paul Rogers, [Nuclear Posture Review: Sliding Towards Nuclear War?](#) The Transnational, 1 February 2018

Claudia Major, [Germany's Dangerous Nuclear Sleepwalking](#), Carnegie Europe, 25 January 2018

[Dozens of US nuclear weapons in Turkey could be in question as the NATO allies fight a proxy war in Syria](#), Business Insider, 22 January 2018

[US Air Force in bombing exercise over North Sea](#), EuroNews, 19 January 2018

Unal, B. and Lewis, P., [Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences](#), Research Paper, International Security Department, Chatham House, January 2018

[BAE ditched by Norway's \\$1 trillion investment fund over nuclear weapon concerns](#), Telegraph, 16 January 2018

[Pentagon suggests countering devastating cyberattacks with nuclear arms](#), New York Times, 16 January 2018

[NATO chief: UN convention won't rid world of nuclear arms](#), ABC News, 14 January 2018

Must Read: David P. Barash, [Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that](#), The Guardian, 14 January 2018 - Nuclear deterrence continues to dominate international relations. Yet there is no proof it ever worked, nor that it ever will

Must Read: [Exclusive: Here is a draft of Trump's Nuclear Review. He wants a lot more nukes](#), Huffington Post, 11 January 2018

[Sweden defies US, NATO threats over UN nuclear ban treaty](#), Daily Sabah, 2 January 2018

Operations and Missions

Andrew T. Wolff, [Invitations to Intervene and the Legitimacy of EU and NATO Civilian and Military Operations](#), International Peacekeeping, Vol. 25:1, 2018, pp. 52-78

Afghanistan

In early January the US military [announced](#) that it was strengthening its presence in Afghanistan, including additional armed and unarmed drones and roughly 1,000 combat advisers. However, January saw a resurgence of high-profile attacks by Taliban and Islamic State in the capital. An Islamic State [suicide attack](#) on a market in Kabul in January, for example, left at least 20 dead and 30 wounded, while a [Taliban siege](#) of the Intercontinental Hotel left at least 18 dead and a Taliban [bombing](#) of a crowded shopping street killed at least 95 and wounded 158 people.

In February, the US military announced that it had expanded its air war against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. US military officials described the bombing in a news release as the largest guided-weapons drop ever made by a B-52.

In March, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani invited the Taliban to discuss a political settlement to the conflict, with elements of the Taliban apparently voicing interest in such a discussion. In a visit to Kabul, US Defense Secretary James Mattis [stated](#) that he is just as focused on promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan as he is on winning the ground war against the Taliban. "All wars come to an end," Mattis told reporters en route to Kabul. "You don't want to miss an opportunity because you weren't alert to the opportunity. So, you need to have that door open, even if you embrace the military pressure."

US strategy is to force the Taliban to the negotiating table by exerting effective pressure through military action. The US commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. John Nicholson, confirmed in March that US forces were stepping up their efforts to secure Kabul by

launching special operations raids in an effort to remove the Taliban from the city. He also [accused](#) Russia of arming the Taliban.

In an interview with the Washington Post, Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that new troops and equipment and a closer relationship with Afghan forces would reverse Taliban gains. "This is not another year of the same thing we've been doing for 17 years. This is a fundamentally different approach", he said. However, the reality is that the Taliban have made significant [territorial gains](#), with the group now a threat in 70 per cent of Afghanistan. Moreover, the strength of the Afghan security forces has declined sharply over the past 12 months, a US government watchdog said, amid reports of desertions and high casualty rates. The number of security forces personnel has fallen by about 10 per cent to just under 300,000, [according to a new report](#) at the end of April (although the figures were subsequently [revised](#) upwards to 313,728 as of 31 January).

In April, another suicide bombing by the Islamic State in Kabul killed 57 people waiting for voter ID cards and injured 119 others. The Afghan government is conducting a voter registration drive in advance of autumn elections for the National Assembly and local councils. Afghanistan will also have a presidential election in 2019.

[Financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces key to lasting security in Afghanistan](#), NATO News, 29 May 2018

[Cancel Security Agreements with US and NATO: Senators](#), Tolo News, 20 May 2018

Antonio Giustozzi, [Daesh Moves House: Settling in to Life in Afghanistan](#), RUSI Newsbrief, 18 May 2018

[Afghan officials discuss building integrity and good governance](#), NATO News Release, 15 May 2018

[Afghan security forces 'shrink sharply' - US watchdog](#), BBC News, 1 May 2018

['Failure strategy': How NATO won the battle but lost Afghanistan](#), CBC, 1 May 2018 - A new book by the former Canadian commander explores a pivotal battle and the politics that surrounded it

[Taliban Cannot Win War, Better To Accept Peace Offer: NATO](#), Tolo News, 16 March 2018

[Taliban Briefly Take Afghan District as Security Worsens](#), New York Times, 12 March 2018

[NATO supportive of reforms in police ranks, says Mol](#), Pajhwok, 4 March 2018

Must Read: Steven Aftergood, [The Expanding Secrecy of the Afghanistan War](#), Secrecy News blog, 7 February 2018

Borhan Osman, [The Cost of Escalating Violence in Afghanistan](#), International Crisis Group Commentary, 7 February 2018

[In a new wave of the Afghanistan air war, the U.S. strikes a little-known militant group](#), Washington Post, 6 February 2018

Tony Tai-Ting Liu, [Afghanistan and Its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal](#), *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 70:1, 2018, pp.143-144

Ivo Daalder, [The tragic truth about America's longest war](#), CNN, 2 February 2018

[NATO supports dialogue between Allied military cadets and Afghan citizens](#), NATO News Release, 1 February 2018

[Attacks Reveal What U.S. Won't: Victory Remains Elusive in Afghanistan](#), New York Times, 29 January 2018

['It's a Massacre': Blast in Kabul Deepens Toll of a Long War](#), New York Times, 27 January 2018

[Siege at Kabul Hotel Caps a Violent 24 Hours in Afghanistan](#), New York Times, 21 January 2018

[US has to pay Pakistan \\$45m for using roads for Nato supplies](#), The News, 5 January 2018

Kosovo

NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo (KFOR) since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area. As at February

2018 [KFOR](#) had 4,031 personnel from 28 contributing countries.

[Kosovo, NATO Conduct Training Exercise Near Pristina Featuring Mock Riot](#), Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 28 April 2018

Andrew Testa, [Kosovo Finds Little to Celebrate After 10 Years of Independence](#), New York Times, 15 February 2018

[Montenegro Officers to Join NATO Force in Kosovo](#), Balkan Insight, 2 February 2018 - Montenegro plans to deploy two military officers in the NATO-led mission in Kosovo, its first new international operation since it joined the Western military alliance last year

Libya

Abstract: There is a widespread assumption that, given the imminent threat of mass atrocities against the Libyan civilians – especially in Benghazi – and in the absence of non-military alternatives, military action against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi was a justified and necessary response. This paper challenges this widespread assumption. It argues that on the eve of NATO-led military intervention, there was no ‘clear evidence’ to suggest that the Libyan regime was on the verge of committing mass atrocities against civilians. This research also documents the range of political and diplomatic options open to the international community to engage with Gaddafi, all of which were sidetracked in favour of military action. Despite the brutality of Gaddafi’s rule, military intervention in Libya did not meet the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) ‘just cause’ and ‘last resort’ criteria. Far from being a successful application of R2P’s most coercive pillar, the Libyan case was a manifest misapplication of R2P’s military component. An objective analysis of the Libyan crisis during February and March 2011 should have prevented the use of military force.

