NATOMonitor
Analysis and Comment on Current Developments in the Atlantic Alliance.
Updated: 30 min 58 sec ago
'The Cable Reporting from Munich Security Conference
Foreign Policy blog The Cable has made some good posts at the Munich Security Conference. Notably, this quote from Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski:
The question posed to Sikorski and the other panelists at the Friday evening discussion was whether Germany could play a role in Europe today similar to the role the United States played in Europe after World War II. Sikorski said that Germany doesn't have the attributes of a hegemon, such as an overwhelming economy, a large military budget, and an international role commensurate of a preeminent regional power."So you will not be a benign hegemon in Europe and you shouldn't even try," Sikorski told his largely German audience. He even referred to lingering concerns about German power left over from the WWII period."Why is Russia always a bigger security challenge than Germany for Poland? When Germany gets too big for its boots, we always automatically add allies," Sikorski said. "So don't get too dizzy with success."Ouch."Germany cannot be said to be said to be similar to the United States [in the post WWII period]," Sikorski said. "The position of benign hegemon for Germany is not attainable, and therefore I would propose your actual position in the EU, which is a very honorable one, is the position of the largest shareholder."Did Poland join NATO to counter Germany as much as Russia? Was it a reaction as much to World War Two as the Cold War? There is an element of that under the surface.
Of course, Poland doesn't have a stable history of independence. It is unlucky to be situated with no strategic or obvious natural borders, and between two large neighbours, so these fears are deeply ingrained in the national psyche. But it is unusual to take a slap at a neighbour and ally in public like this - especially at a time when the Germans have done nothing to deserve it!
The question posed to Sikorski and the other panelists at the Friday evening discussion was whether Germany could play a role in Europe today similar to the role the United States played in Europe after World War II. Sikorski said that Germany doesn't have the attributes of a hegemon, such as an overwhelming economy, a large military budget, and an international role commensurate of a preeminent regional power."So you will not be a benign hegemon in Europe and you shouldn't even try," Sikorski told his largely German audience. He even referred to lingering concerns about German power left over from the WWII period."Why is Russia always a bigger security challenge than Germany for Poland? When Germany gets too big for its boots, we always automatically add allies," Sikorski said. "So don't get too dizzy with success."Ouch."Germany cannot be said to be said to be similar to the United States [in the post WWII period]," Sikorski said. "The position of benign hegemon for Germany is not attainable, and therefore I would propose your actual position in the EU, which is a very honorable one, is the position of the largest shareholder."Did Poland join NATO to counter Germany as much as Russia? Was it a reaction as much to World War Two as the Cold War? There is an element of that under the surface.
Of course, Poland doesn't have a stable history of independence. It is unlucky to be situated with no strategic or obvious natural borders, and between two large neighbours, so these fears are deeply ingrained in the national psyche. But it is unusual to take a slap at a neighbour and ally in public like this - especially at a time when the Germans have done nothing to deserve it!
Afghan Cost Cutting Could Bring Security Problems
Reuters has published an excellent piece on the cost concerns pushing NATO to look at smaller Afghan National Security Forces of around 230,000, instead of 350,000 as currently planned. The article reports the cost story that NATO Monitor mentioned yesterday, and has one interesting quote:
Diplomats and NATO officials said there were concerns about the dangers of building up such a large force and then cutting it back."The problem is: what are they going do?" said one diplomat. "You don't want large numbers of armed unemployed."
This is absolutely the heart of the matter. If you train up and equip 350,000 troops, or less, and then retain only 230,000 then you have thousands of trained and armed men who will turn to some form of insurgency. It would make no sense whatsoever, and yet it seems to be an option that NATO is considering for reasons of political expediency at home.
Between the possibility of ending the NATO combat role early, and the apparent problems of sustaining funding for the ANSF afterwards, there is a serious risk that the West, with its war weary publics is in danger of simply abandoning the country to its fate. It doesn't help that there has been no convincing rationale for being in Afghanistan since the Taliban were toppled and Al Qaeda destroyed in the country after 9/11, and no politician has been able to make an argument that sounded in any way convincing to voters.
But this does raise the question, what have the years of fighting and loss of life been for? What strategic goal has been served?
Diplomats and NATO officials said there were concerns about the dangers of building up such a large force and then cutting it back."The problem is: what are they going do?" said one diplomat. "You don't want large numbers of armed unemployed."
This is absolutely the heart of the matter. If you train up and equip 350,000 troops, or less, and then retain only 230,000 then you have thousands of trained and armed men who will turn to some form of insurgency. It would make no sense whatsoever, and yet it seems to be an option that NATO is considering for reasons of political expediency at home.
Between the possibility of ending the NATO combat role early, and the apparent problems of sustaining funding for the ANSF afterwards, there is a serious risk that the West, with its war weary publics is in danger of simply abandoning the country to its fate. It doesn't help that there has been no convincing rationale for being in Afghanistan since the Taliban were toppled and Al Qaeda destroyed in the country after 9/11, and no politician has been able to make an argument that sounded in any way convincing to voters.
But this does raise the question, what have the years of fighting and loss of life been for? What strategic goal has been served?
A Pakistani View on the 'State of the Taliban'
General Talat Masood rejects the main thrust of the NATO State of the Taliban report. It is clear that relations between NATO and PAkistan have been further poisoned by this episode, which is serious for NATO as it needs the Pakistani supply lines to maintain ISAF sustainably.
NATO Looking for Help to Fund Afghan Security Forces
One topic that was raised at the Defence Ministers gathering this week was future funding of the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014. This is absolutely vital as the Afghan government is in no position to pay the estimated $6 billion per year necessary to equip, train and deploy their police and army units.
By 2014 it is planned to have 350,000 ANSF personnel in place, although some think this is too many. For example, French Defence Minister Gerard Longuet told journalists that "A reasonable number would be 230,000." In contrast, the Taliban are thought to number in the region of 20,000 fighters, although that number could certainly increase quickly.
NATO Secretary General told the press that NATO was appealing to the entire international community to help secure the future of Afghanistan by contributing to the bill, and when pressed if he meant China and Russia, as well as others, replied:
“It’s a call on the whole of the international community to contribute to financing the Afghan security forces because I think it is also in the interest of countries in the region to see a stable and secure Afghanistan.”This is certainly something NATO needs to get right, and in comparison with the bills that they are paying to keep combat forces in country, $6 billion per year spread between all NATO members is very little. NATO Monitor is having trouble figuring out why China and Russia would find it in their strategic interest to help NATO out with this, especially Russia since NATO is so unresponsive to their concerns on BMD and CFE.
(Read more here and here, and watch the press conference here.)
By 2014 it is planned to have 350,000 ANSF personnel in place, although some think this is too many. For example, French Defence Minister Gerard Longuet told journalists that "A reasonable number would be 230,000." In contrast, the Taliban are thought to number in the region of 20,000 fighters, although that number could certainly increase quickly.
NATO Secretary General told the press that NATO was appealing to the entire international community to help secure the future of Afghanistan by contributing to the bill, and when pressed if he meant China and Russia, as well as others, replied:
“It’s a call on the whole of the international community to contribute to financing the Afghan security forces because I think it is also in the interest of countries in the region to see a stable and secure Afghanistan.”This is certainly something NATO needs to get right, and in comparison with the bills that they are paying to keep combat forces in country, $6 billion per year spread between all NATO members is very little. NATO Monitor is having trouble figuring out why China and Russia would find it in their strategic interest to help NATO out with this, especially Russia since NATO is so unresponsive to their concerns on BMD and CFE.
