European Disarmament

On the issue of sharing of nuclear weapons within NATO, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has issued a report entitled “Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO”.  The authors are George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steven Pifer, Paul Schulte and Jaclyn Tandler.

 Go to full report.

Des Browne, former United Kingdom Defense Secretary, in a speech on “A Mistrustful NATO-Russian Relationship” at the Russian Council on International Affairs in Moscow on March 23, 2012, made the following points about non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

In my view, the current U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are militarily useless and should be reduced in number, consolidated to fewer bases, and eventually removed altogether. Not everyone in NATO agrees with me and it is not clear what the future of these weapons will be.

I know the Russian position up to now has been that these weapons must be removed to national territory before any discussion of Russian weapons in this category can begin. I say to this audience in all honesty that Russia is strong in this category of weapons systems and is known to station some of them very close to NATO territory, especially in the Baltic region. The nearest NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory are, on the other hand, at In cirlik airbase in Turkey, some 800 km away.

Now, I know that for Russia there is nothing non-strategic about these NATO weapons. I also believe, in its own security interests, Russia should be willing to negotiate their removal from Europe in return for a small reduction in its own stockpile, increased transparency on total numbers and locations of weapons held in this category, and some removal of Russian systems to points further away from NATO borders.

 There will be no hope of progress without reciprocity.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons are in my view a dangerous terrorism risk and should be eliminated altogether but even if people believe they provide a valuable source of security I think there is a worthwhile deal to be done here. Russia, in my view, would also be well within its rights to trade increased transparency on NSNW for greater transparency and increased warning time in relation to NATO conventional forces.

Read more of his address.

 Francesco Calogero and Giorgio La Malfa from Italy, writing inThe Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, indicate:

• With the end of the Cold War, the military justification for tactical weapons in Europe has disappeared — as has the need for a neither-confirm-nor-deny secrecy policy on the details of these weapons.
• Presumably, if the United States were to remove its tactical weapons from Europe, Russia would move in the same direction. But, today, some NATO host countries of US tactical nuclear weapons are eager to see their withdrawal, while others are emphatic that they stay both for security and symbolic purposes.
• If NATO were to state in the upcoming Defense and Deterrence Posture Review the exact numbers and locations of its tactical nuclear weapons, a more open, frank, and democratic discussion would unfold on the relevance of these deployments. It would also be a gesture of sincerity toward NATO’s nonproliferation goals.

Read more.

Oliver Meier, writing in the blog of the Arms Control Association, indicates: “As NATO works to revise its nuclear and deterrence strategy in time for its May 2012 Summit in Chicago, Germany is pushing for changes in the Alliance’s declaratory policy and for a stronger role of NATO in arms control and disarmament. Yet at the same time, Berlin is trying to dodge a debate about the deployment of new types of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.”

Read more.

From the United Kingdom we learn: “The Baptist Union of Great Britain, the Methodist Church, and United Reformed Church have been outspoken in their opposition to a replacement of the Trident nuclear submarines. Renewal of Trident is incompatible with the UK’s desire to encourage global nuclear non-proliferation.

“Trident is likely to cost the UK a staggering 3.7 billion per year over the next 15 years. In addition to moral and ethical concerns, there are also serious economic arguments against renewing it. Trident is a large drain on our budget with very little to show for it. Consequently we would all be better off without Trident.”

 Read more.

Recommendations of Global Zero NATO-Russian  Commission Report

“Following on the New START treaty recently brought into force, Global Zero calls for the United States and Russia to begin comprehensive nuclear arms negotiations in early 2013 to reduce their arsenals to as low as 1,000 total weapons each, and, as part of these negotiations, to pursue the expedited removal of all of their tactical nuclear weapons from combat bases on the European continent to national storage facilities in the United States and Russia.

“These comprehensive negotiations would, for the first time in history, include all nonstrategic nuclear weapons (commonly referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons) and all non-deployed strategic weapons (‘reserve’ strategic vehicles and warheads in storage) in addition to the deployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles that are constrained by New START.”

Read more.

Dana Liebelson of the Project on Goverment Oversight (POGO) on February 2, 2012 reported: “When Defense Secretary Leon Panetta unveiled his plan to achieve $487 billion in budget cuts over the next ten years, he hinted  that a smart strategy would mean cutting the number of nuclear weapons.  Today, POGO sent him a very timely letter:  the U.S. should cease funding the B61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, or pass the costs on to the countries where they’re stationed. This would save taxpayers more than $2 billion dollars.