Arif Saba and Shahram Akbarzadeh, [The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: An Assessment of the Just Cause and Last Resort Criteria in the Case of Libya](#), *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25:2, 2018, 242-265.

[Belgian lawyer takes on NATO immunity in Libya](#), Brussels Times, 2 February 2018

Populism and NATO

Recent elections in several European countries witnessed the rise of populist movements, most of which share Eurosceptic, isolationist, and often pro-Russian stances. What effects should we expect from these electoral results and, more broadly, from the rise of populist movements in European states—especially those who belong to NATO? Will Europe be affected? If so, will this have any influence on NATO or Alliance stability?

Sven Biscop, [The Dangerous Geopolitics of Populism, and What NATO and the EU Can Do About It](#), Egmont Security Policy Brief No.97, May 2018

Rob Berschinski, [The Threat within NATO](#), Defense One, 9 April 2018

Must Read: Judy Dempsey, [NATO’s bad apples](#), Carnegie Europe, 3 April 2018 - NATO faces a dilemma over criticizing member states that undermine democracy and the rule of law and disclose information that might endanger an ally

Federica Vinci, [Quo Vadis Europe: NATO and the Rise of Populism](#), NATO Defense College Commentary 02/18, February 2018

Russia-NATO relations

In January, US Senate Democrats released a report [alleging](#) that Russia conducted a broad campaign over the past 20 years to undermine democratic institutions in Western Europe and North America using military operations, cyber attacks and disinformation. The 200-page report from the Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal was to “undermine the transatlantic alliance”. It makes 30 policy recommendations, including freezing Russian finances linked to corruption, supporting democratic institutions abroad and levying new sanctions against Russia. Senate Republicans declined to join the report.

In March and April Russia-NATO relations declined further following the chemical weapon attack in the UK (see above). In April, however, the supreme allied commander of NATO and Russia's top general [met](#) in Azerbaijan, the first meeting between the two generals since 2013.

The [NATO-Russia Council](#) (NRC) met at Ambassadorial level in Brussels on the 31 May 2018. According to a [NATO news release](#) there was an "open exchange on several topics, including the situation in and around Ukraine, issues related to military activities, transparency and risk reduction, as well as asymmetric techniques as aspects of doctrine and strategy". Both sides also briefed on major upcoming military exercises.

NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia in 2014 due to Moscow's intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. For two years, ambassadors and ministers did not meet, until the NRC was revived in 2016. This latest meeting of the NRC was the seventh over the past two years, and the first since October 2017.

In May, NATO and the EU demanded that Russia [accept responsibility](#) for the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine, an incident in which 298 civilians of multiple nationalities were killed.

[NATO-Russia Council meets in Brussels](#), NATO News, 31 May 2018

[NATO Warns Russia On 'Malign Activities,' Briefs On War Games](#), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 May 2018

[NATO General Surprised By Lack Of 'Visible Russian Interference' In Armenia Crisis](#), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4 May 2018

[Mirror Images: The Standoff between Moscow and Western Capitals](#), International Crisis Group Commentary, 4 May 2018

Viljar Veebel, [NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States](#), Defence Studies, vol. 18:2, pp. 229-251

[Russia says NATO membership of Balkan countries threatens security](#), Reuters, 23 April 2018

Must Read: Thomas Frear, Lukasz Kulesa and Denitsa Raynova, [Russia and NATO: How to overcome deterrence instability?](#) European Leadership Network Euro-Atlantic Security Report, April 2018

Wolfgang Rudischhauser, [Putin's Weapons Show Just hot air from Moscow?](#) German Federal Academy for Security Policy, Security Policy Working Paper No.7, April 2018

[Top Russian, NATO generals hold rare face-to-face meeting](#), Reuters, 19 April 2018

Ulrich Kühn, [Strategic Toughness Toward Russia the Key to Keeping Baltic Allies Safe](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 April 2018

[NATO Has Crossed a 'Red Line' With Expansion, Russian Official Warns](#), Moscow Times, 3 April 2018

James Stavridis, [A New Cold War Is Not Inevitable](#), Bloomberg, 27 March 2018

Nolan Peterson, [NATO Braces for Putin's Next Military Move in Eastern Europe](#), Daily Signal, 26 March 2018

Dave Majumdar, [Here's Why Russia's 'New' Tu-160M2 Could Be NATO's Worst Nightmare](#), National Interest, 23 March 2018

[Nato must improve defences against a 'more aggressive' Russia, says chief](#), The Guardian, 18 March 2018

Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, [NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard](#), National Security Archive, 16 March 2018 - Russian president led to believe Partnership for Peace was alternative to expanded NATO; Documents show early Russian opposition to "neo-containment;" more U.S. assurances to Russia: "inclusion not exclusion" in new European security structures

Robert Farley, [FACT: NATO Thought Russia Would Crush Them In a War \(Until the 1970s\)](#), The National Interest, 10 April 2018

[Russia's conventional forces outgun NATO near its borders](#), The Economist, 8 March 2018

Ulrich Kühn, [Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018

[NATO says Russian warnings against allies "unacceptable"](#), Reuters, 2 March 2018

Alexander Gabuev, [Russian-U.S. Flashpoints in the Post-Soviet Space: The View from Moscow](#), US-Russia Insight, Carnegie Moscow Center, 23 February 2018

Paul Stronski, [Managing Potential Flashpoints Between Russia and the West in Eurasia](#), US-Russia Insight, Carnegie Moscow Center, 23 February 2018

Andrey Kortunov, [Disillusionment and Missed Opportunities: Russian-U.S. Relations in 2017](#), US-Russia Insight, Carnegie Moscow Center, 23 February 2018

...the main issue is conflict over the regional and global security order. This conflict's primary players are the United States and Russia. Washington insists on a European security order centered on NATO, while Moscow prioritizes building geopolitical buffers in Europe to protect itself from NATO. Moscow does not view European NATO members as neutral but as secondary players in the conflict. And although Russia and the United States are again the prime adversaries, Europeans and Russians have become mutually alienated.

Must Read: Dmitri Trenin, [European Security: From Managing Adversity To A New Equilibrium](#), Carnegie Moscow Center, February 2018

Pavel K. Baev, [The military dimension of Russia's connection with Europe](#), *European Security*, Vol. 27:1, 2018, pp. 82-97

[NATO's declared readiness to work with Russia runs counter to practical deeds — diplomat](#), TASS, 16 February 2018

Must Read: Bruni Tertrais, [Does Russia really include limited nuclear strikes in its large-scale military exercises?](#) IISS Politics and Strategy, 15 February 2018

Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronski, [The \(Former\) Soviet Empire Strikes Back](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 February 2018

[Russia Tells NATO Not to Worry About New Missiles on The Border](#), Newsweek, 6 February 2018

[Lithuania: Russia Deploying More Missiles into Kaliningrad](#), VOA, 5 February 2018

Robert Beckhusen, [If Russia Went to War Against NATO It Might Lose For One Simple Reason](#), National Interest, 2 February 2018

[Putin names air force regiment 'Tallinn' in snub to NATO](#), New Europe, 2 February 2018

Must Read: Keir Giles, [Russia Hit Multiple Targets with Zapad-2017](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 25 January 2018

Must Read: Aleksandr Khramchikhin, [Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 25 January 2018

Must Read: Dmitri Trenin, [Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War](#), Carnegie Moscow Center, 25 January 2018