(Read more here and here, and watch the press conference here.)
Pakistani View on NATO Supply Problem
The Pakistan Observer has an interesting analysis from a Pakistani point of view on NATO's supply line problems. It concludes:
Stocked-up supplies and reliance on the NDN thus far enables the US and NATO to sustain the war that for many looks no longer winnable although the United States has had to pay six times as much to import supplies via alternative routes. The writing on the wall is that the US will have to mend fences with Pakistan.
Stocked-up supplies and reliance on the NDN thus far enables the US and NATO to sustain the war that for many looks no longer winnable although the United States has had to pay six times as much to import supplies via alternative routes. The writing on the wall is that the US will have to mend fences with Pakistan.
Putin: NATO BMD 'aimed at Russia'
Russian PM and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin appeared on Russian TV yesterday and condemned US and NATO ballistic missile defence plans (See here for example). Reminding viewers that the United States is the only country ever to have used nuclear weapons in a war, he said that the Euro BMD system is:
undoubtedly aimed at neutralizing the nuclear rocket capability of Russia.He added that NATO doesn't want partners, but vassals. This hard line on NATO-Russia has long been part of Putin's thinking. But he is correct to say that Russian attempts to make a genuine military partnership out of the BMD proposals, with a truly joint system between Russia and the Alliance, have been completely rebuffed by Brussels.
undoubtedly aimed at neutralizing the nuclear rocket capability of Russia.He added that NATO doesn't want partners, but vassals. This hard line on NATO-Russia has long been part of Putin's thinking. But he is correct to say that Russian attempts to make a genuine military partnership out of the BMD proposals, with a truly joint system between Russia and the Alliance, have been completely rebuffed by Brussels.
Afghans Concerned at NATO 2013 Withdrawal Talk
There are signs of a worried reaction from Afghanistan that the US might be getting ready to leave early. One report we've read says:
Earlier in Kabul, a senior Afghan security official said his government had not been informed of Panetta’s announcement and said it “throws out the whole transition plan.”“Transition has been planned against a timetable and this makes us rush all our preparations,” he said. “If the Americans withdraw from combat, it will certainly have an effect on our readiness and training, and on equipping the police force.” There has been a smattering of surprised and concerned responses from NATO allies too.
Earlier in Kabul, a senior Afghan security official said his government had not been informed of Panetta’s announcement and said it “throws out the whole transition plan.”“Transition has been planned against a timetable and this makes us rush all our preparations,” he said. “If the Americans withdraw from combat, it will certainly have an effect on our readiness and training, and on equipping the police force.” There has been a smattering of surprised and concerned responses from NATO allies too.
Is Israel Getting Ready to Attack Iran, and What Will NATO do if it Does?
So, there's a little brouhaha going on on the sidelines of the NATO defence ministerial. David Ignatius at the Washington Post has published a piece saying that Us Defense Secretary Leon Panetta believes that the Israelis are getting ready to attack Iran in May or June. Panetta, in Brussels for the NATO meeting, has refused to deny the report.
Clearly this is meant to send a strong signal to Iran that now would be a good time to come back to the table. And Ignatius says that the US has warned Israel against this course of action, and will stay on the sidelines. For their part, the Israelis want (Ignatius says) favour going alone and can hit Iran for five days - but even the hawks he spoke to acknowledge that this will only set Iranian nuclear work back a few years.
Of course, the problem for the Israelis is that this is all fantasy. If Israel attacks, then there will be attacks against Jewish people and organisations around the world, as well as against Israel. There would also likely be attacks against US military targets in the region at the least. Some kind of general war would massively destabilise a volatile region. What's worse, Iran would instantly withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty citing what would be in such circumstances justified national security concerns, and would then be free to go hell-for-leather for the bomb with no legal constraints. Everything in the situation would be much worse.
And what would NATO do? Certainly not join the attacks, but would US nuclear facilities in Turkey be a target for Iranian retaliation? It is possible. What then of the Alliance's Article V defence guarantee? Would NATO be forced to go to war alongside the US and Israel? Such a situation doesn't really bear thinking about.
Meanwhile, Haaretz is reporting a NATO Defence College report which says that NATO must be ready to build much closer links with Middle East allies if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Haaretz says the report says that NATO should:
.. should consider war games and joint exercises and even expanding cooperation by deploying nuclear weapons in countries that were party to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative forums.Now, NATO Monitor hasn't read the full report (we'll post more fully on it soon), but it is hard to see how the Middle East would be made safer by more western intervention in the form of some kind of nuclear stand-off between Iran and Israel/NATO. It is much easier to see that an Israeli/American/NATO attack on Iran would be a disaster in the region and the wider world.
It is deeply depressing that for decades the very powers now seemingly sliding towards an attack on Iran have refused to take seriously either the Arab/Israeli peace process or calls for a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. No pressure has been put on Israel or other US allies in the region to give up nuclear, chemical or biological weapons as part of a wider process of peacebuilding. Equally, no real pressure has been brought to bear since the 1990s for any meaningful dialogue on the peace process itself. Nor has any meaningful attempt been made to treat Iran as a sovereign state and equal partner in discussing the full range of its security concerns - after all, US policy has been for the overthrow of the current Iranian state for three decades.
There is no simple or easy solution to this complex web of security issues. But allowing the most hardline Israeli government ever to dictate policy for the rest of the world makes no sense, for us or for them. The effort currently being put by hawks into a drive for war would be much better spent on a drive for mutually beneficial threat reduction and confidence building measures that simply have not been tried. In the end, Israel is going to have to live in its region and it can't exist forever in a state of war, heavily defended but with no real security. Iran has a right under the NPT to civilian nuclear technology, and the US and its allies are going to have to live with that. If their leaders could be sure they aren't going to be overthrown by the US, then their incentive to militarise that capability is dramatically reduced - especially if Israel is part of a regional WMD Free deal.
NATO's adventures in Libya and Afghanistan should have taught the alliance that the wider Middle East is a complicated place where simplistic military solutions always lead to wider complications than first expected. It should, therefore, ignore the siren voices calling on it to become involved.
Clearly this is meant to send a strong signal to Iran that now would be a good time to come back to the table. And Ignatius says that the US has warned Israel against this course of action, and will stay on the sidelines. For their part, the Israelis want (Ignatius says) favour going alone and can hit Iran for five days - but even the hawks he spoke to acknowledge that this will only set Iranian nuclear work back a few years.
Of course, the problem for the Israelis is that this is all fantasy. If Israel attacks, then there will be attacks against Jewish people and organisations around the world, as well as against Israel. There would also likely be attacks against US military targets in the region at the least. Some kind of general war would massively destabilise a volatile region. What's worse, Iran would instantly withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty citing what would be in such circumstances justified national security concerns, and would then be free to go hell-for-leather for the bomb with no legal constraints. Everything in the situation would be much worse.
And what would NATO do? Certainly not join the attacks, but would US nuclear facilities in Turkey be a target for Iranian retaliation? It is possible. What then of the Alliance's Article V defence guarantee? Would NATO be forced to go to war alongside the US and Israel? Such a situation doesn't really bear thinking about.
