What next for NATO?

Susi Snyder (IKV Pax Christi) on NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Review

Source: First Committee Monitor – Preview Edition, Reaching Critical Will, 3 October 2011

Despite NATO member commitments at the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to, inter alia, reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the 2010 NATO summit proclaimed that “NATO would remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist”.

All NATO members have signed and ratified the NPT, all NATO members are bound to the decisions of the Review Conference. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept commits the alliance to “the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.” This seems to be a direct contradiction to the agreement made by these same states during the NPT Review Conference.

For decades, the Non-Aligned Movement has raised concerns about NATO’s nuclear sharing policy. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the NAM advocated for these concerns to be addressed in the final document action plan. The NAM proposed language for the final document specifically calling on the nuclear weapons states to “withdraw nuclear weapons stationed on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article I and II of the Treaty”. The proposed language also took into account the (then) forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept Review when the NAM suggested that nuclear weapon states should “abolish the role of nuclear weapons in all military and security doctrines as well as policies, and in strategic concepts of military and political alliances, in order to facilitate the process of their total elimination”. While this language was not adopted by NPT state parties, the agreement in the final document to “address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process” and “to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” was agreed by consensus.

NATO members are currently undergoing a Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) meant to define an “appropriate mix” between nuclear and conventional weapons and missile defence needed to uphold Alliance commitments to collective self-defence. The DDPR process began with a series of brainstorming sessions and seminars among members of the North Atlantic Council. The Terms of Reference for the process were agreed earlier in 2011 and the process is meant to be concluded by the time of NATO’s next summit in Chicago from 20 to 21 May 20-21 2012.

Aside from defining the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence, other challenges await NATO in preparing for this coming summit. Not least is the need to, once again, redefine itself and its relationship with Russia. NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is hoping that agreement with Russia will be reached on missile defence cooperation. This has been a sticking point for relations between the two entities, and while agreement in principle was reached at the Lisbon Summit (November 2010), the devil remains in the details.

The role of US forward deployed sub-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons in five European countries is also going to be a point of contention leading up to the summit. Previous justifications for keeping these weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the Netherlands, including the risk of these states otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons, are recognised as no longer valid. Instead, the current argument used in Brussels to retain the status quo is that the weapons represent a shared burden.

While at one time this may have been the case, the only way that the burden of the weapons is shared across the Alliance is by providing the illusion of a voice in decision making around them. The Nuclear Planning Group (all NATO members except France) discusses the potential use of the weapons, or the possibility of defining a declaratory policy for the alliance. Not all members participate equally in the actual hosting, training, flight support, or any other practical implementation of this “burden sharing”. Many NATO representatives recognise that when it comes down to an actual decision to ever use the weapons, the ultimate decision-maker will not be the Nuclear Planning Group, will not be the North Atlantic Council, but will be the United States. So the illusion of sharing the burden is nothing more than that—an illusion. The weapons themselves are simply a placeholder to make some alliance members feel better about the US commitment to their security. They are a representation of cold war thinking, a remnant of the past. These weapons are not necessary to secure European security, and are actually detracting from it as they are an obstacle towards further strengthening of the NATO-Russia relationship. As long as US nuclear weapons remain in Europe, European security will not be assured and NATO members will not move forward on their other international obligations and political commitments to seek a world free of nuclear weapons.

Susi Synder is the Programme Leader of the Disarmament Programme at IKV Pax Christi (The Netherlands).