[America planned to bring Russia in from the cold with Star Wars project](#), The Telegraph, 20 January 2018

Jiri and Leni Friedman Valenta, [Russia's Strategic Advantage in the Baltics: A Challenge to NATO?](#), The Begin-Sadat Center For Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 143, January 2018

[From this secret base, Russian spy ships increase activity around global data cables](#), Barents Observer, 12 January 2018

[Russia 'simulated full-scale war' against Nato, says military commander](#), The Independent, 7 January 2018

[NATO's intercepts of Russian aircraft increased in 2017 from 2016](#), The Baltic Times, 6 January 2018

Robert Johnson, [Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures: A Critique of the Literature](#), Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 29:1, 2018, pp. 141-163

[Shoigu: NATO is Massing Troops along Russia's Western Borders](#), Polygraph Info, 3 January 2018

"If Nato was dissolved tomorrow, you'd be amazed how peaceful Europe would become. The reason for its existence – the USSR – vanished decades ago. We don't keep up a huge alliance to protect us from the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Ottomans, or any other powers that have disappeared. So why this one? It was preserved to save the jobs and pensions of its staff. It was only expanded because American arms manufacturers were afraid they would lose business when the Cold War ended".

Peter Hitchens [blog](#), MailOnline, 18 March 2018

Secretary General's Annual Report

In March, Jens Stoltenberg released his fourth Annual Report as NATO Secretary General.

[The Secretary General's Annual Report 2017](#)

[NATO Trends Heading Up, Annual Report Shows](#), US DoD News Release, 16 March 2018

Strategic Concept

Rosario Soler, [NATO: Towards a new Strategic Concept](#), IIR, 29 January 2018

Summits

NATO's next Summit: 11-12 July 2018 in Brussels

Hans Binnendijk and Edward Joseph, [Needed: A Balkan initiative for the NATO summit](#), Defense News, 2 May 2018

[3,500 police reinforcements needed for Nato summit](#), The Bulletin, 14 March 2018

Olesya Brodin, [NATO Summit 2018 – An Implementation Summit?](#) German Marshal Fund, 11 January 2018

Syria

In the brutal seven-year Syrian civil war, there have been persistent allegations that President Assad has repeatedly used chemical weapons against his own people, some of which have been verified by the UN or other independent groups, although many of the allegations remain contested and contentious.

The most recent [suspected chemical weapons attack](#) in Syria took place on the 7 April in Douma, a suburb outside of Damascus, killing at least [several dozen](#) civilians. This followed smaller chlorine gas attacks that [were reported](#) in Douma on 7 and 11 March. Although the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announced that it would be investigating the incident to determine which chemical weapons may have been used, on the 13 April, three NATO member states—the United States, France and the United Kingdom—pre-empted the investigation and conducted airstrikes against [three targets in Syria](#).

In a televised [address to the nation](#), President Trump explained that the purpose of the strike was to "establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread and use of chemical weapons". UK Prime Minister Theresa May and President Emmanuel Macron of France also issued [statements](#) on the airstrikes.

The next day, the UN Security Council [met](#) to discuss the situation in Syria. Russia condemned the airstrikes, which it asserted were a violation of the UN Charter. Russia also introduced a [draft resolution](#) which condemned "aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies", but it only received three votes (Russia, China and Bolivia) and failed to pass. Eight Security Council members voted against (including, unsurprisingly, France, the UK and the US) and four abstained.

NATO released three press statements the day after the airstrikes. First, the [NATO Secretary General expressed his support](#) for the actions taken by the three member states and argued that it “will reduce the regime’s ability to further attack the people of Syria with chemical weapons”—despite US [airstrikes on Sharyrat airbase in Syria in April 2017](#) proving ineffective as a deterrent to further chemical weapons use in Syria. The second press release [announced](#) that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would meet at Ambassadorial level later that day in order for France, the UK and the USA “to update the Council on the latest developments in Syria”. Finally, the NAC released a [statement](#) on “Actions taken against the use of chemical weapons in Syria”, in which the three allies briefed “that a significant body of information indicated that the Syrian regime was responsible for the attack against civilians in Douma on 7 April” and “that there was no practicable alternative to the use of force”. The statement also said that “Allies expressed their full support for this action”.

The strikes “degraded the capabilities of Syria to conduct new attacks and at the same time send a clear message which deters further attacks”, NATO Secretary General [Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference](#) after the meeting of the NAC. “We will never have a total guarantee against new attacks as long as we have regimes which are willing to use chemical weapons”, he said. “Chemical weapons cannot be used with impunity and cannot be normalized”.

Nonetheless, there was no recognition by the Secretary General that the airstrikes had been undertaken in advance of any findings from the OPCW, international authorization within the United Nations or congressional and parliamentary discussion within the three states.

[Syria strike was not justified by existing law says key defence lawyer](#), Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 2018

Peter Certo, [There Was Nothing Humanitarian About Our Strikes on Syria](#), Institute of Policy Studies, 19 April 2018

John Hart and Ralf Trapp, Collateral Damage? [The Chemical Weapons Convention in the Wake of the Syrian Civil War](#), Arms Control Today, April 2018

Must read: Laurie Blank, [Syria Strikes: Legitimacy and Lawfulness](#), Lawfare, 16 April 2018

Dmitri Trenin, [The New Cold War Is Boiling Over in Syria](#), Carnegie Moscow Centre, 14 April 2018

[NATO Allies Back U.S.-Led Airstrikes on Syria: The Latest](#), Time, 14 April 2018

[European leaders back Syria airstrikes: China against](#), Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 2018

[Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after North Atlantic Council meeting on Syria](#), 14 April 2018

[Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Actions taken against the use of chemical weapons in Syria](#), NATO News Release, 14 April 2018

[North Atlantic Council to be briefed on actions taken in Syria](#), NATO Press Release, 14 April 2018

[Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the actions against the Syrian regime's chemical weapons facilities and capabilities](#), NATO Press Release, 14 April 2018

Oytun Orhan, [NATO Allies Go Head to Head in Syria](#), German Marshall Fund, 9 April 2018

Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance

NATO has no list of those who lost their lives in its service, according to officials and officers asked by The Associated Press.

[Memorial recalls the dead, but few at NATO know their names](#), Tampa Bay Times, 25 May 2018

Elisabeth Braw, [Why NATO Needs a Streamlined Decisionmaking Process](#), The National Interest, 1 May 2018

[Russia interference should be countered with 'the truth' and not 'more propaganda.'](#) NATO chief says, CNBC, 17 February 2018

Women, Peace and Security

NATO and partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) are committed to removing barriers for women's participation in peace and security matters, and in 2007 adopted a specific policy to support implementation of UNSCR 1325. At the 2014 Wales Summit, it was acknowledged that the integration of gender perspectives throughout NATO's core tasks would contribute to a more modern, ready and responsive NATO.

The NATO Secretary General has appointed a Special Representative to serve as the high-level focal point on all aspects of NATO's contributions to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In January Clare Hutchinson took office as the Special Representative.