Meanwhile, Haaretz is reporting a NATO Defence College report which says that NATO must be ready to build much closer links with Middle East allies if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Haaretz says the report says that NATO should:
.. should consider war games and joint exercises and even expanding cooperation by deploying nuclear weapons in countries that were party to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative forums.Now, NATO Monitor hasn't read the full report (we'll post more fully on it soon), but it is hard to see how the Middle East would be made safer by more western intervention in the form of some kind of nuclear stand-off between Iran and Israel/NATO. It is much easier to see that an Israeli/American/NATO attack on Iran would be a disaster in the region and the wider world.
It is deeply depressing that for decades the very powers now seemingly sliding towards an attack on Iran have refused to take seriously either the Arab/Israeli peace process or calls for a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. No pressure has been put on Israel or other US allies in the region to give up nuclear, chemical or biological weapons as part of a wider process of peacebuilding. Equally, no real pressure has been brought to bear since the 1990s for any meaningful dialogue on the peace process itself. Nor has any meaningful attempt been made to treat Iran as a sovereign state and equal partner in discussing the full range of its security concerns - after all, US policy has been for the overthrow of the current Iranian state for three decades.
There is no simple or easy solution to this complex web of security issues. But allowing the most hardline Israeli government ever to dictate policy for the rest of the world makes no sense, for us or for them. The effort currently being put by hawks into a drive for war would be much better spent on a drive for mutually beneficial threat reduction and confidence building measures that simply have not been tried. In the end, Israel is going to have to live in its region and it can't exist forever in a state of war, heavily defended but with no real security. Iran has a right under the NPT to civilian nuclear technology, and the US and its allies are going to have to live with that. If their leaders could be sure they aren't going to be overthrown by the US, then their incentive to militarise that capability is dramatically reduced - especially if Israel is part of a regional WMD Free deal.
NATO's adventures in Libya and Afghanistan should have taught the alliance that the wider Middle East is a complicated place where simplistic military solutions always lead to wider complications than first expected. It should, therefore, ignore the siren voices calling on it to become involved.
Pakistan to Reopen NATO Supply Lines?
Since the attack on the Pakistani border posts last year, NATO has had no supply lines into Afghanistan fromt he south. Now, the Pakistani government has signaled that it will press its parliament to allow the reopening of NATO supply lines to Afghanistan very soon. (See this AFP story).
It is likely that Pakistan will in future tax convoys passing through its territory, but given the strategic difficulties of supplying Afghanistan from the north or by air, that's a tax NATO will have to pay.
The government cannot be sure it will win this debate, and indeed Jamaat-e-Islami (The Islamic Party) issued a statement saying that convoys would resume "over their dead bodies". They cited drone attacks by the US on Pakistani soil as a reason to refuse permission to supply ISAF.
Many other groups and parties also oppose any compromise with NATO. The debate will be difficult for the government, and if supply convoys do start to move from Pakistan again, it seems likely that more extreme elements in Pakistan are ready to use violence against them.
It is likely that Pakistan will in future tax convoys passing through its territory, but given the strategic difficulties of supplying Afghanistan from the north or by air, that's a tax NATO will have to pay.
The government cannot be sure it will win this debate, and indeed Jamaat-e-Islami (The Islamic Party) issued a statement saying that convoys would resume "over their dead bodies". They cited drone attacks by the US on Pakistani soil as a reason to refuse permission to supply ISAF.
Many other groups and parties also oppose any compromise with NATO. The debate will be difficult for the government, and if supply convoys do start to move from Pakistan again, it seems likely that more extreme elements in Pakistan are ready to use violence against them.
Smart Defence, Just Cuts or Genuine Reorganisation?
At his press conference after today's defence ministers' meeting broke up, Anders Fogh Rasmussen talked about the Smart Defence initiative he is pushing to make the most of diminishing resources available to NATO member states:Today we also discussed Smart Defence. We agreed we have tomake sure that every cent we spend delivers the maximum effect, with themaximum efficiency together. We have to decide what capabilities our Allianceneeds. And we have to prioritise, specialise and cooperate, to make sure we canget them.
We have identified a number of areas where Smart Defencewould make a real difference – such asintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; logistics and maintenance; andtraining. Allies are discussing a number of projects which will deliver realimprovements and make maximum use of the limited resources we have. By the timewe meet in Chicago, I would expect us to have political agreement on asignificant number of projects, as well as an approach for a longer termstrategy, which sees Smart Defence at the hub of the way we do business.
Because economic hard times will come and go, but we alwaysneed security. And we need to stay serious about our security. This discussion comes notably against a background where the US has announced significant cuts in its presence in Europe. Allies are questiong exactly what it means that the US is planning to cut 2 out of 4 brigade combat teams remaining in Europe, as well as an air wing? Is the US cutting back its commitment to Article V and the defence of the Alliance? Some in the Baltic States and eastern Europe with the most pronounced fears about Russia might see it that way. Or, at a time of budget cuts, is the US simply redeploying resources to places they are needed, recognising the reality that there is little to no chance of a land war being waged against NATO far into the future? (See the Chicago Times for a good discussion of the issue)There are concerns that less training time will mean less inter-operability, and that it will become more difficult to mount NATO operations in future.
European nations should look to put their own house in order before being too critical of the US. Maintaining many separate defence budgets and overlapping military capabilities, NATO's European allies spend a large fraction of the US defence budget and yet get little for it. Greater budgetary and defence policy integration across Europe, even with significantly reduced expenditure across the continent, could actually leave European allies with more troops, more planes, more ships available for the defence of Europe or for the projection of power for peacekeeping or other purposes. Such a move by the Europeans would likely mean more coordination inside the EU, and would necessitate deeper EU/NATO cooperation. Political realities make that difficult. (The Tribune also ran a piece on a speech that Cathy Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy made the other day)
So, now we wait for Chicago to see whether the Smart Defence initiative means anything, or whether NATO's drift in this area will continue.
We have identified a number of areas where Smart Defencewould make a real difference – such asintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; logistics and maintenance; andtraining. Allies are discussing a number of projects which will deliver realimprovements and make maximum use of the limited resources we have. By the timewe meet in Chicago, I would expect us to have political agreement on asignificant number of projects, as well as an approach for a longer termstrategy, which sees Smart Defence at the hub of the way we do business.
Because economic hard times will come and go, but we alwaysneed security. And we need to stay serious about our security. This discussion comes notably against a background where the US has announced significant cuts in its presence in Europe. Allies are questiong exactly what it means that the US is planning to cut 2 out of 4 brigade combat teams remaining in Europe, as well as an air wing? Is the US cutting back its commitment to Article V and the defence of the Alliance? Some in the Baltic States and eastern Europe with the most pronounced fears about Russia might see it that way. Or, at a time of budget cuts, is the US simply redeploying resources to places they are needed, recognising the reality that there is little to no chance of a land war being waged against NATO far into the future? (See the Chicago Times for a good discussion of the issue)There are concerns that less training time will mean less inter-operability, and that it will become more difficult to mount NATO operations in future.