Read more.

Craig Whitlock writing in the January 30, 2012 Washington Post indicates: “NATO allies are confronting a sustained weakening of the military alliance as ailing economies are forcing nearly all members, including the United States, to accelerate cuts to their defense budgets at the same time.

“The Pentagon’s recent decision to eliminate two of the Army’s four brigages in Europe  is the latest blow to NATO’s military capabilities. It extends a year of grim announcements from members of the alliance that they can no longer afford their security commitments and that a long period of austerity is in the offing.”

Read more.

Greg Jaffe in an article in the January 13, 2012 Washington Post writes:  “The Obama administration has decided to remove two of the four U.S. Army brigades remaining in Europe as part of a broader effort to cut $487 billion from the Pentagon’s budget over the next decade, said senior U.S. officials.

“The reductions in Army forces, which have not been formally announced, are likely to concern European officials, who worry that the smaller American presence reflects a waning of interest in the decades-long U.S.-NATO partnership in Europe.”

Read more.

In an interview with Maria Tabek of Ria Novosti on December 23, 2011, Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. State Department, among other topics discussed non-strategic nuclear weapons and conventional armed forces in Europe.

Here are excerpts from the interview on these topics.

QUESTION: New START Treaty implementation is going pretty well but US representatives used to say that New START is just a first step. The U.S. wanted to discuss with Russia further reductions not only of strategic nuclear weapons but also of non-strategic. Have you already started these discussions and if so at which stage are they at now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER:  You asked me about tactical nuclear weapons as we say or non-strategic nuclear weapons. President Obama the day he signed the New START Treaty on April 8th of 2010 said that we should be looking for the next nuclear reduction negotiation and began to plan for it. He mentioned three categories actually for future reduction negotiations. The first category would be further reductions in deployed nuclear warheads. These warheads are the easiest ones to see from outer space, from either Russian satellites or US satellites. Up to this point in the history of arms control efforts we’ve always focused on deployed weapons.

The President proposed two new categories. One – non-deployed nuclear weapons, weapons that are in storage facilities or reserve and the third category is non-strategic weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. Those last two categories are brand new and for that reason we have been very interested in working with Russian Federation on some new approaches that will be necessary for verifying such agreements. We are also interested in some of the conceptual and definition questions that are involved because what we consider a tactical nuclear weapon may be different from what the Russian Federation considers to be a tactical nuclear weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapon.

At the moment we are engaged in what I would say is a “homework period”. We are preparing a way for new negotiations but we are not yet ready to embark on new negotiations.

QUESTION: What is the problem? Why can’t you start new negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It’s not really a problem. As I said I consider it’s highly necessary to do this preparatory work. We really have to figure out how to scope new negotiations and I’m emphasizing that we are ready for serious discussions but we are not ready yet for reduction negotiations. We really have to figure out the new conceptual structure.

QUESTION: How long do you think this “homework period” will last?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Oh I can’t predict entirely because we have some work to do, there is another factor that I should mention. That is the fact that the US is engaged in a so-called deterrence and defense posture review with our allies in NATO, and that affects defense in Europe whether conventional or nuclear. So before that review is completed we wouldn’t be ready in any event because we have to understand how our allies think about nuclear weapons in Europe. So that will be completed towards the time of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. And furthermore, here in the United States, we are pursuing an analysis under the umbrella of the 2010 nuclear posture review to look at the future of our strategic nuclear forces. And that is in terms of force posture and in terms of nuclear doctrine. It’s very important to complete that review as well. This review should be completed pretty soon. These are other factors that are not related to US-Russian discussion, that are related to NATO deterrence and defense posture review and to our internal US review.

QUESTION: Another deadlock in bilateral relations: conventional armed forces in Europe? What are the chances of Russia and US to find some common grounds in this area?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Conventional arms control in Europe is again not simply a bilateral matter it’s not just a matter between Moscow and Washington. It’s multilateral that involves NATO countries who are our allies and also involves other countries who are not members of any alliance, it involves countries like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the South Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia, Moldova, I was just there last week in Moldova – and also Ukraine, Belarus – so there are many countries that have an interest in this matter. And I really see it as a complex series of discussions, but nonetheless, while I was in Europe last week I could see the great deal of enthusiasm for moving forward in modernizing conventional arms control. I think about the exciting possibilities for 2012, I think this is an area with some very exciting possibilities for this.

The interview also included discussion of missile defense in Europe. Read more in the complete interview.