[NATO organises second workshop on military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to, conflict-related sexual and gender based violence](#), NATO News Release, 28 March 2018

[If you want to make peace, listen to women. A Canadian at NATO is doing just that](#), The Star, 11 March 2018

[How do women in science contribute to peace and security?](#) NATO News Release, 5 March 2018

[Improving gender equality in Georgia's armed forces](#), NATO News Release, 26 February 2018

[NATO reaffirms its commitment to women's security in close partnership with the International Community](#), NATO News Release, 18 April 2018

Doug Bandow, [NATO Discovers War Is Bad for Women](#), American Spectator, 12 February 2018

[Angelina Jolie to Tackle Sex Crimes With NATO Gen-Sec](#), Telesur, 31 January 2018

Abstract (abridged): As a result of NATO's engagement with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda, military personnel have been tasked with engaging with and implementing NATO's interpretation of that agenda, to do 'gender work' within the alliance. There is only a small—though increasing—number of men working full time on gender issues within the military structures of the alliance. This article analyses the experiences of two military men doing this gender work. Conceptualizing a (re)negotiation of gender relationships based upon empathy, similarity, interdependence, respect and equality, the accounts of these men are analysed, exploring ways in which a more 'gender conscious' militarized masculinity may develop. It is argued that positive, incremental shifts within militarized masculinities should not be dismissed; yet the process is contested, contradictory and incomplete. The article highlights how perceived gender transgressions are policed and controlled via trivialization and feminization, and how conceptualizations of masculinist protection and credibility can reinforce pre-existing gender relations.

Matthew Hurley, [The 'genderman': \(re\)negotiating militarized masculinities when 'doing gender' at NATO](#), *Critical Military Studies*, Vol. 4:1, 2018, pp.72-91

[Jolie to NATO: Take Lead In Fighting Crimes Against Women In War Zones](#), Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 31 January 2018

[UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie visits NATO Headquarters](#), NATO News Release, 31 January 2018

George Szamuely, [NATO's Fraudulent War on Behalf of Women](#), CounterPunch, 9 January 2018

[NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security takes office](#), NATO News Release, 8 January 2018

Carol Cohn, [The Perils of Mixing Masculinity and Missiles](#), *New York Times*, 5 January 2018

Security News from NATO Member States:

Albania

[Remarks by Secretary Mattis at an Enhanced Honor Cordon Welcoming Albania Defense Minister Olta Xhaçka to the Pentagon](#), US MoD Press Release, 17 April 2018

Belgium

Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet, [Reassessing Belgium's 'Failed' Counterterrorism Policy](#), Lawfare, 22 March 2018

Thomas Renard and Rik Coolsaet, [How Belgium overcame the threat from returning foreign terrorist fighters](#), Egmont, 22 March 2018)

Alexander Mattelaer, [Belgian Defence in 2018: Regeneration Time?](#) Egmont Security Policy Brief, No.95, February 2018

Bulgaria

[NATO Member Bulgaria Picks Russia to Overhaul Aging MiG-29 Jets](#), US News, 14 March 2018

Martin Dimitrov, [Pro-EU Bulgaria Has Little Faith in NATO](#), Balkan Insight, 5 March 2018

Canada

In February, Canada announced that it was rejoining the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) component about seven years after it left the programme. Canada was one of the 12 founder nations of the E-3A Component in 1979, but withdrew its participation in 2011 for budgetary reason following an earlier defence review. Canada also [approved](#) five suppliers to compete for an estimated \$15 billion contract to provide a new combat aircraft to the country's armed forces: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Saab, Dassault and Airbus.

Justin Massie and Benjamin Zyla, Alliance Value and Status Enhancement: Canada's Disproportionate Military BurdenS haring in

Afghanistan, Politics & Policy, Volume 46, No. 2 (2018), pp. 1-25

[Canadian Armed Forces contribute to strengthen Iraqi forces capabilities in dealing with explosive hazards](#), NATO News Release, 21 March 2018

[NATO researcher warns of Russian interference in 2019 Canadian election](#), Globe and Mail, 27 February 2018

[Canada names suppliers approved to bid in future fighter competition](#), Defense News, 24 February 2018

[Canada to rejoin NATO E-3A Component after seven-year absence](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 February 2018

Scott Taylor, [Money, troops wasted on non-existent Russian threat](#), Herald, 4 February 2018

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is planning to open a new space surveillance centre to assess and process satellite and aerial images for the military intelligence service (VZ) as well as NATO in July this year (although it will not be fully operational until the end of 2019) to serve the country and NATO's military intelligence. The centre will receive images of the situation on the ground around the globe from satellites, analyse them and provide them for NATO and the local army's use, including its foreign missions. The system known as SATCEN CR is also planned to help the civilian sector in natural disasters.

[General Pavel supports sending Czech soldiers to Baltics](#), Prague Monitor, 21 May 2018

[Survey: Czechs increasingly favouring EU, NATO](#), Prague Monitor, 18 May 2018

[NATO General Petr Pavel: Czechs Underestimate the Danger of Russian Disinformation Campaigns](#), Radio Praha, 4 May 2018

[Babis pledges to boost Czechia's defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024](#), Intellinews.com, 24 March 2018

[NATO head: Economic rise enables Czechs to raise defence spending](#), Prague Daily Monitor, 23 March 2018

[Secretary General praises the Czech Republic's commitment to NATO](#), NATO News Release, 22 March 2018

[Czech minister puts hold on Israeli radar deal over NATO concerns](#), Defense News, 15 March 2018

[Satellite centre for NATO to be built in ČR](#), Prague Daily Monitor, 21 February 2018

[Czechs to open satellite center to serve intelligence, NATO](#), Military Times, 20 February 2018

[Czech military eyes \\$490M howitzer buy from NATO member](#), Defense News, 7 February 2018

[Czechs Reelect Populist, Russia-Friendly President In Tight Race](#), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 January 2018

Denmark

In January, the Danish government [announced](#) that it would seek a significant increase in defence spending to counter what Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen described as an increased military threat from Russia. In February, the Danish parliamentary approved an additional 12.8 billion crowns (\$2.14 billion) to military spending over the next six years. Denmark will also establish a 4,000-member army brigade focused on the Baltic Sea. By 2023, military spending will be 20 per cent above current levels. For 2018, parliament had earlier agreed to military spending of 22 billion crowns.

[NATO Deputy Secretary General visits Denmark](#), NATO News Release, 20 April 2018

[Special forces, allies to benefit from Denmark's defense spending deal](#), Defense News, 5 February 2018

[Danish lawmakers agree to hike military spending, citing Russia threat](#), Reuters, 28 January 2018

[Denmark will increase defense spending to counter Russia: PM](#), Reuters, 15 January 2018

Estonia

While almost 90 percent of Estonians are in favour of NATO membership, only 32 percent of Russian-speaking residents support Estonia's membership in the alliance, a recent survey commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Defence showed.

[NATO: 1st Infantry Brigade's battle readiness positive](#), ERR News, 26 May 2018

[Survey: Support of Russian-speaking residents of NATO membership still low](#), ERR News, 24 May 2018

France

In February, France announced plans to increase defence spending by more than 40 per cent by 2025, bringing it into line with NATO targets. The French government unveiled a bill that increases spending on the armed forces from 34.2 billion euros (\$42 billion) in 2018 to 50 billion euros in 2025, taking the defence budget from 1.82 per cent of GDP currently to the NATO target of two per cent. France's nuclear 'deterrent' will receive €37 billion by 2025, with work started on a third generation nuclear submarine programme and new airborne nuclear missiles. France is also spending more than \$100 million on artificial intelligence [applications](#) for combat aircraft.