European nations should look to put their own house in order before being too critical of the US. Maintaining many separate defence budgets and overlapping military capabilities, NATO's European allies spend a large fraction of the US defence budget and yet get little for it. Greater budgetary and defence policy integration across Europe, even with significantly reduced expenditure across the continent, could actually leave European allies with more troops, more planes, more ships available for the defence of Europe or for the projection of power for peacekeeping or other purposes. Such a move by the Europeans would likely mean more coordination inside the EU, and would necessitate deeper EU/NATO cooperation. Political realities make that difficult. (The Tribune also ran a piece on a speech that Cathy Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy made the other day)
So, now we wait for Chicago to see whether the Smart Defence initiative means anything, or whether NATO's drift in this area will continue.
Euro Missile Defence Command to be at Ramstein
AFP is reporting that the NATO base at Ramstein in Germany will host the command for the NATO missile defence. The base also hosts Allied Air Command. Interceptors will be based in Romania and Poland, with sea based ones home-ported in Spain.
At the same time, RIA Novosti has reported that Russia may be prepared to allow joint missile defence exercises with NATO planned for March to go ahead. However, the Russians are still seeking legally binding written guarantees from the US that the Euro BMD system will not have the capability to counter Russian missile launches.
The issue has, as NATO Monitor has often discussed, been a block in talks around the basket of conventional and nuclear arms control discussions between the US and Russia. NATO and the US continue to insist that the European BMD system is a counter to potential threats from Iran, and nothing to do with Russia. The Russians counter that the system may be configured that way at present, but that could change with time.
As we have said before, NATO has to make an assessment. Is it's security enhanced more by reducing possible conventional and nuclear threats from Russia, or by deploying a BMD system of at best dubious reliability against an Iranian threat that doesn't actually exist?
At the same time, RIA Novosti has reported that Russia may be prepared to allow joint missile defence exercises with NATO planned for March to go ahead. However, the Russians are still seeking legally binding written guarantees from the US that the Euro BMD system will not have the capability to counter Russian missile launches.
The issue has, as NATO Monitor has often discussed, been a block in talks around the basket of conventional and nuclear arms control discussions between the US and Russia. NATO and the US continue to insist that the European BMD system is a counter to potential threats from Iran, and nothing to do with Russia. The Russians counter that the system may be configured that way at present, but that could change with time.
As we have said before, NATO has to make an assessment. Is it's security enhanced more by reducing possible conventional and nuclear threats from Russia, or by deploying a BMD system of at best dubious reliability against an Iranian threat that doesn't actually exist?
Rose Gottemoeller on the US, Russia and Arms Control
Rose Gottemoeller, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance gave a short interview this week on arms control efforts with Russia, and mentioned the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. It's only short, so is worth posting in full:Interview: Judy Dempsey - International Herald TribuneTuesday, 31 January 2012, 9:30 am
Press Release: US State Department
Interview
Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
On-the-Record
Washington, DC
January 19, 2012________________________________________QUESTION: Late last year, the Americans broke off conventional arms control talks with Russia. Why?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The situation simply could not continue indefinitely. The Russian Federation had “suspended implementation” of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in December 2007. Last fall, we decided we needed to take action. Together with a group of other Treaty signatories--NATO allies and partners Moldova and Georgia--we agreed to halt implementation of the Treaty with Russia. We continue to implement the CFE Treaty with all the other states-parties. We were sending a message; we considered it to be a rational countermeasure, and did it more in sorrow than in anger. It was a message to Russia that we would like to see them come back into implementation of the Treaty. The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continues to consult on finding a way forward with our Treaty partners.
QUESTION: What could restart negotiations?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Right now, I think we’re in a good place. It is still premature to talk about negotiations, but ceasing the implementation of the CFE Treaty toward Russia actually opens up an environment to explore new opportunities for the future of conventional arms control in Europe. But first we need to do some very basic work on the concepts and substance, together with our allies and partners, including the Russians. Everybody knows that the CFE Treaty simply is not relevant anymore to the current security situation in Europe. It was negotiated at a time when the Warsaw Pact was still standing against us.QUESTION: It was a Cold War relic?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: What we have now is an opportunity for a regime that would be clearly post Cold War. We need to think ahead about what will be most helpful, contributing to resolving the frozen conflicts and strengthening regional security. I think the Russians have the same interest in stable and predictable security relationships as other countries.QUESTION: If you look at the entirety of Russia’s security outlook, tactical nuclear weapons are an important card, because its conventional forces are so weak. Where do we stand with regard to tactical nuclear weapons?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It is true that the Russian military doctrine is quite clear on the strategic importance they give to tactical nuclear weapons. But we need to pull the aperture wider. When President Obama signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, he said that the United States would like to negotiate further reductions in three categories of nuclear arms: in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, in non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons (for example, held in storage facilities) and in non strategic nuclear weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which are the ones that concern Europe. The President made it very clear that we want to tackle all three categories in the next arms reduction negotiations with Russia.QUESTION: But why should the Russians agree to cuts in tactical weapons?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Again, you have to look at the full picture. The Russians have always said that they are concerned about U.S. up-load capabilities…QUESTION: …meaning that the U.S. could relatively quickly bring back a substantial number of reserve nuclear weapons from storage…ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: …and that could be a part of the picture for future negotiations. I am not saying that we are making an official proposal at this point. But you have to have an idea what the trade-offs might be.QUESTION: So far, there really has not been much movement on tactical weapons.ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I would not say that. In fact, there has been movement in two areas: First, the United States has made it clear that we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about the issues affecting further reductions. And we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about transparency measures that we might pursue even before we get back to the negotiating table. And so, we are looking at some ideas in that regard. In the meantime, there is some important homework that we have to do within the NATO Alliance--the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is taking place right now. We know that NATO is committed to an extended deterrent and will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. In May, we are going to have the NATO summit in Chicago. That is an opportunity to reach some conclusions on what NATO policy is going to be with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons.QUESTION: Does missile defense complicate things?ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We hope not! (laughs) Because we talk until we are blue in the face to make the point that we believe cooperation on missile defenses in Europe would be very much in the interests of the Russian Federation. Our goal is to reach agreement on a political framework to move missile defense cooperation forward and strengthen the overlapping capabilities that we have. We want to address the common threat that ballistic missiles pose for security in Europe, including for Russia. Through this cooperation, Russia would see first-hand that this system is designed and capable to defend only against missiles originating from the Middle East. At the same time, we have been trying to convey to them also that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe are not intended nor will they be capable to undermine the Russian strategic offensive armed forces. The Russians remain to be convinced. But I don’t think it’s a hopeless situation. Not by any stretch of the imagination.ENDS
Afghan Withdrawal Debate Online!
Twitter allows participants in the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Brussels to share a few thoughts. After US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said yesterday that:
Hopefully by the mid to later part of 2013 we'll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advise and assist role,This doesn't mean we're not going to be combat-ready, but rather that the U.S. and other international forces will no longer be in the formal combat role we're in now.This followed French President Sarkozy's announcement that France would withdraw forces from the country by the end of 2013, prompted by the killing of French soldiers by an Afghan trainee. This posed major problems for NATO as France plays a major role in the training mission for Afghan security forces.