[Secretary General thanks President Macron for his personal commitment to the transatlantic relationship](#), NATO News Release, 15 May 2018

[NATO Secretary General praises France as "champion of multilateralism"](#), NATO News Release, 14 May 2018

[France boosts defence spending to hit NATO target](#), The Local.fr, 8 February 2018

[France to boost defence spending in 'unprecedented' move to meet Nato commitments](#), Telegraph, 8 February 2018

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez, [The U.S.-France Special Relationship after a Year of Trump](#), GMF Policy Brief, 1 February 2018

Germany

Germany spent just 1.13 percent of its economic output on the military in 2017, well below the alliance's agreed 2 per cent target. An analysis by the BDI industry association showed the lower 2017 figure was mainly due to stronger-than-expected economic growth, which lowered the percentage.

Reports in February suggest that the German military is struggling to meet its commitments to NATO. First, Germany's parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces [urged](#) the navy to stop deploying frigates to NATO, EU and UN missions because the military simply doesn't have enough ships. German vessels have played key roles in anti-smuggling and migrant rescue missions in the Mediterranean.

Second, the Bundeswehr is due to take over leadership of NATO's multinational Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) at the start of next year, but doesn't have enough tanks, [according to a leaked Defence Ministry document](#). Specifically, the Bundeswehr's ninth tank brigade in Münster only has nine operational Leopard 2 tanks—even though it promised to have 44 ready for the VJTF—and only three of the promised 14 Marder armoured infantry vehicles. A lack of spare parts and the high cost and time needed to maintain the vehicles was given as the reason for the shortfall. It added that it was also lacking night-vision equipment, automatic grenade launchers, winter clothing and body armour.

In April, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen [requested](#) an additional \$14.6 billion for the country's military budget, saying the current budget of \$45 billion is vastly inadequate for the military modernization Germany needs. But the actual budget [settlement](#) was much less and will see military spending as a percentage of GDP increase in 2019 but fall in subsequent years.

Bonnie Kristian, [Why Germany's Failure to Meet Its NATO Spending Goal Matters](#), National Review, 24 May 2018

[As Germany prepares for NATO crisis-response role, its military readiness is 'abysmal'](#), Stars and Stripes, 16 May 2018

[NATO spending target not some "fetish" for Germany – Merkel](#), Reuters, 14 May 2018

[German military spending quota would drop below 2018 level in 2022: source](#), Reuters, 2 May 2018

[German Defense Minister von der Leyen wants €12 billion more for Bundeswehr](#), Deutsche Welle, 29 April 2018

[German 1st Panzer Division prepares to lead NATO Response Force](#), IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 2018

[Germany's fighter jets may not be fit for NATO service — and it's the latest setback in a wider problem](#), Business Insider, 3 April 2018

[German Tornado jet may be unsuitable for NATO missions – report](#), Euro News, 31 March 2018

Christian Mölling, [Defense Innovation and the Future of Transatlantic Strategic Superiority: A German Perspective](#), GMF Policy Brief, 23 March 2018

[Germany proposes Ulm as NATO logistics hub against Russia](#), Deutsche Welle, 20 March 2018

Ariel Cohen, [Germany and the US need a new beginning in their security relationship](#), The Hill, 25 February 2018

John Lough, [Germany's Russia Challenge](#), Fellowship Monograph No.11, NATO Defense College, February 2018

[Germany's Bundeswehr 'lacks basic equipment' for NATO mission](#), Deutsche Welle, 19 February 2018

[German military short on tanks for NATO mission](#), Deutsche Welle, 15 February 2018

[Germany not very ready to take over NATO's very ready task force](#), The Local.de, 15 February 2018

['No more missions for Germany's navy,' warns armed forces ombudsman](#), Deutsche Welle, 11 February 2018

[Germany's military is falling behind, and the US is putting it on notice](#), Business Insider, 3 February 2018

[US Army Leader Tells Germany: Meet NATO Spending Goal or Weaken NATO](#), Voice of America, 29 January 2018

[German defense spending way below 2-percent target](#), Deutsche Welle, 19 January 2018

Charles Pena, [Germany Must Meet Its Obligation to NATO](#), National Review, 17 January 2018

Greece

In January, hundreds of thousands of Greeks in Thessaloniki protested against the use of the name "Macedonia" in any solution to a disagreement between Athens and Skopje over the name of the former Yugoslav republic. Greece says the name Macedonia implies a territorial claim over its own northern region of that name. The two countries agreed earlier in the month to renew efforts to settle the 25-year old row, which has blocked the ex-Yugoslav republic's attempts to join NATO and the EU. However, in early February, more than 100,000 people gathered in Athens to again protest about this issue. In May, the US military [deployed](#) Reaper drones to Greece for the first time.

Nick Turse, [Threats "from the South" prompt US to base drones in Greece for the first time](#), The Intercept, 24 May 2018

[A rare military crisis is brewing between Greece and Turkey as the NATO allies inch towards war](#), Business Insider, 18 April 2018

[NATO: Athens, Ankara Responsible for Resolving Greek Soldiers Issue](#), Greek Reporter, 14 March 2018

[Greeks Protest to Defend Right to the Name 'Macedonia'](#), New York Times, 4 February 2018

[Greeks rally against use of "Macedonia" in name dispute with Skopje](#), Reuters, 21 January 2018

Hungary

Hungary is spending 30 per cent of its HUF428 billion (\$1.7 billion) 2018 defence budget on procurement and modernisation, complying with NATO

requirements, Defence Minister István Simicskó told state-run Kossuth radio on 3 January. He confirmed procurement of two A319 Airbus aircraft, which he said would be commissioned this year and support redeployment and transport of Hungarian troops participating in various overseas missions.

A [dispute](#) between Hungary and Ukraine has been slowly escalating. It began over a so-called Language Law passed by Ukraine's Parliament to promote the use of the Ukrainian language. Western Ukraine has a multi-ethnic population, among them ethnic Hungarians. The Polish and Romanian minorities have negotiated and received concessions; Hungary (with local lobbyists) has not been willing to compromise. Budapest gave an ultimatum and are linking the matter to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. In April, Budapest vetoed a planned session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission for the third time and also vetoed the invitation of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to the next NATO summit in July.

[Stoltenberg hopes Ukraine, Hungary able to find solution in language row](#), UNIAN, 29 May 2018

[The Orbán government should not block Ukraine's NATO and EU integration](#), Hungary Free Press, 4 May 2018

[Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels](#), Hungary MoD, 16 February 2018

[Hungary blocks NATO-Ukraine Defense Commission](#), UNIAN, 9 February 2018

[Hungary adjusts to NATO spending guidelines](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 January 2018

Iceland

[NATO Demands Cause Headaches in Iceland](#), IDN, January 2018

Italy

[Director Lisa Camillo seeks to expose the dark secrets of Sardinia's NATO military bases](#), Il Globo, 16 April 2018

See a trailer for this forthcoming documentary [here](#)

Manlio Dinucci, [Nato and nukes are not electoral themes](#), VoltaireNet, 6 February 2018

Lithuania

[Lithuania Wants More NATO Anti-Aircraft Missiles to Deter Russia](#), US News, 20 April 2018

[NATO soldiers seek to bring support, as well as defence to Lithuania](#), Euro News, 20 April 2018

[Deputy Secretary General marks first anniversary of NATO's enhanced forward presence in Lithuania](#), NATO News Release, 5 February 2018

Montenegro

[Montenegrin Defense Chief Says NATO Contributions on Target for 2024](#), VOA, 28 February 2018

Netherlands

[NATO boss: 'The Netherlands needs to invest more in defence'](#), Universiteit Leiden, 20 April 2018

[Netherlands to host NATO MRTT unit](#), Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 January 2018

Norway

[Arctic air base could be saved last minute by Nato's growing focus on North Atlantic](#), Barents Observer, 9 May 2018

[Norway lawmakers warn of 'slippage' from NATO defense spending target](#), Defense News, 2 February 2018

Poland

According to a Polish [defence ministry proposal](#) that came to light in May, Warsaw is seeking a permanent US military presence and is willing to pay up to \$2 billion towards such a goal. The defence ministry press office [confirmed to Politico](#) that the proposal

is genuine and is not classified. It was drafted by senior ministry officials and a group of Polish military officers.

"This proposal outlines the clear and present need for a permanent US armoured division deployed in Poland, Poland's commitment to provide significant support that may reach \$1.5-2 billion by establishing joint military installations and provide for more flexible movement of US forces", the Polish defence ministry document states. It adds that Warsaw is committed "to share the burden of defence spending, make the decision more cost-effective for the US government and allay any concerns for Congress in uncertain budgetary times".

Poland currently hosts US and NATO armed forces that are stationed in the country on a rotational basis, moving between Poland and the three Baltic states. Poland has also been modernizing its military forces and in March signed the largest weapons deal in the country's history: a \$4.75 billion deal with the US for the acquisition of [Patriot soil-to-air missiles](#). Negotiations are ongoing for the eventual delivery of more Patriots, a 360° radar and low-cost missiles.

[Poland Proposes Basing Sites in Offer to Host US Forces Permanently](#), Military.com, 31 May 2018

[Warsaw to Trump: Let's make a military deal \(without NATO\)](#), Politico, 30 May 2018

[Judy Dempsey, Poland Courts American Boots](#), Carnegie Europe, 29 May 2018

[Kremlin on US Base in Poland: Moscow Ready to React to NATO's Expansion](#), Sputnik News, 28 May 2018

[More efficient NATO command needed: Polish defence minister](#), Radio Poland, 27 May 2018

Francisco Duarte, [As NATO-Russia Relations Stagger, Poland's Military Modernization Programs Pitch Up](#), Inquisitr, 1 April 2018

[Poland, Lithuania want NATO's eastern flank strengthened: Speaker](#), Radio Poland, 1 March 2018

Judy Dempsey, [Poland's Narrative of Victimhood](#), Carnegie Europe, 6 February 2018

Portugal

[Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Defence of Portugal](#), José Azeredo Lopes, NATO News Release, 27 January 2018

[Portugal "key ally" for NATO, but must spend more on defence](#), Famagusta Gazette, 27 January 2018

Romania

[Romania hosts NATO Allies for major Black Sea exercise](#), Business Review, 10 May 2018

[Gov't approves bills to acquire HIMARS systems, four multifunctional corvettes](#), Romania Journal, 15 February 2018

[General Dynamics Awarded \\$1 Billion Contract for Armored Vehicles to Romanian Army](#), Global Defence News, 12 January 2018

Turkey

In January, Turkey launched a ground offensive against Syrian-Kurdish militia forces, putting Ankara into renewed fighting with US backed Kurdish fighters. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson jointly requested that Turkish forces exercise restraint. Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated that he intended to stay in Syria until "the business is done", and pledged to widen Turkey's offensive against Kurdish militias in northern Syria from Afrin to Manbij. This brought Turkish forces and their Syrian allies closer to US troops in Syria, who are there to support the Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State. By the end of January, Turkish military officials [claimed](#) to have "neutralized" 579 YPG and Islamic State militants.

Meanwhile, US Gen. Joseph Votel, head of Central Command, [said](#) he had no plans to withdraw US forces from Manbij, as Turkey had demanded. Turkey's offensive in northern Syria also dragged significant numbers of Syrian Kurds [away](#) from the US-led coalition's fight against the Islamic State. In March, Turkish-backed Syrian rebels [seized control](#) of the Syrian city of Afrin, dealing a major blow to Kurdish hopes of self-governance.

In April, a new bill introduced in the US Senate [would](#) ban Turkey from taking delivery of the F-35 fighter jet if it does not release the imprisoned American pastor Andrew Brunson. Turkey has pledged to buy 116 F-35As.

[Pompeo: Turkey needs to 'rejoin NATO'](#), Washington Examiner, 23 May 2018

Amelia Meurant-Tompkinson, [Turkey's pipedreams and NATO's nightmares](#), The Strategist, 22 May 2018

[Turkey threatens US over bill seeking to halt weapons sales](#), Defense News, 9 May 2018

[Looking at the map is enough to see Turkey's importance: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 30 April 2018

Ferhat Gurini, [Turkey's Persistent Kurdish Question](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 April 2018

[NATO: Turkey to be responsible for rapid response unit soon](#), Middle East Monitor, 18 April 2018

[Secretary General in Ankara: NATO stands with you in solidarity](#), NATO News Release, 17 April 2018

[NATO chief calls for more support to Turkey ahead of his visit](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 15 April 2018

[Turkey's Erdogan says France is abetting terrorists](#), Reuters, 7 April 2018

Nick Ashdown, [Does Turkey favour good relations with Moscow over NATO, the EU?](#) Ahval, 2 April 2018

[Turkey says France could become 'target' for backing Syria Kurds](#), Reuters, 30 March 2018

Ünal Çeviköz, [Turkey's Relations with NATO are Undergoing a Historic Trial](#), European Leadership Network Commentary, 16 March 2018

[S-400s becoming a more difficult issue for Turkey-NATO ties](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 14 March 2018

[Turkey pledges to meet NATO's 2 percent defense spending guideline by 2024](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 5 March 2018

[Amid Turkish Assault, Kurdish Forces Are Drawn Away From U.S. Fight With ISIS](#), New York Times, 28 February 2018

[Turkey to develop unmanned tanks, president says](#), ABC News, 21 February 2018

[Tillerson meets Turkey's Erdogan amid soaring tensions between the 2 NATO allies on opposite sides of Syria fight](#), Business Insider, 16 February 2018

Scott Romaniuk and Tobias Burgers, [Turkey: NATO's Rogue Member State](#), Geopolitical Monitor, 12 February 2018

[On Northern Syria Front Line, U.S. and Turkey Head Into Tense Face-off](#), New York Times, 7 February 2018

Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, [United States and Turkey: A Vulnerable Relationship](#), GMF, 5 February 2018

[Turkey's Worst Day Yet in Syria Offensive: At Least 7 Soldiers Killed](#), New York Times, 4 February 2018

Turkey and NATO are growing apart, The Economist, 1 February 2018

[Over 500 militants neutralized by Turkish Army in Syria's Afrin: Turkish General Staff](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 29 January 2018

Burhanettin Duran, [Who harms NATO? Turkey or the US?](#), Daily Sabah, 28 January 2018

A NATO ally arming a terrorist organization that is attacking another NATO ally is a fundamental breach of everything that NATO stands for. It is a policy anomaly that needs to be corrected.

Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey's minister of foreign affairs, [America Has Chosen the Wrong Partner](#), New York Times, 28 January 2018

Bessma Momani, [Turkey's Afrin Offensive Could Have Dangerous Consequences](#),

Centre for International Governance Innovation, 26 January 2018

Xander Snyder, [Turkey Invades, NATO Benefits](#), Geopolitical Futures, 26 January 2018

[NATO 'acknowledges' Turkey's terror concern](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 24 January 2018

[NATO moves to assure Turkey of its support in fighting terrorism](#), Defense News, 24 January 2018

Krishnadev Calamur, [The Syrian Battlefield Grows Yet More Complicated](#), The Atlantic, 24 January 2018 - And it puts NATO's two largest militaries on opposite sides

[Judy Asks: Is Turkey Damaging NATO?](#), Carnegie Europe, 24 January 2018

[Deputy Secretary General in Istanbul: Turkey is a vital member of NATO](#), NATO News Release, 23 January 2018

[Turkish offensive against Syrian Kurds risks greater tensions with US](#), Stars and Stripes, 23 January 2018

[NATO allies clash as Turkey attacks US-backed Kurds in Syria](#), Deutsche Welle, 22 January 2018

[Turkish intervention in Syria likely to force US to choose between NATO ally, Turkey, and the YPG](#), IHS Jane's Intelligence Weekly, 22 January 2018

[NATO on Afrin: We understand Turkey's security concerns](#), Daily Sabah, 21 January 2018

[Turkey to brief NATO deputy secretary general about crossborder Afrin operation](#), Hurriyet Daily News, 21 January 2018

[Turkish Troops Attack U.S.-Backed Kurds in Syria, a Clash of NATO Allies](#), New York Times, 21 January 2018

[Turkish forces push into Syria, battle Kurdish militia](#), Reuters, 20 January 2018

Can Kasapoğlu and Sinan Ülgen, [Operation Olive Branch: A Political Military Assessment](#), EDAM Report, January 2018

Emanuele Scimia, [Angered by allies](#), Turkey buys Russian defense system, Asia Times, 2 January 2018

United Kingdom

The UK Government's power to block requests for information on national security grounds was [significantly curtailed by a tribunal ruling](#) in January over targeted killings of British jihadists abroad. Although attempts to obtain the legal advice given to the prime minister before RAF drone strikes in Syria in 2015 were dismissed, the court said officials could not rely on a blanket ban preventing the release of all relevant details.

At the end of January, the UK's public spending watchdog issued a damning assessment of how the Ministry of Defence manages its procurement budget, identifying a series of issues that could leave it with a funding gap of up to £21bn over the next decade. The National Audit Office, in its review of the MoD's equipment plan for 2017-18, warned that the renewal of Britain's nuclear deterrent could destabilise the 10-year budget due to its size and complexity. The watchdog's audit of the Dreadnought and Astute submarine projects found that costs had risen by £941m in just the last year.

In March, a chemical weapon attack was carried out in the UK (see ***Chemical Weapons Attack – Salisbury*** above)

The United Kingdom is [reported](#) to be considering sending more troops to Afghanistan. UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson is believed to have asked Prime Minister Theresa May for 400 more soldiers to be sent to help fight the Taliban, adding to the 600 already training Afghan forces. Although Williamson was [asked](#) by the UK Defence Committee on 22 May to provide further details about these reports, the defence secretary said he was not in a position to go into more detail.

[£850m Sea Ceptor missile system enters service with Royal Navy](#), UK Mod Press Release, 24 May 2018

Justin Bronk, [The European Fighter Cooperation Question: How Many UK F-35s?](#) RUSI Defence Systems, 18 May 2018

[Britain's war – denials wear thin: defence secretary now acknowledges civilian killing by RAF](#), Drone Warfare (blog), 3 May 2018

Julian Ku, [The British are Coming to the South China Sea, and It's About Time](#), Lawfare Blog, 28 February 2018

[Tracking apps that reveal location of British warships spark security fears](#), Independent, 5 February 2018

Sven Biscop, [Brexit, Strategy, and the EU: Britain Takes Leave](#), Egmont Paper 100, February 2018

The UK National Audit Office, [Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2017 to 2027](#), 31 January 2018

[Ministers face £20bn black hole over 'unaffordable' new jets, warships and submarines](#), The Telegraph, 31 January 2018

Ian Keddle, [How the UK armed forces would look if you started from scratch](#), The Guardian, 29 January 2018

Ewan Lawson, [Thinking About Home? The National Security Capabilities Review and UK Defence](#), RUSI Commentary, 15 January 2018

UK forces to help French campaign against Islamists, The Times, 11 January 2018

[UK military forced to borrow Nato planes to monitor increasing activity by Russian submarines, shows new figures](#), The Independent, 10 January 2018

[Tribunal rules against total secrecy over UK drone strikes](#), The Guardian, 4 January 2018

David Anderson, [New Approaches to Intelligence Oversight in the U.K.](#), Lawfare Blog, 2 January 2018

United States

In January 2018, the US released its new [National Defense Strategy](#), which refocused on the possibility of war with China and/or Russia, marking a shift from the last 15 years' focus on [fighting transnational terrorist groups](#). "Great-power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of U.S. national security", US Defense Secretary Mattis [said](#) in a speech

unveiling the new strategy. In February the US Department of Defence released its new [nuclear posture review](#) (see *Nuclear Weapons* above).

In February, President Trump requested \$716 billion in defence spending for 2019, representing a 17 per cent increase to the 2017 budget, which would provide the Pentagon with all the money it has requested in recent years. The proposal would also accelerate recent expansions of personnel levels, adding a further 16,400 troops, and includes \$24 billion for enhancing America's nuclear programme.

The 2019 budget request for US Special Operations Command is \$13.6 billion, 10 per cent higher than the 2018 level and is the largest budget request ever submitted by US SOCOM. US special operations forces, which are currently deployed in 90 countries, have more than doubled in size from 33,000 personnel in 2001 to around 70,000 personnel in early 2018.

In March President Trump [announced](#) plans to ease restrictions on the sale of certain models of armed drones to dozens of allies. The policy shift will lower barriers to the sale of the lighter "hunter-killer drones" that carry fewer bombs and perform short-range missions. It will also ease restrictions on the sale of surveillance drones of all sizes. The list of allies expected to benefit from the eased restrictions includes NATO members, Saudi Arabia and other close partners in the Gulf, and Japan and South Korea.

Also in March, President Trump [appointed](#) former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton as his new national security adviser, replacing Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster in the post, suggesting a more hard-line US stance towards Iran and North Korea. However, with North Korea at least, events took a different turn when President Trump agreed on a whim on the 8 March to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The on-off meeting remains scheduled for the 12 June in Singapore.

Divisions between the US and European NATO allies deepened in May. President Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal and his embrace of a protectionist approach to trade even with close allies were the main [fault lines](#).

At the military level, however, the transatlantic relationship continued to blossom. In May, for example, the Pentagon announced the official launch of a new naval command (Atlantic Command headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia) and the reactivation of the US Second Fleet to bolster the US and NATO presence in the Atlantic Ocean (NATO Defence Ministers Meeting above).