This set the scene for an interesting discussion this morning, but the row-back started early. This morning as US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder tweeted that:
Day 1 of #NATO DefMin w/ #SecDef. Transition in#Afghanistan will be key issue. Making good progress; need to stay #Lisbon-agreed courseThis was quickly followed by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen tweeting that:
#NATO decisions in Lisbon remain bedrock of our strategy in#Afghanistan. Alliance will stick to agreed Lisbon targetand
Expect start transition last group #Afghan districts and provinces mid-2013. Complete transition to full security responsibility by end 2014However, the difference seems to be one of emphasis rather than great substance. Wired are reporting a NATO background briefing on the topic:
In a background briefing for reporters, a NATO official I’m not allowed to name pointed to mid-2013 as the beginning of the final phase for its “transition” to Afghanistan control. By then, the “lead responsibility for the planning and conduct of operations” against the Taliban will fall to the Afghan soldiers and police (and militiamen) that NATO trains, the official said. In other words, the heavy lifting on the transition will basically be done by 2013, not 2014. US experts say that Panetta's announcement would not mean a much faster or deeper drawdown than currently planned, simply a shift in the way the mission is carried out.
There won;t be final announcements on this today or tomorrow, but expect something at the Chicago Summit.
Hopefully by the mid to later part of 2013 we'll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advise and assist role,This doesn't mean we're not going to be combat-ready, but rather that the U.S. and other international forces will no longer be in the formal combat role we're in now.This followed French President Sarkozy's announcement that France would withdraw forces from the country by the end of 2013, prompted by the killing of French soldiers by an Afghan trainee. This posed major problems for NATO as France plays a major role in the training mission for Afghan security forces.
This set the scene for an interesting discussion this morning, but the row-back started early. This morning as US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder tweeted that:
Day 1 of #NATO DefMin w/ #SecDef. Transition in#Afghanistan will be key issue. Making good progress; need to stay #Lisbon-agreed courseThis was quickly followed by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen tweeting that:
#NATO decisions in Lisbon remain bedrock of our strategy in#Afghanistan. Alliance will stick to agreed Lisbon targetand
Expect start transition last group #Afghan districts and provinces mid-2013. Complete transition to full security responsibility by end 2014However, the difference seems to be one of emphasis rather than great substance. Wired are reporting a NATO background briefing on the topic:
In a background briefing for reporters, a NATO official I’m not allowed to name pointed to mid-2013 as the beginning of the final phase for its “transition” to Afghanistan control. By then, the “lead responsibility for the planning and conduct of operations” against the Taliban will fall to the Afghan soldiers and police (and militiamen) that NATO trains, the official said. In other words, the heavy lifting on the transition will basically be done by 2013, not 2014. US experts say that Panetta's announcement would not mean a much faster or deeper drawdown than currently planned, simply a shift in the way the mission is carried out.
There won;t be final announcements on this today or tomorrow, but expect something at the Chicago Summit.
Panetta Wants Early End to Afghanistan Combat Role
Here's a surprise. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta wants the US and NATO out of their combat role in Afghnaistan by the end of 2013. (See the original report here). The French decision to do this unilaterally must have had an effect. No wonder the US has finally decided it has to talk with the Taliban.
The trouble is that politically motivated announcements like this, which are good for the electoral timetable back home (in France and in America) do nothing to contribute to the security of the people of Afghanistan. In fact, they simply prove to those Taliban fighters who involuntarily gave information for the State of the Taliban report that they are right, and if they simply wait, the westerners will be gone.
The trouble is that politically motivated announcements like this, which are good for the electoral timetable back home (in France and in America) do nothing to contribute to the security of the people of Afghanistan. In fact, they simply prove to those Taliban fighters who involuntarily gave information for the State of the Taliban report that they are right, and if they simply wait, the westerners will be gone.
BBC leaks NATO Afghan report, the truth hurts or at least embarrasses!!
The BBC has been leaked a report compiled for NATO from interrogations of thousands of captured Taliban fighters. The report, The State of the Taliban, states that the Pakistani ISI intelligence service is aiding and even directing Taliban activities. It says that many Afghans prefer the Taliban to the corrupt Karzai central and regional governments. It reveals that many Taliban fighters regard NATO military gains as completely illusory, since they are biding their time and will retake territory at their leisure when NATO withdraw from it.
So far, so unremarkable. This tells us little that independent journalists and analysts haven't been saying for a long time. However, it is reassuring to know that (however quietly and however far behind the scenes) NATO does not believe the unrealistically rosy reports put out by its own PR machine.
What this report does bring into question is how NATO can extract itself from Afghanistan without complete and utter embarrassment. France is likely to press at tomorrow's Defence ministerial, and then again at the Summit in Chicago in May, for an early withdrawal. It is becoming increasingly clear that the mission that is supposed to define NATO's role for the 21st Century (at least in part) is ending badly.
With the US administration and the Karzai government entering into apparently separate talks with Taliban representatives about the future beyond 2014 when NATO ends its combat mission in the country, the harsh reality of tactical success and strategic failure for the alliance is hammered home in the State of the Taliban.
In retrospect, the decision around the last elections to prop up the discredited President Karzai and the kleptocracy he has constructed to "govern" Afghanistan looks worse and worse. The only question now for NATO is how to save face while getting out, and even that looks harder by the day. If nothing else this will make the debate around the ministerial meetings more interesting.
Even if ISAF is still trying to sound positive (see this video) the truth is out, its embarrassing and it hurts!
(Note: Extracts of the State of the Taliban report can be found on the BBC website here)
So far, so unremarkable. This tells us little that independent journalists and analysts haven't been saying for a long time. However, it is reassuring to know that (however quietly and however far behind the scenes) NATO does not believe the unrealistically rosy reports put out by its own PR machine.
What this report does bring into question is how NATO can extract itself from Afghanistan without complete and utter embarrassment. France is likely to press at tomorrow's Defence ministerial, and then again at the Summit in Chicago in May, for an early withdrawal. It is becoming increasingly clear that the mission that is supposed to define NATO's role for the 21st Century (at least in part) is ending badly.
With the US administration and the Karzai government entering into apparently separate talks with Taliban representatives about the future beyond 2014 when NATO ends its combat mission in the country, the harsh reality of tactical success and strategic failure for the alliance is hammered home in the State of the Taliban.
In retrospect, the decision around the last elections to prop up the discredited President Karzai and the kleptocracy he has constructed to "govern" Afghanistan looks worse and worse. The only question now for NATO is how to save face while getting out, and even that looks harder by the day. If nothing else this will make the debate around the ministerial meetings more interesting.
Even if ISAF is still trying to sound positive (see this video) the truth is out, its embarrassing and it hurts!
(Note: Extracts of the State of the Taliban report can be found on the BBC website here)
NGOs Call for Policy Change in Afghanistan
Thanks to NATOWatchfor the following report regarding the future of Afghanistan to the attentionof NATO Monitor.
Oxfam, together with more than 20 other NGO partners, has published a joint position paper on the future of Afghanistan, tenyears after the original Bonn conference, with a view to influencing the 5 December Conference that will examine longer termpolitical perspectives for that country.
Their prescription for what needs to be done to build a secure future for Afghanistan’speople shows the gap between traditional development work and the COIN strategycurrently being pursued by ISAF. One key finding of the report is that:
Over the past decade, too much aid has been spent to meet the short-termmilitary objectives of ISAF-contributing nations rather than to address theneeds of Afghan men, women and children.
This is surely correct, and Oxfam and the other NGOs are right to say intheir recommendations that:
Agree clear new commitments on how they will provide long-term developmentassistance in a coherent and sustainable way. Such assistance must address theneeds and rights of Afghans, and not be subordinated to security and militaryobjectives. It should not be overly focused on areas in the country affected byconflict at the expense of more peaceful, but still poor, areas.
This would be the best for the economic development of the entire country, butit is not to say that the conflict ridden areas of Afghanistan do not need aidas part of reducing support for insurgents. The problem, of course, is that theAfghan government has next to no legitimacy, being fiscally corrupt and havingbeen elected through a process that was so blatantly a perversion of the electoralprocess as to be meaningless.
Unfortunately there is an assumption running through the position paper thatthe central government of Afghanistan can be brought to a position where it canhave control of the entire country, something which has never really been thecase. It is doubtful in the extreme if it can be brought about now.
Neither ISAF nor international NGOs will be able to mould Afghanistan into a western vision of what it should be. The best that can be hoped for is that Afghans themselves, acting within their own cultural context, can act over time to repair the damage done by decades of outside intervention.
NATO BMD Underming NATO Security
On the anniversary of the Lisbon Summit, President Medvedev of Russia made an announcement on missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO. His statement showed frustration after a year of largely fruitless talks:
The problem is, it means that in the future, interceptor missiles and other missile defense elements may be deployed close to the Russian borders and in adjacent seas. At the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon a year ago, I suggested creating a joint missile defense system in Europe. We suggested that if we have to develop missile defense, it is better to do it together. We suggested making this system sector-based, with each party responsible for the corresponding sector. Moreover, we said we were open to suggestions from our NATO partners and could make necessary adjustments to this layout, as long as its key elements remain intact. And the key element is that Europe does not need new dividing lines. It needs a common security perimeter, with Russia participating in it as an equal partner. I am still convinced that such an approach would offer unique opportunities for Russia and NATO to develop a real strategic partnership, because friction and confrontation in our relations can be replaced with the principles of equality, indivisible security, mutual trust and predictability. Unfortunately, the United States, and later other NATO members, failed to demonstrate serious readiness to take this way. They are not going to take account of our concerns regarding the architecture of the European missile defense system. At least they are not doing it today. They merely tell us that their plans are not aimed against Russia. Leaving aside a discussion of the use of missile defence deployment, it has been clear for some time that there is no possibility of NATO entering into a genuinely cooperative programme with Russia, under which Russia would be a genuine partner. Any BMD system deployed to Europe would remain under NATO control.
This is not an issue that can be looked at in isolation, but is a wider part of relations between the US, NATO and Russia. Other issues intimately bound up in the BMD question include the presence of some 180 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and NATO's insistence that these can only be removed as part of an arms control deal involving the several thousand remaining Russian tactical nukes; the collapse of the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; NATO-Georgia relations; and the new NATO exercises designed to reassure the Baltic States that NATO is able to come to their defence in the unlikely event of war with Russia.
The problem here is Russia's weakness rather than its strength. Russia now places the same reliance on tactical nuclear forces to outweigh a conventional imblanace in NATO's favour as NATO used in the reverse circumstance during the Cold War. In addition,t he Adapted CFE Treaty is seen as no longer meeting current conditions, where NATO heavily outnumbers Russia in conventional forces. The treaty constrains Russia within its own borders, in particular in the Caucasus, where it has a long term insurgency.
President Medvedev announced several actions as a result of the failure of BMD talks. The timing must be seen as a reaction to the US announcement that it is ending compliance with its obligations under the CFE Treaty (see this AP article). These are worth quoting in full:
First, I have instructed the Defense Ministry to immediately activate an early warning radar in Kaliningrad. Second, as part of the Russian aerospace defense program, Russia will urgently strengthen its defensive capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Forces installations.
Third, strategic ballistic missiles coming into the arsenals of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be fitted with advanced missile defense penetration systems and the latest effective warheads.
Fourth, I have ordered the Armed Forces to develop a set of measures that will enable Russia, if necessary, to destroy the data exchange and control centers of the missile defense system. These measures are adequate, effective and cost-efficient.
Fifth, if the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy, along its western and southern borders, advanced offensive systems capable of destroying the European component of the missile defense system. This will include deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Other measures aimed at neutralizing the European component of the US missile defense system will also be prepared and implemented if necessary.
Next, if problems persist, Russia reserves the right to refrain from taking further steps as regards disarmament and arms control. Furthermore, considering that strategic offensive and defensive weapons are closely interrelated, Russia may have sufficient grounds to withdraw from the New START Treaty. Such a possibility is envisaged in the very idea of this treaty. The threat to move Iskander missiles to NATO's borders is most unfortunate and unhelpful. As is the threat to the New START treaty. In truth there is nothing here that will make Russia-NATO or Russia-US relations any better, or contribute to a solution to the BMD problem.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has responded, but his statement is weak. He fails to acknowledge that NATO as a whole (especially the more easterly parts) is simply not ready to work with Russia as a parter, and that in the Baltic States, Poland and elsewhere the majority rather see Russia as a threat to be deterred and countered.
In Russia, it seems for political reasons, the "threat" of NATO BMD is overblown. There is little to no prospect that this 'missile shield' will work, anymore than the systems the US has deployed to date. It will certainly not work against Russian strategic systems, especially if these are now fitted with simple countermeasures as Medvedev has ordered.
Important questions remain unanswered. Is NATO really ready to restart the Cold War just to deploy and expensive and non-functional defence against a largely illusory missile threat?
Does it not make much more sense to actually sit down with Russia as a partner and negotiat a security relationship that makes sense for both? The CFE Treaty, if it is to survive, needs to change to reflect the fact that since 1999 NATO has expanded to Russia's borders and is now the overwhelmingly most powerful military force in the world. Russia needs to recognise that its actions in Georgia, not to mention Chechenya and Dagestan, inspire fear in its other neighbours and it must seek a peaceful resolution of border disputes.
The tiny US nuclear force in Europe should be withdrawn within US borders, and tactical nuclear forces should be part of talks between the US and Russia on all nuclear forces. After all, these tacnukes are at several months readiness, and the threat they were deployed to face no longer exists.
And BMD needs to be put back into its box and left there. It doesn't work, it probably can't ever work, and the damage it is already doing to European security through this quarrel with Russia needs to be undone immediately.
HISTORICAL NOTE:
On 9 March this year in a Press Conference before ministerial meetings, Secretary General Rasmussen said the following, which shows exacty NATO's position. NATO and Russia would operate two completely separate missile defence systems. This position still has not changed, and that is what has caused the Russian pullout. NATO is not offering a partnership, so why would Russia cooperate?