Must Read: Rebecca Gordon, [Trump Drones On: How Unpiloted Aircraft Expand the War on Terror](#), TomDispatch, 24 May 2018

[Show of Unity: US' NATO Ambassador Says 'We Are One'](#), Defense One, 24 May 2018

Azita Raji, [If the Transatlantic Relationship Sneezes, Will NATO Catch a Cold?](#) War on the Rocks, 21 May 2018

[President Donald J. Trump Hosts NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg At The White House](#), White House Fact Sheet, 17 May 2018

[Trump responds to European criticism about reliability](#), Tampa Bay Times, 17 May 2018

[NATO Secretary General and President Trump discuss preparations for July summit](#), NATO News, 16 May 2018

Tom Engelhardt, [The Caliphate of Trump: And a Planet in Ruins](#), TomDispatch, 8 May 2018

['Great power competition': Nato announces Atlantic command to counter Russia](#), The Guardian, 5 May 2018

[Launch of new naval command reflects concerns over Russian presence in Atlantic region](#), CBS News, 5 May 2018

Danny Sjursen, [War and the Imperial Presidency: Congress Offers a Bipartisan Blank Check to Donald Trump](#), TomDispatch, 3 May 2018

Arnold Isaacs, [Why Can't the World's Best Military Win Its Wars? Americans Need to Rethink War and Look Honestly at](#)

[Ourselves and Our Friends](#), TomDispatch, 1 May 2018

Dan Plesch, [Could the US win World War III without using nuclear weapons?](#) The Conversation, 19 April 2018

Steven Aftergood, [Growing Pentagon Secrecy Draws Questions](#), Federation of American Scientists, 16 April 2018

[U.S. Special Operations Forces \(SOF\): Background and Issues for Congress](#), Congressional Research Service, 13 April 2018

[Mattis to decide future of nuclear command, control and communications](#), Space News, 11 April 2018

Rebecca Gordon, [Trump's Recycling Program: War Crimes and War Criminals, Old and \(Potentially\) New](#), TomDispatch, 29 March 2018

Stanley R. Sloan, [A Way Forward for NATO Allies: Cope with Trump while preparing for a Post-Trump Future](#), War on the Rocks, 27 March 2018

As of March 2018, the Trump administration has appointed [only 70 of 188 U.S. ambassadors](#). At the same time, it has increased the deployment of [special operations forces to 149 countries](#) – up from 138 during the Obama administration in 2016. So while U.S. ambassadors are operating in one-third of the world's capitals, special operations forces are active in three-fourths.

Must Read: Monica Duffy Toft, [Fewer diplomats, more armed force defines US leadership today](#), The Conversation, 26 March 2018

Andrew Bacevich, [What Happens When a Few Volunteer and the Rest Just Watch: The American Military System Dissected](#), TomDispatch, 10 April 2018

Must Read: Michael Klare, [Could the Cold War Return With a Vengeance?](#) TomDispatch, 3 April 2018

William Hartung, [Weapons for Anyone: Donald Trump and the Art of the Arms Deal](#), TomDispatch, 1 April 2018

[NATO's AWACS give U.S. eyes in the sky over Syria](#), NBC News, 25 March 2018

Hans Kristensen, [Despite Rhetoric, US Stockpile Continues to Decline](#), Federation of American Scientists, 22 March 2018

[U.S. Army Works With NATO Allies in Estonia](#), US DoD News Release, 15 March 2018

Jessica Purkiss and Abigail Fielding-Smith, [Trump's Pentagon ups secrecy around US air wars](#), Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 14 March 2018

[US Lawmakers Restore NATO Observer Group to 'Stand with European Allies'](#), VOA, 1 March 2018

[Senate revives NATO observer mission after decade-long hiatus](#), Stars and Stripes, 1 March 2018

A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, [Remarks to the Senate NATO Observers Group](#), Washington, DC, 28 February 2018

[Of Course NATO is Obsolete](#), The American Conservative, editorial, 28 February 2018

Must Read: William Hartung, [How the Pentagon Devours the Budget: Normalizing Budgetary Bloat](#), TomDispatch, 27 February 2018


Danny Sjursen, [Trump's National Defense Strategy -Something for Everyone \(in the Military-Industrial Complex\)](#), TomDispatch, 20 February 2018

[U.S. Revives Concerns About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies](#), New York Times, 18 February 2018

Must Read: Stephanie Savell, [The Wars No One Notices: Talking to a Demobilized Country](#), TomDispatch, 15 February 2018

Nick Turse, [Drug Wars, Missing Money, and a Phantom \\$500 Million: Pentagon Watchdog Calls Out Two Commands for Financial Malfeasance](#), TomDispatch, 8 February 2018

William Smith, [NATO's Real Existential Threat: The Surrender of Western Values](#), The American Conservative, 7 February 2018



Current US Counter War Locations, [Costs of War Project](#), January 2018

William J. Astore, [Our Enemy, Ourselves: Ten Commonsense Suggestions for Making Peace, Not War](#), TomDispatch, 4 Feb. 2018

[Trump's Shadow Hangs Over NATO](#), Foreign Policy, 29 January 2018

[Mattis unveils new strategy focused on Russia and China, takes Congress to task for budget impasse](#), Washington Post, 19 January 2018

[U.S. military puts 'great power competition' at heart of strategy: Mattis](#), Reuters, 19 January 2018

Alfred McCoy, [The World According to Trump - Or How to Build a Wall and Lose an Empire](#), TomDispatch, 16 January 2018

Paul McLeary, [Hawaii and the Horror of Human Error](#), The Atlantic, 15 January 2018

William Hartung, [War Pay: Another Good Year for Weapons Makers Is Guaranteed](#), TomDispatch, 11 January 2018

Vincent Morelli and Kristin Archick, [Transatlantic relations in 2018](#), CRS Insight, 10 January 2018

[The US Army Concept for Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations, 2025-2040](#), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-6, January 2018

Must Read: Tom Engelhardt, [Mapping a World From Hell - 76 Countries Are Now Involved in Washington's War on Terror](#), TomDispatch, 4 January 2018

Upcoming Event: Shadow NATO Summit IV

Organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham, Kings College London and NATO Watch

NATO's 360-degree approach to deterrence and collective defence: over-stretched and under-powered?

9 July 2018

King's College London
War Studies Meeting Room, 6th Floor King's Building
London WC2R 2LS

Overview:

NATO appears to be trying to address security challenges from many different directions. Its agenda includes a more assertive and unpredictable Russia, an arc of instability across the Middle East and North Africa, international terrorism, missile and nuclear weapon proliferation, the threat of cyber-attacks and a continuing mission in Afghanistan. In seeking to maintain an all-round, 360-degree perspective is NATO in danger of losing its way? The alliance of 29 states is not only bound by a pledge of collective defence but has defined itself by a set of common values and a membership composed of human rights-respecting democracies. But can an alliance, originally designed to contain the Soviet Union and ostensibly organised around democratic ideals, endure attacks on democratic governance and the rule of law by a growing subset of its members? In seeking to meet myriad external challenges *and* maintain internal cohesion at a time when core values are fracturing, is NATO over-stretched and under-powered? In advance of the upcoming NATO Summit in Brussels on 11-12 July, this workshop will examine these trends in transatlantic security, nuclear weapons proliferation and the attitudes and assumptions underlying current NATO policy.

The detailed programme is available [here](#) or on the following websites:

www.natowatch.org

www.basicint.org

REGISTRATION REQUIRED BY 4 JULY 2018

Places are limited - To register, please email your contact details to:

Zara Rizvi at BASIC: zrizvi@basicint.org

IDEAS, FEEDBACK, SUGGESTIONS?

Ideas, feedback, suggestions? We want to hear from you. Please contact us at [NATO Watch](#) with any news and stories for the *Observatory*, as well as feedback or suggestions.

DONATE NOW PLEASE

NATO Watch is a small non-profit organisation that provides **independent oversight and analysis** of an ever-growing NATO. But with tightly stretched resources we struggle to consistently and continually function as an effective 'watchdog'.

If you share our vision for a transparent and accountable NATO please donate whatever you can afford to help NATO Watch thrive. Click on the picture below to find out how you can make a donation.