Q: ITAR-TASS News Agency, Denis Dubrovin. Secretary General, a step back from Libya to NATO-Russia cooperation in the area of missile defence. A few days ago our mutual friend James Appathurai has said in Washington that it's totally unacceptable for NATO, the proposals of the sectoral missile defence system in Europe, Russian proposals.So does it mean that we now have more misunderstandings in this area? Or how could you comment on this statement? Thank you very much.ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: Yes, but that statement does not represent a new position. It is actually what has already been stated by NATO leaders already during our meeting in Lisbon. It's well-known that we have initiated a joint analysis as to how we can implement practical cooperation on missile defence. It is a joint analysis.Russia presents her ideas. We present our ideas, and I am quite optimistic that at the end of the day we will find a solution because we are faced with a common security challenge.I would like to stress that we want to pursue a cooperative approach, but we do believe that it is possible to really pursue a cooperative approach through a system which is based on a Russia missile defence system responsible for the protection of Russian territory and the Russian population and a NATO-based system responsible for the protection of NATO allies.It shouldn't be a surprise that NATO can't, of course, outsource the protection of a NATO territory and NATO populations. So now let's focus on what unites us and I do believe that we can find mutually satisfactory solutions to a cooperative approach
The problem is, it means that in the future, interceptor missiles and other missile defense elements may be deployed close to the Russian borders and in adjacent seas. At the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon a year ago, I suggested creating a joint missile defense system in Europe. We suggested that if we have to develop missile defense, it is better to do it together. We suggested making this system sector-based, with each party responsible for the corresponding sector. Moreover, we said we were open to suggestions from our NATO partners and could make necessary adjustments to this layout, as long as its key elements remain intact. And the key element is that Europe does not need new dividing lines. It needs a common security perimeter, with Russia participating in it as an equal partner. I am still convinced that such an approach would offer unique opportunities for Russia and NATO to develop a real strategic partnership, because friction and confrontation in our relations can be replaced with the principles of equality, indivisible security, mutual trust and predictability. Unfortunately, the United States, and later other NATO members, failed to demonstrate serious readiness to take this way. They are not going to take account of our concerns regarding the architecture of the European missile defense system. At least they are not doing it today. They merely tell us that their plans are not aimed against Russia. Leaving aside a discussion of the use of missile defence deployment, it has been clear for some time that there is no possibility of NATO entering into a genuinely cooperative programme with Russia, under which Russia would be a genuine partner. Any BMD system deployed to Europe would remain under NATO control.
This is not an issue that can be looked at in isolation, but is a wider part of relations between the US, NATO and Russia. Other issues intimately bound up in the BMD question include the presence of some 180 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and NATO's insistence that these can only be removed as part of an arms control deal involving the several thousand remaining Russian tactical nukes; the collapse of the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; NATO-Georgia relations; and the new NATO exercises designed to reassure the Baltic States that NATO is able to come to their defence in the unlikely event of war with Russia.
The problem here is Russia's weakness rather than its strength. Russia now places the same reliance on tactical nuclear forces to outweigh a conventional imblanace in NATO's favour as NATO used in the reverse circumstance during the Cold War. In addition,t he Adapted CFE Treaty is seen as no longer meeting current conditions, where NATO heavily outnumbers Russia in conventional forces. The treaty constrains Russia within its own borders, in particular in the Caucasus, where it has a long term insurgency.
President Medvedev announced several actions as a result of the failure of BMD talks. The timing must be seen as a reaction to the US announcement that it is ending compliance with its obligations under the CFE Treaty (see this AP article). These are worth quoting in full:
First, I have instructed the Defense Ministry to immediately activate an early warning radar in Kaliningrad. Second, as part of the Russian aerospace defense program, Russia will urgently strengthen its defensive capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Forces installations.
Third, strategic ballistic missiles coming into the arsenals of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be fitted with advanced missile defense penetration systems and the latest effective warheads.
Fourth, I have ordered the Armed Forces to develop a set of measures that will enable Russia, if necessary, to destroy the data exchange and control centers of the missile defense system. These measures are adequate, effective and cost-efficient.
Fifth, if the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy, along its western and southern borders, advanced offensive systems capable of destroying the European component of the missile defense system. This will include deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Other measures aimed at neutralizing the European component of the US missile defense system will also be prepared and implemented if necessary.
Next, if problems persist, Russia reserves the right to refrain from taking further steps as regards disarmament and arms control. Furthermore, considering that strategic offensive and defensive weapons are closely interrelated, Russia may have sufficient grounds to withdraw from the New START Treaty. Such a possibility is envisaged in the very idea of this treaty. The threat to move Iskander missiles to NATO's borders is most unfortunate and unhelpful. As is the threat to the New START treaty. In truth there is nothing here that will make Russia-NATO or Russia-US relations any better, or contribute to a solution to the BMD problem.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has responded, but his statement is weak. He fails to acknowledge that NATO as a whole (especially the more easterly parts) is simply not ready to work with Russia as a parter, and that in the Baltic States, Poland and elsewhere the majority rather see Russia as a threat to be deterred and countered.
In Russia, it seems for political reasons, the "threat" of NATO BMD is overblown. There is little to no prospect that this 'missile shield' will work, anymore than the systems the US has deployed to date. It will certainly not work against Russian strategic systems, especially if these are now fitted with simple countermeasures as Medvedev has ordered.
Important questions remain unanswered. Is NATO really ready to restart the Cold War just to deploy and expensive and non-functional defence against a largely illusory missile threat?
Does it not make much more sense to actually sit down with Russia as a partner and negotiat a security relationship that makes sense for both? The CFE Treaty, if it is to survive, needs to change to reflect the fact that since 1999 NATO has expanded to Russia's borders and is now the overwhelmingly most powerful military force in the world. Russia needs to recognise that its actions in Georgia, not to mention Chechenya and Dagestan, inspire fear in its other neighbours and it must seek a peaceful resolution of border disputes.
The tiny US nuclear force in Europe should be withdrawn within US borders, and tactical nuclear forces should be part of talks between the US and Russia on all nuclear forces. After all, these tacnukes are at several months readiness, and the threat they were deployed to face no longer exists.
And BMD needs to be put back into its box and left there. It doesn't work, it probably can't ever work, and the damage it is already doing to European security through this quarrel with Russia needs to be undone immediately.
HISTORICAL NOTE:
On 9 March this year in a Press Conference before ministerial meetings, Secretary General Rasmussen said the following, which shows exacty NATO's position. NATO and Russia would operate two completely separate missile defence systems. This position still has not changed, and that is what has caused the Russian pullout. NATO is not offering a partnership, so why would Russia cooperate?
Q: ITAR-TASS News Agency, Denis Dubrovin. Secretary General, a step back from Libya to NATO-Russia cooperation in the area of missile defence. A few days ago our mutual friend James Appathurai has said in Washington that it's totally unacceptable for NATO, the proposals of the sectoral missile defence system in Europe, Russian proposals.So does it mean that we now have more misunderstandings in this area? Or how could you comment on this statement? Thank you very much.ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: Yes, but that statement does not represent a new position. It is actually what has already been stated by NATO leaders already during our meeting in Lisbon. It's well-known that we have initiated a joint analysis as to how we can implement practical cooperation on missile defence. It is a joint analysis.Russia presents her ideas. We present our ideas, and I am quite optimistic that at the end of the day we will find a solution because we are faced with a common security challenge.I would like to stress that we want to pursue a cooperative approach, but we do believe that it is possible to really pursue a cooperative approach through a system which is based on a Russia missile defence system responsible for the protection of Russian territory and the Russian population and a NATO-based system responsible for the protection of NATO allies.It shouldn't be a surprise that NATO can't, of course, outsource the protection of a NATO territory and NATO populations. So now let's focus on what unites us and I do believe that we can find mutually satisfactory solutions to a cooperative approach
Concerns on Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation from Libya
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen Speaking to Press, Nov. 3 (NATO photo)Questions were raised during Secretary General Rasmussen's Press Briefing on November 3
about the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Libya into neighboroughing countries, and even into Gaza. The Secretary General admitted that there were concerns, but said that with the end of Unified Protector, this was nopw a responsibility for Libya, regional countries and individual NATO nations rather than for NATO collectively:
Oana Lungescu: Associated Press.
Q: Yes, Secretary General, just a question on the loose weapons in Libya. As you mentioned the Security Council has already considered this and I understand that there's quite a lot of concern throughout Europe and in other countries that some of these weapons have already been smuggled out through Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa and across Egypt, perhaps to Gaza. Can you comment on that, please? Thank you.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I have no exact information as regards to the possible smuggling of arms, but I would like to remind you that the arms embargo is still in place. We have terminated our Operation Unified Protector, including the enforcement of the arms embargo, but according to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions the arms embargo is still in place and it is a responsibility of individual nations now to enforce the arms embargo, including Libya's neighbours.
And the UN Security Council has also clearly stated that it is a responsibility of the new political authorities in Libya to make sure that all weapons are properly controlled, monitored, secured, and eventually maybe also destroyed, if necessary.Further questioned as to whether the new Libyan government is able to prevent the flow of weapons from Libya, he added:
Oana Lungescu: Defence News at the back.
Q: Secretary General, could you just confirm I've got it right on Libya that on the arms embargo, preventing proliferation of weapons then is just down to the regional countries? And do you... my follow-up question to that is, can you be confident that they're capable of doing that work alone? And thirdly, are there any circumstances in which NATO would help ensure that weapons are not crossing borders?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: The enforcement of the arms embargo is not just for Libya's neighbours or countries in the region. The arms embargo is still in place according to the United Nations mandate, so it is a responsibility of all members of the United Nations to enforce the arms embargo, including NATO Allies.
As I said, NATO as such has terminated Operation Unified Protector, so it's not for NATO any longer to enforce the arms embargo as an alliance, but it's still the responsibility of individual Allies to implement the United Nations resolution as far as the arms embargo is concerned.
And upon request from the new authorities in Libya, it is, of course, possible for individual nations, including NATO Allies, to assist the new authorities in Libya. That follows from international law that the legitimate government of a country can ask other countries to help enforce, for instance, an arms embargo or control arms smuggling or whatever.
So, I would not exclude the possibility that individual Allies and individual nations in general can help the new authorities in Libya on their request. There are indeed very serious concerns that the outcome of Libya's short civil war will be bad for the region. Having gone far beyond a 'responsibility to protect' mandate in supporting the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime, NATO has some responsibility to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation to conflict zones in Africa, or to terrorist organisations.
Two real concerns currently exist. It is estimated that thousands of anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS) which had been stockpiled by Gadhafi are now flowing out of Libya to the south. Two such weapons were used against an Israeli aircraft in East Africa in 2002, although the plane in question was not shot down. With thousands available on the black market now, the risk dramatically increases to civilian aircraft in the region. There are reports of RPGs and SA-7 MANPADS reaching Gaza (see here for example).
Secondly, Tuareg tribes in northern Mali and Niger sent many fighters to support Gadhafi and these men are now returning to their own countries much better armed than before. A Tuareg rebellion in Mali was only ended in 2009, and there are reports (see this from AP for example) that Tuareg rebels are preparing a new insurrection against Bamako, fuelled by Libyan arms.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of NATO's engagement in Libya over the past six months, it is clear that the Alliance and its member states must act proactively to assist the new Libyan government in dealing with this threat to state and human security. The NTC is not in charge of Libya at present, the 300 plus militia groups that actually fought the civil war are. The situation in the country is fragile. If NATO is really interested in protecting civilians then stemming the flood of SALW both within and out of Libya is a must.
about the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Libya into neighboroughing countries, and even into Gaza. The Secretary General admitted that there were concerns, but said that with the end of Unified Protector, this was nopw a responsibility for Libya, regional countries and individual NATO nations rather than for NATO collectively:
Oana Lungescu: Associated Press.
Q: Yes, Secretary General, just a question on the loose weapons in Libya. As you mentioned the Security Council has already considered this and I understand that there's quite a lot of concern throughout Europe and in other countries that some of these weapons have already been smuggled out through Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa and across Egypt, perhaps to Gaza. Can you comment on that, please? Thank you.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I have no exact information as regards to the possible smuggling of arms, but I would like to remind you that the arms embargo is still in place. We have terminated our Operation Unified Protector, including the enforcement of the arms embargo, but according to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions the arms embargo is still in place and it is a responsibility of individual nations now to enforce the arms embargo, including Libya's neighbours.
And the UN Security Council has also clearly stated that it is a responsibility of the new political authorities in Libya to make sure that all weapons are properly controlled, monitored, secured, and eventually maybe also destroyed, if necessary.Further questioned as to whether the new Libyan government is able to prevent the flow of weapons from Libya, he added:
Oana Lungescu: Defence News at the back.
Q: Secretary General, could you just confirm I've got it right on Libya that on the arms embargo, preventing proliferation of weapons then is just down to the regional countries? And do you... my follow-up question to that is, can you be confident that they're capable of doing that work alone? And thirdly, are there any circumstances in which NATO would help ensure that weapons are not crossing borders?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: The enforcement of the arms embargo is not just for Libya's neighbours or countries in the region. The arms embargo is still in place according to the United Nations mandate, so it is a responsibility of all members of the United Nations to enforce the arms embargo, including NATO Allies.
As I said, NATO as such has terminated Operation Unified Protector, so it's not for NATO any longer to enforce the arms embargo as an alliance, but it's still the responsibility of individual Allies to implement the United Nations resolution as far as the arms embargo is concerned.
And upon request from the new authorities in Libya, it is, of course, possible for individual nations, including NATO Allies, to assist the new authorities in Libya. That follows from international law that the legitimate government of a country can ask other countries to help enforce, for instance, an arms embargo or control arms smuggling or whatever.
So, I would not exclude the possibility that individual Allies and individual nations in general can help the new authorities in Libya on their request. There are indeed very serious concerns that the outcome of Libya's short civil war will be bad for the region. Having gone far beyond a 'responsibility to protect' mandate in supporting the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime, NATO has some responsibility to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation to conflict zones in Africa, or to terrorist organisations.
Two real concerns currently exist. It is estimated that thousands of anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS) which had been stockpiled by Gadhafi are now flowing out of Libya to the south. Two such weapons were used against an Israeli aircraft in East Africa in 2002, although the plane in question was not shot down. With thousands available on the black market now, the risk dramatically increases to civilian aircraft in the region. There are reports of RPGs and SA-7 MANPADS reaching Gaza (see here for example).
Secondly, Tuareg tribes in northern Mali and Niger sent many fighters to support Gadhafi and these men are now returning to their own countries much better armed than before. A Tuareg rebellion in Mali was only ended in 2009, and there are reports (see this from AP for example) that Tuareg rebels are preparing a new insurrection against Bamako, fuelled by Libyan arms.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of NATO's engagement in Libya over the past six months, it is clear that the Alliance and its member states must act proactively to assist the new Libyan government in dealing with this threat to state and human security. The NTC is not in charge of Libya at present, the 300 plus militia groups that actually fought the civil war are. The situation in the country is fragile. If NATO is really interested in protecting civilians then stemming the flood of SALW both within and out of Libya is a must.
